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Zusammenfassung 
Seit Jahrhunderten erforschen Philosophen, wie Menschen denken und welche 
Denkfähigkeiten sie besitzen. Außerdem versuchen sie herauszufinden, wie Menschen ihr 
Denken einsetzen können und sollten, um ein friedliches und fruchtbares Zusammenleben zu 
erreichen. Dabei entstanden die Disziplinen ‚theoretische‘ und ‚praktische‘ Philosophie, 
wobei sich die erste hauptsächlich mit Epistemologie, und die zweite mit Ethik und Moral 
beschäftigt. Philosophen wie Kant entwickelten ihre Theorien über praktisches Denken oft 
aufbauend auf ihren Theorien zu theoretischem Denken, und präsentierten so relativ ‚all-
umfassende‘ Theorien. Im letzten Jahrhundert begannen auch die Naturwissenschaften 
praktische und theoretische Denkprozesse des Menschen zu erforschen. Im Unterschied zur 
philosophischen Forschung, in der oft ‚Gedankenexperimente‘ eingesetzt wurden, nutzten 
psychologische oder neurowissenschaftliche Forschung Verhaltensexperimente, und die 
Modellannahmen die postuliert wurden, beziehen sich entweder auf theoretisches oder 
praktisches Denken. Gegenwärtige Theorien menschlichen Denkens, die auf experimentellen 
Ergebnissen basieren, sind unter anderem ‚Zwei-Prozess‘ Modelle. Sie werden ‚Zwei-
Prozess‘ Modelle genannt, da in ihnen ‚rationale‘ und ‚emotional/intuitive‘ kognitive Prozesse 
als Grundlage des Denkens angenommen werden. Solche Erklärungsansätze gibt es sowohl 
im Bereich der theoretischen als auch der praktischen Denkforschung. Allerdings wird zu 
beiden Denkbereichen meist getrennt geforscht und dementsprechend gelten die jeweiligen 
Modelle auch nur für theoretisches oder praktisches Denken. Daher war die Idee für die 
vorliegende Arbeit, diese beiden Forschungsbereiche gemeinsam mittels 
Verhaltensexperimenten und bildgebenden Verfahren zu untersuchen, um Evidenzen dafür zu 
bekommen, dass beide Denkbereiche auf ‚rationalen‘ und ‚emotional/intuitiven‘ Prozessen 
basieren. Sollte es Evidenzen dafür geben, wären wohl ‚Zwei-Prozess‘ Modelle der beste 
Erklärungsansatz für beide Denkdomänen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen wurden drei 
Vorstudien und fünf Experimente durchgeführt, die von Verhaltensexperimenten mit 
„normalen“ Personen, über Extremgruppenvergleiche (z.B., hoch-intelligente vs. 
durchschnittlich-intelligente Personen) bis hin zu bildgebenden Verfahren reichten. Die 
Ergebnisse dieser Experimente liefern erste Evidenzen für die eben getroffenen Annahmen. 
Theoretisches und praktisches Denken scheinen auf ‚rationalen‘ und ‚emotional/intuitiven‘ 
kognitiven Prozessen zu beruhen, die wiederum mit Aktivierungen in fronto-temporo-
parietalen Gehirnstrukturen assoziiert sind. Die Ergebnisse werden im Rahmen der aktuellen 
Forschung zu theoretischem und praktischem Denken interpretiert und diskutiert.  
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Abstract 
For hundreds of years, philosophers explored how humans reason and what reasoning abilities 
humans possess. They were also interested at how these reasoning abilities could and should 
be applied to reach a peaceful and flourishing coexistence. The two sub-disciplines 
investigating these issues are theoretical and practical philosophy. Epistemology is the main 
research domain of the former, whereas morals and ethics represent the main research field of 
the latter. Philosophers like Kant often derived their theories on practical reasoning from their 
assumptions on theoretical reasoning, trying to propose an ‘all-encompassing’ theory. Since 
the last century, even the field of natural sciences investigated on practical and theoretical 
human reasoning processes. In contrast to philosophy, disciplines like neuroscience or 
psychology used behavioral experiments instead of ‘thought experiments’, and the models 
proposed often refer either to practical or to theoretical reasoning. Actual proposals derived 
from experimental findings to explain human reasoning often suggest ‘dual-process’ accounts. 
‘Dual-process’ models contain ‘rational’ and ‘emotional/intuitive’ cognitive processes that are 
assumed to be involved in human reasoning. Such assumptions have been made in the areas 
of theoretical and practical reasoning research. However, these reasoning domains have 
mainly been investigated in isolation and the respective ‘dual-process’ accounts thus refer to 
either theoretical or practical reasoning. Therefore, the idea of the current thesis being 
presented here, is to investigate theoretical and practical reasoning combined, applying 
behavioral and brain imaging experiments to provide evidence that both reasoning domains 
are similarly based on ‘rational’ and ‘emotional/intuitive’ processes. If such evidence could be 
found, ‘dual-process’ models should account for both of these reasoning domains. To reach 
this aim, three pre-studies and five experiments were conducted ranging from behavioral 
experiments with “normal” participants over extreme groups (i.e., persons with superior 
intelligence as compared to persons with average intelligence) to brain imaging techniques. 
The results reveal first hand evidences supporting the above assumptions. Theoretical and 
practical reasoning seem to require ‘rational’ and ‘emotional/intuitive’ cognitive processes 
based on activations in a fronto-temporo-parietal network in the brain. These results and 
further findings will be interpreted and discussed within the context of the current research on 
theoretical and practical reasoning. 
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1. Introduction 
For hundreds of years, philosophers have tried to unlock the basis of human ‘eudaimonia’ 
(from the Greek, often translated as happiness, felicitousness, bliss, and the like), the basis of 
a peaceful, flourishing life (e.g., Stoa, see Weinkauf, 2001; Plato, see Wolf, 1996; Aristotle, 
2002). To accomplish such a “research” goal, two main sub-disciplines developed dealing 
with the important issues involved: theoretical and practical philosophy. 
Theoretical philosophy deals with the understanding of how humans’ reason, or at 
least, what reasoning abilities and capacities humans possess. The main sub-discipline of 
theoretical philosophy is ‘epistemology’ (i.e., the study of knowledge and justified belief). 
Thereby, a main question is how true knowledge and justified beliefs can be achieved, or how 
knowledge can be evaluated as true and beliefs as justified (Sandkühler, 1999). 
Practical philosophy on the other hand, is concerned with the ways on how humans 
should reason to act accordingly or to evaluate the actions of others as appropriate or 
inappropriate. Practical philosophy therefore asks what kind of actions and behaviors are 
adequate and useful to be able to attain ‘eudaimonia’. The main sub-discipline of practical 
philosophy is ethics dealing with morality and morals (Sandkühler, 1999). 
Many philosophers contributed different theories in both theoretical and practical 
philosophy. The ideas concerning ‘how we should live and act’ (i.e., ethics/morality) were of 
particular interest, not only for philosophers but by many. The basis of the reasoning 
processes and mechanisms involved in practical reasoning however, were often derived from 
the theoretical assumptions developed before. Thus, theoretical and practical philosophy are 
often strongly intertwined. 
Nowadays, theoretical and practical reasoning is not only investigated in the domain 
of philosophy, but also in the areas of experimental research like psychology or neuroscience. 
However, many of the tasks applied in experiments are derived from philosophy and often 
date back to Aristotle’s time (cp., Manktelow, 2004). A main difference between the former 
philosophical theories and actual empirically based proposals is that theoretical and practical 
reasoning are now investigated separately and that the former reciprocal correlation between 
theoretical and practical reasoning seem to have been shelved. Thus, one of the purposes of 
this current project is to recombine theoretical and practical reasoning research within a single 
experimental design. 
The methods used in theoretical philosophy, and consecutively also applied in 
practical philosophy, were often based on logic. Logic in turn was thought to correspond to 
rationality or as Kant (1781/1998) put it, ‘pure reason’. However, for the purposes of clarity, 
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Kant (1781/1998) understood logic as the science of the necessary laws of reason thus he 
denoted that logic tells us how to reason, not based on empirical (i.e., subjective or 
psychological) principles, but rather on objective (i.e., ‘a priori’) principles. Therefore, Kant’s 
term of logic and the use of logic referred to the mere form of the reasoning process, 
independent of any kind of content. The same holds for the sub-discipline of ‘formal logic’ (in 
the following referred to as ‘logic’). Logic delivers a formal system on how to reason 
correctly, often using axiomatic propositions. Today, logic is understood as the system 
proposing the principles of drawing valid inferences based on mere formal propositions, 
statements or judgments (Tugendhat & Wolf, 2004). Thereby, making a deductive inference 
means inferring a conclusion from a diversity of given premises (i.e., 
propositions/statements). The opposite method is inductive inference (Sandkühler, 1999). 
Deductions mean inferences drawn from the general to the particular, while inductive 
inferences mean general conclusions derived from statements about particular cases. 
However, an inductive inference is insecure and could be wrong. Deductive inferences (also 
often labeled deductive reasoning or logical reasoning) on the other hand, lead to valid 
statements/conclusions. A special relationship between the given premises and the conclusion 
therefore, exists: If the premises are true, then the conclusion is true (Hoyningen-Huene, 
2006). Note that there is no assertion about the premises, which might be wrong. However, if 
the premises are true, then, the conclusion is also true, given that the deduction is valid. This 
refers to the fact that the validity of an inference is independent of the truth status of the 
premises or conclusion. Drawing a valid inference depends not on the content, but only on the 
logical form of the argument. An inference may therefore be valid, even though the 
conclusion is not true (i.e., false). 
As mentioned above, philosophers also applied the method of logic in practical 
philosophy. Early approaches in ethics were, for example, the virtue theories by Plato (see 
Wolf, 1996) or Aristotle (2002), the founder of (formal) logic. They proposed living in 
accordance with our nature as a desirable goal, including development of virtues and 
prevention of vices. The idea of living only according to our “god”-given nature may seem 
antiquated; however, it provided ‘guidelines’ for human behavior. Other theories focused on 
emotions as the basis for practical reasoning and decision making processes (emotive ethics; 
e.g., Shaftesbury, 1711/1963; Hutcheson, 1755/1968; Hume, 1748/2002, 1751/2003; Smith, 
1759/ 2004). These concepts were much closer to current research findings (e.g., Haidt, 
2001). The same goes with exponents (utilitarianism/consequentialism; e.g., Bentham, 
1789/2007; Mill 1863/1994) stressing the outcomes of the actions themselves instead of the 
Introduction 
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agents involved (e.g., Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). Finally, one of 
the best-known points has been made by Kant, who wanted to relieve us from our self-
inflicted immaturity. He seemed to be the first to systematically explore the ‘pure’ (rational) 
reasoning abilities which humans possess, and based thereupon, how we should reason and 
consequently act (Kant, 1781/1998, 1785/2000, 1797/2007, 1788/2008).1
As was mentioned earlier in the history-related part of the introduction, main research 
interests in philosophy as well as in the natural sciences had tried to explore human reasoning, 
both in the theoretical and the practical domain. Thereby, a fundamental issue concerns the 
reasoning processes involved in either of these reasoning domains. The current thesis was 
inspired by the idea laid out in the original philosophical research to explore these reasoning 
domains in combination. However, it is not to deduce practical from theoretical reasoning, but 
to investigate the cognitive processes presumably involved in both, thus common to 
theoretical and practical reasoning, through the application of experimental methods. 
Therefore, the following introduction will report research findings on theoretical and practical 
reasoning, utilizing behavioral and brain imaging experiments. The findings then shall be 
integrated to derive the leading research idea and to present the developed experimental 
paradigm used for the experiments conducted within this thesis. 
 His ‘categorical 
imperative’, as basis for a life according to duties, is the most famous statement aimed to 
come up with a guide to human behavior. It is important to note that Kant had derived his 
assumptions from ‘pure rationality’ which humans should apply in reasoning. This is called 
deontology or deontological ethics. 
Since logic plays such an important role in philosophy and in experimental researches, 
it is only helpful to introduce some terms used, clarifications, and principles of ‘classical’ 
(formal) logic. 
 
1.1 Basic principles of logic 
The starting points in logic are simple statements/propositions that could be true or false. 
Since logic deals with symbols, abstracting from the content, one may use ‘A’ and ‘B’ for 
statements2
                                                 
1 Kant started with the ‘critique of pure reason’ investigating our ’pure’ logical reasoning abilities before 
introducing the ‘critique of practical reason’ and the ‘metaphysics of morals’ as basis of morality. 
, and the abbreviations ‘T’ for true and ‘F’ for false. ‘T’ and ‘F’ are truth values in 
logic, indicating that a statement could be true or false, but nothing else (“tertium non datur”, 
2 Normally, lower case letters are used for propositional logic. However, to stay consistent with the following 
experiments, where upper case letters are used, these are accordingly applied here. 
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from Latin: there is no third, cp., Hoyningen-Huene, 2006).3
A part of logic, namely ‘propositional logic’ (also called ‘junctor logic’, or ‘sentential 
logic’, or ‘statement logic’), deals with these extensional sentential connectives. Symbols (i.e., 
junctors) applied to connect statements/propositions are for example ‘˄’ as truth functional 
‘and’ (i.e., conjunction), ‘˅’ as truth functional ‘or’ (i.e., disjunction), and ‘¬’ as truth 
functional ‘not’ (i.e., negation). A simple method to infer the truth value of the overall 
statement from the partial statements with respect to their ‘truth functional junctor are truth 
tables, which allow the determination of the truth value of a sentential connective statement. 
These truth tables show all potential truth values of the partial statements followed by the 
resulting truth values for the sentential connective as a whole. In Table 1 below, the potential 
truth values for ‘A’ and ‘B’, and the resulting truth values according to conjunction, 
disjunction, and negation are depicted. 
 Such statements do not need to 
stand alone (e.g., ‘A’), but could be combined (e.g., ‘A’ and ‘B’). Combining different 
statements could lead to extensional sentential connectives. Extensional sentential connectives 
are also called ‘truth functional’ connectives and combine two partial statements to an overall 
statement, whereby the truth value of the resulting overall statement is unambiguously defined 
by the truth values of the partial statements (cp., Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). Extensional in the 
domain of logic signifies to abstract from the meaning (cp., Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). 
 
Table 1: Truth table showing potential truth values for ‘A’ and ‘B’ as well as the resulting truth values of the 
conjunction (‘˄’) and the disjunction (‘˅ ’) of both, with ‘T’ as true and ‘F’ as false. The truth table for negation 
(‘¬’) is shown separately below, since this table only contains two columns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite these “simple” combinations of statements, even more elaborate sentential 
connectives are used. These deal with two more junctors that both refer to statements 
connected via an “If…, then…” sentence. The first part of this sentence is called ‘antecedent’, 
the second one ‘consequent’, and the whole statement is referred to as ‘conditional’ (cp., 
Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). The first junctor connecting ‘A’ and ‘B’ is ‘→’, called ‘material 
                                                 
3 Note that this applies to binary logic, which is important for the current work, but also other logic systems 
exist. 
A B A ˄ B A ˅ B 
T T T T 
T F F T 
F T F T 
F F F F 
A ¬B 
T F 
F T 
Introduction 
5 
 
implication, the second junctor connecting ‘A’ and ‘B’ is ‘↔’, named ‘material equivalence’ 
or ‘biconditional’. The truth tables for both of these possible “If…, then…” connections are 
presented in Table 2 below. Note that both of these forms can be rewritten applying negation 
and conjunction, thus simplifying the evaluation of their respective truth values. 
 
Table 2: Truth table with the antecedent ‘A’, the consequent ‘B’, and the potential truth values ‘T’ for true and 
‘F’ for false; on the left side is the conditional (A  B) with the material implication (); right side shows the 
biconditional with the material equivalence (↔) ; (‘¬’) as negation and (‘˄’) as conjunction. 
 
A B 
A  B 
or 
¬ (A ˄ ¬ B) 
 A B 
A ↔ B 
or 
(A → B) ˄ (B →A) 
T T T  T T T 
T F F  T F F 
F T T  F T F 
F F T  F F T 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, logicians often use the terms ‘iff’, or the connective ‘if and only 
if’ to denote a ‘material equivalence’ instead of a ‘material implication’ (cp., Manktelow, 
2004). As could be seen, the truths table of the ‘material implication’ shows that it is not the 
case that ‘A’ and simultaneously ‘not B’. Thus, the only false truth value results if ‘A’ is true 
but concurrently ‘B’ is false. In contrast, the ‘material equivalence’ denotes that ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
are equivalent interchangeably. ‘A’ implies ‘B’ and vice versa. Thus, either both statements 
are true, or both statements are false, but it cannot be the case that ‘A’ is false and ‘B’ is true 
or ‘B’ is false and ‘A’ is true. 
Now, the basics of logic are set and the presentation will show how deductive 
inferences can be drawn from these ‘simple’ statements. 
 
1.2 Deductive inferences 
1.2.1 Conditionals 
The last section reported the basics of logic, especially of single statements/propositions and 
their connections. It has been shown how truth values of single statements and sentential 
connectives could be determined. These basics of logic can now be applied to deductive 
reasoning. In philosophy, deductive inferences are also drawn by using the above mentioned 
principles as well as further deduction rules to draw valid conclusions from given premises. A 
form of deductive reasoning encompasses the conditional sentences reported above and is also 
known as conditional reasoning (cp., Manktelow, 2004). This form of inference consists of 
the conditional “If A, then B” sentence, then also labeled ‘major premise’, a second sentence, 
named ‘minor premise’, and a third sentence, the ‘conclusion’ (cp., Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). 
Introduction 
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The minor premise is an affirmation of the ‘A’ or the ‘B’ part of the conditional sentence, or a 
negation of the ‘A’ or ‘B’ part of the first sentence. The third sentence, the conclusion, is then 
derived from the first two sentences. Formally, such a deductive inference is written as 
follows. 
 
If A, then B. (first premise) 
A.  (second premise) 
B.  (conclusion 
 
Above, the truth values of the two possible “If…, then…” sentences were described. If a 
second premise is now introduced, which could represent four possible assertions of the ’if’ or 
‘then’ parts of the conditional (i.e., ‘A’, ‘¬A’, ‘B’, ‘¬B’), it seems as if eight possible 
conclusions could be drawn. The question is however, whether these inferences are valid or 
invalid. See Table 3 for an illustration of these possible assertions of the minor premise 
combined with the two conditional sentence connections. 
 
Table 3: Conditional sentences with ‘material implication’ or with ‘material equivalence’ as major premise and 
the four possible assertions of the minor premise. 
 
 material implication/conditional material equivalence/biconditional 
major premise A → B A ↔ B 
minor premise A ¬A B ¬B A ¬A B ¬B 
 
As it turns out under the ‘material equivalence’ condition, four inferences can be drawn 
rendering the resulting conclusion always valid. In contrast, under the ‘material implication’ 
condition, only two inferences lead to valid conclusions, whereas the other two inferences 
lead to invalid conclusions. This is due to the fact that the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
interchangeably equivalent in the former case, but not in the latter. Interchangeably means 
that ‘If A, then B.’ can be rewritten as ‘If B, then A.’, since these terms are ‘equivalent’. In 
contrast, under ‘material implication’ ‘A’ implies ‘B’, but not vice versa. Valid inferences are 
labeled with Latin names, i.e. ‘Modus Ponens’ and ‘Modus Tollens’ (for illustration see Table 
4). 
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Table 4: Conditional inferences and validity with major premise, minor premise, and conclusion for ‘material 
implication’ and ‘material equivalence’ (adapted from Manktelow, 2004). 
 
 inference type 
material 
implication 
material 
equivalence 
Major 
premise 
If A, then B.    
Minor 
premise 
A. 
Modus Ponens (MP)   
(Affirmation of the antecedent) 
B. / valid B. / valid 
Not A. Denial of the antecedent (DA) Invalid Not B. / valid 
B. Affirmation of the consequent (AC) Invalid A. / valid 
Not B. 
Modus Tollens (MT) 
(Denial of the consequent) 
Not A. / valid Not B. 
 
Another way to illustrate the relationship between the ‘If’ part of a conditional sentence and 
the ‘Then’ part differentiated according to ‘material implication’ and ‘material equivalence’ 
are ‘Euler Circles’. Here, the position of the circles represents the relationship and the 
labeling of the circles indicates the ‘If’ and the ‘Then’ parts of the conditional sentence. Note 
that the size or shape of an Euler circle is not relevant. The significance of the circles depends 
on their potential overlap (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Euler circle representations for ‘material implication’ and ‘material equivalence’ of conditional 
sentences (adapted from Manktelow, 2004). 
 
This graphical illustration representing the two different readings of conditional sentences 
seems to provide an easier way to infer correctly as to which inferences are valid or invalid, 
given a ‘material implication’ or a ‘material equivalence’. Problems might occur when 
someone does not know truth tables and/or Euler circles, and when it is not clear whether the 
presented “If…, then…” clause represents a ‘material implication’ or a ‘material 
equivalence’: In fact, concerning studies with conditionals state that “[…] there is still no 
complete universally accepted account of its [‘If’] use.” (Manktelow, 2004, p. 37). The 
following section on empirical studies of conditional reasoning will discuss this issue more 
a) Material implication A→B  b) Material equivalence A↔B 
B  
A       B 
A 
Introduction 
8 
 
elaborately. However, since many studies on human reasoning also applied syllogisms, a short 
overview on syllogisms shall be given beforehand. 
 
1.2.2 Syllogisms 
Besides conditional sentences, other forms of deductive inferences are called syllogisms. 
Originally based on the ‘syllogistic’ of Aristotle (Sandkühler, 1999), containing quantifiers 
like “all”, “some”, or “none” they differ from conditional deductions wherein a new 
proposition (i.e., conclusion) is drawn from two propositions (i.e., premises; cp. Sandkühler, 
1999). In the current version of ‘categorical syllogistic’, the two premises encompass a middle 
term ‘B’, not occurring in the conclusion, and two end terms ‘A’ and ‘C’. An example for a 
valid syllogistic inference is shown below. 
 
     All A are B. (first premise) 
     All B are C. (second premise) 
     All A are C. (conclusion) 
 
Now, it can be seen more clearly that the conclusion results from the relation between the two 
end terms ‘A’ and ‘C’, whereas the middle term ‘B’ is eliminated. The different quantifiers 
referred above result in four basic expressions in the Aristotelian logic, which are shown in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: The quantified statements applied in syllogisms of Aristotelian logic (adapted from Manktelow, 2004). 
 
A All A are B. Universal Affirmative 
I Some A are B. Particular Affirmative 
E No A are B. Universal Negative 
O Some A are not B. Particular Negative 
 
These single instances of the four basic quantifiers are the starting basis of the syllogistic 
arguments, which consist of two premises and a conclusion, and are known as ‘moods’. As 
with the conditional sentences referred to above, there are different potential combinations if 
only the premises are taken into consideration. The relation or ‘figure’ as Johnson-Laird 
(1983) labeled it could vary according to the arrangement of the premises (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Syllogistic figures according to their relation of A, B, C in the first and second premise (adapted from 
Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
 
First premise A – B B – A A – B B – A 
Second premise B – C C – B C – B B – C 
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According to the explanations by Manktelow (2004), a total of 512 valid syllogisms can be 
constructed, whereas Aristotle only allowed 14 valid syllogisms. The reason for this huge 
difference is the admittance of ‘existential presuppositions’ and whether “weak” conclusions 
are accepted or not (cp. Manktelow, 2004). Since these issues are far beyond the scope of the 
current work, only an illustration for one statement of the first premise will be shown using 
Euler circles (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Euler circles for the first premise of a syllogistic statement ‘I’ “Some A are B” (adapted from 
Manktelow, 2004). 
 
The examples given above with the Euler circles show potentially different readings of a 
“Some A are B.” statement, indicating why various numbers of valid conclusions are possible 
with the four syllogistic figures. 
Philosophers further analyzed, discussed, and developed the issues concerning ‘logic’ 
and ‘logical reasoning’, but an interesting question still remains: how and whether ‘normal’ 
people who are not trained in logic, are able to reason ‘logically’ or to deal with deductive 
reasoning problems. Since the late 1950s, the domain of ‘cognitive psychology’ began the 
investigation on human reasoning abilities and performances in numerous experiments 
applying various reasoning problems (cp., Manktelow, 2004). A few of the major findings 
will be reported in the succeeding part. 
 
1.3 Behavioral experiments on theoretical reasoning 
Experimental research is often concerned with the investigation of three different forms of 
deductive reasoning problems (e.g., Knauff, 2009a): conditional reasoning in the domain of 
propositional logic (using conditional sentence structures like ‘If…, then...’), syllogistic 
reasoning in the domain of predicate logic (using quantifiers like ‘all’, ‘some’, or ‘none’), and 
relational reasoning (using n-place relations like ‘bigger/smaller’ or ‘to the right/left of’). 
Here, the focus will almost be exclusively on conditional reasoning problems since this kind 
of reasoning tasks were used in all of the experiments which shall be reported later on. 
However, a few experimental results reported in the following presentation also refer to 
syllogistic reasoning problems which were introduced earlier. 
 
  A 
 
   B 
A B  
A    B B A 
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The different versions of deductive inferences utilizing conditional sentence structures 
have already been reported in their abstract version above. These deductive inference 
problems were used in many experiments in the investigation of human reasoning processes 
(Manktelow, 2004). The task of the participants is to judge the validity of a given conclusion, 
or to derive the conclusion by themselves. It seems important to denote again that the validity 
of these four inference schemas does not depend on the potential truth status of the premises, 
but depends on their formal logical relation embedded within the whole problem. This is 
important to keep in mind with studies about reasoning, taking into account that everyday 
reasoning is not content-free or is not dealing with abstract problems. Thus, research on 
human reasoning abilities addresses both the ability to deal with abstract (i.e., content-free) 
problems as well as with meaningful ones (cp., Knauff, 2009a). Compared to processes 
involved in reasoning about abstract “materials”, it seems more relevant to understand the 
reasoning processes and capacities that humans access when handling content-laden 
“material”, especially when it comes to contents that are relevant in everyday tasks. To 
illustrate the difference between abstract and meaningful material in detail, formal logical 
content-free (i.e., abstract) versions of the four deductive inference problems as well as 
content-filled examples are shown in Table 7 below according to the ‘material implication’. 
 
Table 7: The four inference schemas of conditional reasoning (adapted from Knauff, 2007). 
 
Inference schema Logical validity Example with content 
MP, Modus Ponens (affirmation of antecedent) 
 
If A, then B. 
A.  
B. 
valid 
 
 
If it rains, the street is wet. 
It rains. 
The street is wet. 
AC, affirmation of consequent 
 
If A, then B. 
B. 
A. 
invalid 
 
 
If it rains, the street is wet. 
The street is wet. 
It rains. 
DA, denial of antecedent 
 
If A, then B. 
¬ A. 
¬ B. 
invalid 
 
 
If it rains, the street is wet. 
It does not rain. 
The street is not wet. 
MT, Modus Ponens (denial of consequent) 
 
If A, then B. 
¬ B. 
¬ A. 
valid 
 
 
If it rains, the street is wet. 
The street is not wet. 
It does not rain. 
MP and MT are logically valid inferences; AC and DA are logical invalid inferences; ¬ = represents the logical symbol for negation 
and is equivalent to “not". 
 
The validity/invalidity of the conclusions of these four inferences (see e.g., ‘Modus 
Ponens’ or ‘Denial of the Antecedent’ above) could be shown with the symbols and deduction 
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rules of logic. Here, the deductive inference will be explained with the content-filled 
reasoning problems illustrating more “natural” reasoning. The first problem seems to be easy: 
‘If it rains, the street is wet.’; ‘It rains.’ The antecedent proposes that raining leads to the 
consequence of a wet street. Since ‘rain’ is given as second premise, the consequence matches 
the precondition to be fulfilled, thus the conclusion of a wet street is valid. An explanation for 
the invalid conclusion of the second inference schema could be circumstances other than 
raining caused the street to be wet. Thus, the conclusion is false. For the third problem, one 
might assume that the street could be wet, although it did not rain. The main point is, the 
antecedent only says that ‘IF IT RAINS’, something special follows. The antecedent says 
nothing about a potential consequence if it does not rain at all. Vice versa, the antecedent 
proposes no consequence at all ‘if it DOES NOT rain’. In contrast, concerning the latter case 
(the MT) an explanation might be given as follows. The antecedent proposes the consequent, 
thus, what must happen if it rains. This means, the consequence necessarily follows the 
antecedent. However, the second premise states that the consequence is not fulfilled. Since 
there is a strong relation between antecedent and consequent, one could assume that no wet 
street means not raining. This means that it could not be that the consequence does not appear, 
but that the antecedent is given. This would violate the sense of an ‘If…, then…’ connection, 
also in a colloquial sense, or even better, in a general understanding of such a clause. To sum 
up, the main point about drawing a deductive inference in achieving a logically valid 
conclusion is that a conclusion is always valid if no counter examples exist. 
The table above illustrated content-filled deductive inference problems used in 
reasoning experiments. One can imagine that persons not educated to be logicians might draw 
conclusions from the premises that are based on semantics rather than logic. That seems to 
imply that these persons might fail to draw logically correct conclusions.4
                                                 
4 Note that a conclusion follows valid (i.e., necessary) or not from the given premises, but participants dealing in 
experiments with deductive reasoning problems can give correct or incorrect answers. 
 Another point 
might be that persons do not interpret a conditional sentence as ‘material implication’, but as 
‘material equivalence’, thus evaluating all presented conclusions as valid. Therefore, the 
question is how participants in experiments on deductive reasoning deal with reasoning 
problems and whether there are differences in the performances between the different 
inference schemas (i.e., MP, MT, DA, and AC). Indeed, many experiments revealed that 
persons have difficulties in handling deductive inference problems (cp., Evans, Newstead, & 
Byrne, 1993). Evans et al. (1993) summarize the results of diverse studies in the investigation 
of abstract reasoning problems indicating that participants show differences in performance 
Introduction 
12 
 
and difficulties faced in these tasks. Participants had nearly no problems with the MP (89 – 
100 % correct), more problems with the MT (41 – 81 % correct), and much more difficulties 
with the invalid versions of AC (23 – 75 % correct) and DA (17 – 73 % correct) (Evans et al., 
1993). Manktelow (2004) refers to this review as pointing to the wide variation in the 
acceptance of the different inferences, but also presents weighted average frequencies with 
96.6 % correct answers for the MP, 60.2 % for the MT, 39.6 % for the DA, and 39.5 % for the 
AC (cp., Manktelow, 2004). Also, Manktelow denotes the fact that we ‘normally’ do not 
reason about such content-free problems. Thus, the interesting question is, whether or not 
content-based reasoning problems are solved better. Furthermore, it is of great interest as to 
which factors cause errors during the reasoning process, which cognitive mechanisms guide 
reasoning, and additionally, not only whether or not content and background knowledge 
influence reasoning but also what kind of content plays a critical role in these processes 
(Knauff, 2007). Therefore, many experiments applying different tasks including deductive 
reasoning problems have been conducted in order to explore these factors (cp., Manktelow, 
2004). 
One of the best-known experimental paradigms in investigating deductive reasoning is 
the Wason Selection Task (WST, Wason, 1966). It was one of the first tests used to explore 
not only the abstract version (Figure 3), but also content effects in deductive reasoning. In the 
original abstract version, participants are shown a conditional sentence ‘‘If there is a vowel on 
one side of the card, then there is an even number on the other side’’ and four cards 
subsequently (Figure 3). The cards have a visible number or letter on the front side which 
corresponds to the four possibilities of the second premise (i.e., ‘A’, ‘not A’, ‘B’, ‘not B’) 
explained above. The back side of the cards also contains a number or a letter which is not 
visible to the participant. Participants are instructed that they are allowed to turn over the 
cards to test whether the rule (i.e., the conditional sentence) is true or false. This kind of 
reasoning task corresponds to the four inference schemas reported above and a correct 
solution would consist of drawing the valid inferences MP and MT. According to the cards 
presented, the cards with the “E” and the “3” had to be turned over. 
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Figure 3: The Wason Selection Task (WST). The participants have to verify the rule ‘‘If there is a vowel on one 
side of the card, then there is an even number on the other side’’. The visible letters and numbers on the card 
correspond to the four possible propositions A, ¬A, B, and ¬B. Participants were allowed to turn the cards and 
falsify the rule, thus evaluating the validity of the given conditional rule. 
 
The WST has been repeated many times in this abstract version, but only a few participants 
were able to solve it correctly (ca. 10 %) and choose the right cards (cp., Evans et al., 1993; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). Most often, participants tend to verify the rule and choose the 
cards “E” and “2”, or just select the card “E” alone. However, if the WST is filled with 
content, performance improves dramatically. Wason and Shapiro (1971) as well as Johnson-
Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi (1972) could show for example that the content embedded in 
the task and in contrast to the pure abstract version facilitated solving the WST correctly. The 
content Wason and Shapiro (1971) applied consisted of the statement “Every time I go to 
Manchester I travel by car” and subsequently presented cards, which had either the name of a 
city (e.g., Manchester, Leeds) or the travel mode “car” and “train” on their front side. 
Participants were allowed to inspect the cards before the experiment, to ensure that all had 
names of cities or travel modes also on the back side. In this version of the WST, 10 out of 16 
participants solved it correctly, whereas only 2 out of 16 of the same participants solved the 
abstract version correctly. Thus, comparing the 62.5 % participants who answered correctly 
with the usual rate of only 10 % or less in solving the WST correctly shows an indeed 
enormous performance increment. Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) conducted a further study 
revealing even more evidence of a facilitating content effect. They presented the conditional 
sentence “If a letter is sealed, then it has a 50 lire stamp on it” and subsequently closed or 
unclosed envelopes or envelopes from the front side with 50 or 40 lire stamps on it. This time, 
participants were explicitly advised to imagine that they are post officers. They had to check 
which of the envelopes they have to turn over to find out whether or not the envelope violates 
the rule. Results showed the above mentioned facilitating content effect since 21 out of 24 
participants solved the content-filled WST correctly, whereas only 2 out of 24 managed the 
abstract version, also applied in this study. The reported facilitating content effects of realistic 
material involved in deductive reasoning tasks lead to the assumption that persons have only 
difficulties when dealing with the abstract version derived from ‘classical’ logic. 
 
 
E 
 
 
3 
 
 
D 
 
 
2 
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However, many experiments were conducted using diverse contents that showed no or 
even perturbing content effects. For example, Manktelow and Evans (1979) or Evans, 
Barston, and Pollard (1983) as well as Evans, Newstead, Allen, and Pollard (1994) could not 
find any facilitating content effects in their experiments. 
Cox and Griggs (1982) proposed an idea regarding as to why and when content 
facilitates the reasoning process. They varied the content systematically and found that only 
familiar content enhances the reasoning performance. Cox and Griggs (1982; Griggs & Cox, 
1982) argue that past experiences connected with the content enhances the reasoning 
performance, whereas others (Canessa, Gorini, Cappa, Piatelli-Palmarini, Danna, Fazio, & 
Perani, 2005; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; 
Manktelow & Over, 1991) claim it is the kind of content, i.e., social content, which facilitates 
reasoning. 
Socially relevant or familiar content refers to prior knowledge gained through 
experience. Therefore, other researchers (e.g., Evans et al., 1983) conducted experiments 
testing reasoning with prior knowledge and beliefs. The ‘belief bias’ effect they found is a 
well-known phenomenon today (c.p., Evans, 2008; Knauff, 2007) which states the existence 
of “[…] a tendency to judge the argument of a syllogism as valid or invalid on the basis of 
whether or not it is a priori believable.” (Evans et al., 1994, p 266).5
Besides socially relevant content and prior beliefs/knowledge, the emotional load of 
the material also seems to have an impact on deductive reasoning. Blanchette and Richards 
(2004), and Blanchette (2006) investigated reasoning with inference problems containing 
emotional content and could show that positive as well as negative emotional content also 
disturbs the reasoning process. However, Gangemi, Mancini, and Johnson-Laird (2006) and 
Blanchette and Campbell (2005) conducted experiments yielding opposite results: emotions 
could support the reasoning process. In a further study, Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk, and 
Lavda (2007) combined emotional material with socially relevant content (due to prior 
experience), testing neutral, emotional, and terrorism-related syllogisms. The syllogisms were 
 So, Evans et al. (1983) 
could show that participants accepted far more valid than invalid and believable conclusions 
than unbelievable ones. In addition, the ‘belief bias’ effect was stronger for invalid problems. 
Later, Evans, Over, and Manktelow (1993) presented findings that participants accept 
conclusions as being rather logically valid if they are consistent with prior beliefs than 
conclusions that contradict existing beliefs. 
                                                 
5 Despite this quotation, which refers to syllogistic reasoning problems, the belief bias effect has also been found 
in studies using conditional inference problems, although most often syllogisms were applied (cp., Evans & 
Feeney, 2004). 
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either believable or unbelievable, and valid or invalid. The problems were congruent 
(believable/valid and unbelievable/invalid) or incongruent (believable/invalid and 
unbelievable/valid). It is worth taking note that the participants experienced the terrorist 
attacks in London in 2005. As control groups, people from Manchester (England) and Canada 
were tested. Blanchette et al. (2007) could investigate far more realistic emotional and 
experience-based influences than normally possible in the laboratory. In total, their results 
showed that all participants performed better with the neutral problems as compared to the 
emotional or terrorism-related ones, but the London and Manchester participants were 
additionally slightly better in the incongruent-terrorism versions. A follow up experiment, six 
months after the attacks, yielded that only the directly affected London group fared still better 
in the incongruent-terrorism version compared to the other two groups. Blanchette et al. 
(2007) concluded that the London group was the only one that was indeed directly affected by 
the attacks and this could account for their better reasoning performance on the incongruent 
terrorism-related problems. 
Although, there is still an ongoing debate whether reasoning is based on formal and 
logical processes or based more on heuristic, intuitive or knowledge-related ones (Chater & 
Oaksford, 2001; Evans, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000), Blanchette et al. (2007) suppose that 
both types of processes are required. 
To sum up, theoretical reasoning processes seem to be influenced by socially relevant 
and emotional content as well as by prior beliefs and knowledge or additional task-specific 
criteria (i.e., time pressure; e.g., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 
2009). It is of interest whether or not there are theories or models available, which might 
explain the different findings and provide further suggestions on how to continue in order to 
explore the capacities of human reasoning. Therefore, a short overview on different reasoning 
theories will be given in the next chapter. 
 
1.4 Theories of theoretical reasoning 
There are two main theoretical strands explaining deductive reasoning and why errors might 
occur: the semantic and the syntactic theories (cp., Knauff, 2009a). The first strand 
encompasses syntactic theories like the theory of mental logic or mental rules theory (Braine 
& O’Brien, 1998; Braine, O'Brien, Noveck, Samuels, Lea, Fisch, & Yang, 1995; Rips, 1994). 
They propose that humans have a universal and internalized repertory of abstract inference 
rules that is used to derive or prove conclusions. Those theories are closely related to (formal) 
logic and divide the reasoning process into three steps. First, the logical form of the premises, 
Introduction 
16 
 
that is the syntactic form to which inference rules apply, must be detected. That means that 
the following steps of the reasoning process only deal with an abstract form of the premises 
and ignore the content. Second, the available inference rule set is used to either generate or 
verify/falsify a conclusion. This process includes the execution of reasoning strategies for 
combining inference rules to chains of derivation, defining intermediate goals and 
incorporating newly derived premises into the chain of derivation. Third, the ‘abstract 
conclusion’ is translated back into the content of the premises. Errors can occur in all three 
steps, whereby the possibility of the occurrence of errors increases according to the problems’ 
complexity, and when indirect rules need to be applied. The latter additionally requires 
conscious efforts, in contrast to when direct rules of inference are applicable. Application of 
direct rules is assumed to be made with less effort and with more accuracy (Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998). Extra exertion of efforts due to indirect rules or the complexity of problems is 
believed to require increased working memory (WM) capacity. Since WM capacity is limited 
(cp., Miller, 1956), WM overload can additionally increase errors while processing 
information. 
The second branch on deductive reasoning comprises the mental model theory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & 
Schaeken, 1992). It is seen as a semantic theory as reasoning is based on a semantic 
interpretation of the premises. This theory also provides three steps in reasoning and again, in 
all of these steps errors may occur. The first step includes building a mental model based on 
the meaning defined by the premises given and based on relevant general knowledge related 
to the premises. The second step contains the derivation of a conclusion from the model 
whereby the conclusion includes information exceeding that of the premises. Therefore, the 
semantic information of the premises has to be maintained. Finally, the conclusion of the 
model is expected to be regarded as valid if no counter-examples can be found. If at least one 
counter-example is found, one must return to the second step (Johnson-Laird et al., 1992). 
Task complexity according to this theory increases if several models must be constructed, 
such a case occurring for MT inferences for example, but not with MP deductions. Again, a 
relation to WM capacity is postulated, which might be exceeded if too many models must be 
constructed due to complex problems (Johnson-Laird, 2006). Furthermore, a relation between 
reasoning performance and intelligence is proposed such that participants with higher 
intelligence deal better with deductive reasoning problems (Johnson-Laird, 2006). This 
display of better reasoning performance in turn, is related to superior working memory 
capacities (Johnson-Laird, 2006). 
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Other approaches in deductive reasoning, namely domain-specific accounts, focus 
more on the content of the reasoning process and thus postulate qualitative differences. The 
theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) for example proposes that 
deduction is based on abstract knowledge structures (pragmatic reasoning schemas) induced 
from typical life experiences. A similar approach is the logic of social exchange (Cosmides, 
1989) which also proposes schemas but differs with regards to the acquisition of the schemas. 
Cosmides (1989) represents an evolutionary point of view and claims that humans developed 
domain-specific algorithms with inference rules for solving adaptive problems through natural 
selection. Social exchange, or the “[…] cooperation between two or more individuals for 
mutual benefit […]” (Cosmides, 1989, p. 187) is an adaptive problem and an essential part for 
human survival. Therefore, humans have developed schemas which are utilized particularly 
for reasoning in dealing with social exchange. Again, domain-specific accounts of reasoning 
are also prone to errors. 
Finally, ‘dual-process’ accounts/models try to combine different streams of deductive 
reasoning research. Evans (2003, 2008) claims that all of these theories postulate two different 
systems (also named processes or types) and may agree that ‘System 1’ processes are 
unconscious, rapid, automatic, and of high capacity, whereas ‘System 2’ processes are 
conscious, slow, and deliberate. In his view, the often ignored emotions should be included in 
System 1. Support for ‘dual-process’ accounts comes from diverse approaches showing that 
both systems can work together or compete with each other and therefore facilitate or even 
impair reasoning (Evans, 2003). Further evidences have been presented by Reber (1993) or 
Stanovich (1999). Evans (2008) subsumes that they proposed “[…] a link between System 2 
processing and general intelligence, with the corollary System 1 processes are independent of 
general intelligence.” (p. 262), indicating individual differences in reasoning abilities. Colom, 
Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, and Kyllonen (2004) showed that general intelligence and 
working memory capacities are highly correlated. Evans (2008) follows from these findings, 
“[…] one of the stronger bases for dual-systems theory is the evidence that “controlled” 
cognitive processing correlates with individual differences in general intelligence and 
working memory capacity, whereas “automatic” processing does not.” (p. 262). Additionally, 
Evans (2008) believes that the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 1998) as well as 
the mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) implicitly contain dual-process components. 
In his view both theories include assumptions that could account for pragmatic influences on 
reasoning and for the relation of accuracy in reasoning to individual differences based on 
cognitive capacity. Thus, he concludes that research with logical conditionals and syllogisms 
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has yielded evidences for ‘dual-process’ accounts and has proven that people can deal with 
logic, but are influenced by prior knowledge, instructions, time pressure, working memory 
load (mental effort), age, and general intelligence as can be seen in errors such as matching 
errors or ‘belief bias’. 
This overview indicates that many theories try to explain deductive reasoning as well 
as the errors people make in deductive reasoning. Aside from the different assumptions, all 
theories explicitly postulate influences of and/or relations to prior knowledge, working 
memory capacity, and intelligence. The unsolved question is which of these theories explains 
reasoning and related errors best, and which of the approaches present proposals to avoid 
errors or to improve reasoning abilities. This is also one of the objectives of the current 
experiments. Before reporting the current experiments done within the framework of this 
thesis however, the findings of practical reasoning research shall first be reported. 
 
1.5 Behavioral experiments on practical reasoning 
Practical reasoning has mainly been investigated in the domain of morals, particularly with 
regard to children’s development of moral judgment abilities in the last century (e.g., Piaget, 
1932). Due to the fact that morality research has been based on ideas of Piaget (1932), and 
later on Kohlberg (1969) who consider moral judgment levels as being developed during the 
process of growing-up and as being dependent on intelligence, it is not surprising that moral 
reasoning was considered to be based on rationality. Following this idea, the level of the 
ability to think rationally corresponds to the level of moral competence. Neither Piaget nor 
Kohlberg ever thought of emotions as part of the cognitive processes which contribute to 
moral judgments. Although it was Damasio (2006) who proposed in 1994 that emotions are 
encompassed in the cognitive process, it took until 2001 (Haidt, 2001) to take them into 
consideration again.6
However, since 2001 and along with Haidt’s article “The emotional dog and its 
rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment” (Haidt, 2001), there had been a 
revival of the debate on the basis of moral reasoning. In practical reasoning research -as it is 
the case in theoretical reasoning research- the debate on the processes that might be involved 
persists as well. Different researchers postulate different processes accounting for moral 
reasoning and decision making. 
  
                                                 
6 As mentioned earlier, in philosophy, different approaches exist postulating that emotions are relevant for 
practical reasoning and moral judgment making (e.g., Smith, 1759/ 2004) However, in the upcoming 
experimental research, these proposals seem to have been neglected since Haidt’s article in 2001. 
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Haidt (2001), for example, denotes the importance of intuitions and emotions in his 
theory as well as cultural influences for moral reasoning and judgment making. He especially 
doubts that (rational) reasoning causes moral judgments or guides moral actions. Haidt 
explicitly denotes four arguments for his assumptions:  
“[…] (a) There are two cognitive processes at work –reasoning and intuition– and the 
reasoning process has been overemphasized; (b) reasoning is often motivated; (c) the 
reasoning process constructs post hoc justifications, yet we experience the illusion of 
objective reasoning; and (d) moral action covaries with moral emotion more than with 
moral reasoning.” (Haidt, 2001, p. 815). 
Later in his article, he also states that the “Rationalist models focus on Links 5 and 6. In the 
social intuitionist model, in contrast, moral judgment consists primarily of Links 1-4 […].” 
(Haidt, 2001, p. 819). These links explaining moral reasoning and judgment making refer to 
different processes: links 1-4 refer to rather social-intuitive processes whereas the last two 
links refer to rather rational processes. One might assume then that Haidt’s position as 
claiming emotional/intuitive processes to be involved in moral reasoning and judgment 
making rather than denoting rational processes. More importantly, Haidt’s assumptions were 
mainly based on theoretical evidences at that time and thus required further empirical support. 
The experimental evidence for his theory came in the same year from Greene and 
colleagues (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), who showed that 
emotions seem to play a critical role in moral reasoning and judgment making. Greene et al. 
(2001) used moral dilemmas according to the “classical” trolley and footbridge dilemmas in a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. Since these two “classical” dilemmas 
paved the way for numerous experiments that followed and were as well target of critics7
“One such dilemma is the trolley dilemma: A runaway trolley is headed for five 
people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save 
them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it 
will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five 
people at the expense of one? Most people say yes. Now consider a similar problem, 
the footbridge dilemma. As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are 
standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the 
oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five 
people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you 
, 
they will be quoted in full: 
                                                 
7 In the section on brain imaging studies, these critics will be further described. 
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do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save 
the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no.” (Greene et 
al., 2001). 
The dilemmas in Greene et al.’s (2001) experiment were derived from these two classical 
versions. Greene et al. (2001) applied personal and impersonal moral dilemmas as well as 
non-moral neutral stories in the scanner. They declared the personal moral dilemmas as 
personal instead of impersonal because these dilemmas produce serious bodily harm to others, 
were emotionally more salient, and deflected an existing threat actively onto a different 
person/group of people. In the experiment, their participants had to judge the action described 
in each dilemma as morally appropriate or inappropriate. Greene et al. (2001) found that 
participants needed more time to judge a ‘footbridge dilemma version’ as appropriate 
compared to a ‘trolley dilemma version’. Greene et al. (2001) concluded that we normally 
tend to judge a ‘footbridge version’ as inappropriate because of an intensive emotional 
response attached to this type of dilemma. This emotional response has first to be overridden 
before we can make an opposite judgment. As to their imaging results, Greene and colleagues 
(Greene et al., 2001) found increased brain activity for the moral personal condition as 
compared to both of the other conditions in the medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10), the posterior 
cingulate (BA 31), and the bilateral angular gyrus (BA 39). In contrast, the right middle 
frontal gyrus (BA 46) and the bilateral parietal lobe (BA 7/40) showed less activity in the 
personal moral conditions as compared to both of the others. Greene et al. (2001) denominate 
the former areas as associated with emotional processes whereas the later ones are related to 
working memory processes. 
After these first evidences in experimental research showing that emotional/intuitive 
processes seem to play an important role in moral reasoning and judgment making, further 
proposals were made thus igniting diverse researchers to argue about varying positions 
assuming different processes involved in moral reasoning and judgment making. 
Rational processes are stressed by representatives of one group (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; 
Rest, 1979; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), 
emotional/intuitive processes by representatives of another group (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, 
Uhlmann, & Bloom, 2003). A completely different approach focuses on genetic and inborn 
facets. Representatives of this approach claim that emotions or rationality only come into play 
after a moral judgment had been made (e.g., Hauser, 2006, 2007; Mikhail, 2007). Apart from 
these rather extreme positions, the latest attempts tried to reconcile emotional and rational 
proportions by proposing ‘dual-process‘ models or even ‘threefold-process’ accounts (e.g., 
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Bucciarelli, Khemlani, & Johnson-Laird, 2008; Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2008; Monin, 
Pizarro, & Beer, 2007; Moll, Zahn, De Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Nichols, 
& Mallon, 2006). In addition to these different models, several mediating or other influential 
factors were discussed, among them are gender differences (Björklund, 2003; Gilligan, 1982; 
Skoe, Eisenberg, & Cumberland, 2002), time pressure (Björklund, 2003), personality traits 
(Stojiljković, 1998), and impacts of audience (Finger, Marsh, Kamel, Mitchell, & Blair, 
2006). 
Aside from the idea of an innate moral grammar (Hauser, 2006, 2007), there exist 
many proposals such as morality is learned and thus dependents on knowledge and experience 
(Bore, Munro, Kerridge, & Powis; 2005; Bucciarelli et al., 2008; Churchland, 1998; 
Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Hare, 1981; Luo, Nakic, Wheatley, Richell, Martin, & Blair, 
2006; Moll et al., 2005; Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001). This is in line with other models 
suggesting domain-specific knowledge, acquired through learning and experience as being 
crucially involved in reasoning (Evans, 2003; Knauff, 2007), and thus matches ideas that can 
be found in the domain of theoretical reasoning research as well. 
Some researchers had also shifted in their position due to new findings in further 
experiments they conducted (e.g., Greene, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 
2004). Greene (2007) for example now proposes a ‘dual-process’ account of moral reasoning 
with an interaction of emotions and cognition (i.e., rationality) where different proportions 
might support or even interfere with each other in the judgment making process. Another 
‘dual-process’ account was proposed by Goodenough and Prehn (2004) who claimed that 
moral emotions and knowledge-based rationality are part of the reasoning processes for moral 
decisions. Pizarro, Uhlmann, and Salovey (2003) also provided a ‘dual-process’ account, 
which emphasizes the importance of emotions but also stresses rational processes: “[…] 
although moral intuitions seem to be de facto guides when arriving at judgments of moral 
responsibility […] a more deliberative mindset can “undo” the effects of moral intuitions.” (p. 
658). Others even propose three component models of moral reasoning, like Nichols and 
Mallon (2006), where “[…] cost/benefit analysis, checking for rule violations, and emotional 
activations.” (p. 540) are involved in moral reasoning. Casebeer (2003a) also proposes a 
‘threefold-process’ model of moral judgment making with moral emotions, abstract moral 
reasoning and theory of mind (ToM), and assumes that moral decisions are a result of “[…] 
multiple cognitive subprocesses […]” (p. 841). The shortcut from ToM to Piaget (1932), who 
assumed that perspective taking is important for moral reasoning, seems evident. The third 
‘threefold-process’ account has been introduced by Moll and colleagues (Moll et al., 2005) 
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and is called ‘EFECs’ model (i.e., event-feature-emotion complexes). This model contains 
“[…] structured event knowledge, which corresponds to context-dependent representations of 
events and event sequences in the PFC; social perceptual and functional features, represented 
as context-independent knowledge in the anterior and posterior temporal cortex; and central 
motive and emotional states, which correspond to context-independent activation in limbic 
and paralimbic structures.” (Moll et al., 2005, p. 804). Evidently, their model is mainly based 
on brain research results and assumes complex interactional processes between emotional and 
rational proportions and is clearly dependent on learning, thus knowledge and experience-
based. 
Currently, Bucciarelli et al. (2008) suggested a theory of moral reasoning based on 
“[…] an account of inferences in general about permissible situations (Bucciarelli & Johnson-
Laird, 2005), on a theory of emotions (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1996), and on an account of 
intuitions (Johnson-Laird, 2006).” (p. 121). They provide a few clarifications on different 
terms and point to the important difference between their concept of intuition and that of 
Haidt (2001) for example. In Haidt’s approach, intuitions and emotions are treated as almost 
identical whereas Bucciarelli et al. (2008) differentiate the two. For them, intuitions represent 
unconscious premises that yield to conscious conclusions in contrast to conscious reasoning 
where both processes are conscious, even though “[…] the process of reasoning is itself 
largely unconscious.” (Bucciarelli et al., 2008, p. 123). Conscious reasoning is the only 
process that extensively uses working memory and thus may overwrite intuitions. In their 
concept, emotions are made up of cognitive evaluations which can either be conscious or 
unconscious. For their theory it is also crucial that moral reasoning is based on moral 
propositions and these are in turn deontic propositions stating what is allowed or forbidden 
and how one should act. It is also important that deontic propositions are not always moral 
propositions; they can also concern rules in games or manners, and the like. Following that, 
they deliver four principles for moral reasoning and corresponding empirical evidence: 1. 
Indefinability of moral propositions; 2. Independent systems; 3. Deontic reasoning; 4. Moral 
inconsistency (for details see Bucciarelli et al., 2008). In their four experiments, Bucciarelli et 
al. (2008) yielded evidences for these four principles and some arguments against proposals 
of an ‘innate universal moral grammar’ (e.g., Hauser, 2006, 2007) or accounts postulating 
utilitarian approaches of moral reasoning (e.g., Greene et al., 2008). 
Integrating these findings of practical reasoning research shows that there are a few 
relations and similarities to the domain of theoretical reasoning research. In both domains, 
different theories and models are available explaining the reasoning processes involved. 
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Meaning for both theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning research, current models 
propose the involvement of rational and emotional/intuitive processes along with influences 
and mediations of intelligence and working memory capacities as well as time pressure. The 
‘dual-process’ accounts therefore, seem to explain the processes involved in practical 
reasoning best. Further evidences for these assumptions of theoretical and practical reasoning 
research have been shown through the use of brain imaging experiments, which the following 
section shall report. 
 
1.6 Brain imaging experiments on theoretical reasoning 
In the domain of theoretical reasoning, many brain imaging experiments have been 
conducted, exploring reasoning with and without content (e.g., Goel & Dolan, 2003a, 2003b).  
Goel and colleagues (Goel, Büchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000), for example, conducted an fMRI 
study investigating deductive reasoning. They addressed the question on whether deductive 
reasoning is based on sentential linguistic processes or requires spatial manipulation and 
search processes. To test this, Goel et al. (2000) applied syllogistic reasoning sentences with 
and without semantic content. All sentences had to be judged according to their validity and 
were either valid or invalid, but the content-laden sentences also contained believable and 
unbelievable statements, thus their truth values were consistent with the validity status 
(congruent) or not (incongruent). They found a main effect of reasoning for both conditions 
with brain activations in a wide-spread network encompassing the bilateral cerebellum, the 
bilateral fusiform gyrus, the left superior parietal lobe, the left middle temporal gyrus, the 
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, the bilateral basal ganglia, and the brain stem. The content-
laden syllogisms alone activated the left middle/superior temporal lobe (BA 21/22), the left 
inferior prefrontal cortex (BA 44/45), the right cerebellum, and the bilateral basal ganglia. 
The content-free sentences in contrast recruited the bilateral fusiform gyrus (BA 18), the left 
superior parietal lobe (BA 7), the left inferior frontal lobe (BA 44/45), the right inferior 
frontal lobe (BA 45), the bilateral cerebellum, the bilateral basal ganglia, and the brain stem. 
The authors additionally conducted a conjunction analysis to obtain the common activations 
of content-based and content-free reasoning and found activations in the left inferior 
prefrontal cortex (BA 44), the left fusiform gyrus (BA 18), the right fusiform gyrus (BA 37), 
the bilateral basal ganglia, and the right cerebellum. Furthermore, Goel et al. (2000) 
determined the distinct activations of content-based reasoning in contrast to content-free 
reasoning. The comparison of content-based minus content-free sentences revealed 
activations in the left middle/superior temporal lobe (BA 21/22), the left inferior frontal lobe 
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(BA 47), the bilateral striate cortex (BA 17), and the bilateral lingual gyri (BA 18). The 
inverse contrast yielded activations in the bilateral occipital cortex (BA 18/19), the bilateral 
superior and inferior parietal lobes (BA 7/40), the bilateral precentral gyrus (BA 6), and the 
bilateral middle frontal gyrus (BA 6). From these findings the authors arrived to this 
conclusion: “Syllogistic reasoning implicates a widespread network involving occipital, 
temporal, and parietal lobes, prefrontal cortex, and, surprisingly, cerebellum and basal ganglia 
nuclei.” (Goel et al., 2000, p. 509). Further, they infer: “However, closer analysis reveals two 
dissociable anatomical networks for reasoning, with shared common circuits in basal ganglia 
nuclei, cerebellum, fusiform gyri, and left prefrontal cortical regions.” (Goel et al., 2000, p. 
509). However, due to the distinct findings, Goel et al. (2000) also assume that the required 
left hemispheric temporal system for content-based reasoning reveals evidence for sentential 
linguistic processes, whereas the activated parietal areas support ideas of spatial reasoning 
systems. Therefore, the authors finally state “[…] that syllogistic reasoning is implemented in 
two distinct systems whose engagement is primarily a function of the presence or absence of 
semantic content.” (Goel et al., 2000, p. 504). This study revealed evidence that reasoning per 
se requires a network shared with ‘pure’ reasoning as well as content-based reasoning. The 
content in this study however, appears to be not controlled for other factors (e.g., emotional 
load, prior knowledge), thus constraining the conclusions that could be made regarding 
content influences and potential differences of the reasoning processes involved associated 
with different contents. Another study by Goel and Dolan (2003a) was explicitly concerned 
with such a question. 
In this fMRI experiment, Goel and Dolan (2003a) used syllogisms with emotional or 
neutral content. The items had either a valid or invalid conclusion and were again true 
(believable) or untrue (unbelievable) resulting in congruent and incongruent trials. 
Participants had to judge the validity of the sentences. Goel and Dolan (2003a) also 
implemented a baseline condition in which the third sentence was switched around so that no 
conclusion could be drawn. For the reasoning tasks as compared to the baseline, they found 
bilateral activations in striate cortex (BA 17), lingual gyri (BA 18), left cerebellum, left 
temporal lobe (BA 21/22), left temporal pole (BA 21/38), right basal ganglia nuclei, medial 
frontal gyrus (BA 6), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44). 
Syllogistic reasoning with neutral content activated the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC, BA 44/8), whereas syllogistic reasoning with emotional content activated the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the right fusiform gyrus (BA 37). Interestingly, 
the activation of the DLPFC suppressed the VMPFC activation and vice versa. The authors 
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interpret this as a dynamic neural system for reasoning depending on emotional saliency. In 
another study by Goel and Dolan (2003b), deductive reasoning problems were also applied in 
the scanner. This time however, they were interested in the neural correlates of the ‘belief 
bias’ in deductive reasoning. The ‘belief bias’ effect (cp., Evans et al., 1983) refers to the fact 
that peoples’ deductive reasoning performance (e.g., validity judgments) is influenced by 
prior knowledge and beliefs. Thus, Goel and Dolan (2003b) applied syllogisms again, but this 
time with belief-laden contents. These syllogisms had valid or invalid conclusions and true 
(believable) or false (unbelievable) truth values. Of special interest was, whether the prepotent 
response due to beliefs or deductive reasoning dominates the participant’s response when 
there is a mismatch (i.e., incongruence) between believability and validity. As control 
condition, Goel and Dolan (2003b) applied belief neutral syllogisms, and the baseline 
consisted again of syllogisms wherein the third sentence was switched around so that no 
conclusion could be drawn. Participants showed more errors in the reasoning than in the 
baseline condition and were especially more prone to errors in the inhibitory/incongruent 
reasoning condition indicating a ‘belief-bias’ effect. The brain imaging data yielded a left 
temporal lobe system activated for belief-based reasoning and bilateral parietal activations for 
belief-neutral reasoning. When participants solved the deductive problems correctly, even 
though there was a conflicting belief, the right lateral PFC was activated. The authors 
interpret this activation as cognitive monitoring. When the participants failed to complete the 
deductive problems correctly, due to a ‘belief bias’, the VMPFC was activated. Goel and 
Dolan (2003b) assume that ‘belief bias’ effects in reasoning are mediated through effects of 
emotional processes on reasoning. 
Canessa and colleagues (Canessa et al., 2005) conducted a similar fMRI study, but 
were interested in the effects of social content on deductive reasoning instead of the influence 
of beliefs. They applied the Wason selection task (WST) filled with different contents. One 
version described an arbitrary relation between two actions; the other version was a social-
exchange relation between two persons. The analysis of both versions compared to a baseline 
revealed activations in the medial frontal cortex, the left DLPFC, and parietal regions. The 
authors conclude that these regions provide evidence for the major role of the left hemisphere 
in deductive reasoning. Comparing both of the reasoning versions yielded additional 
activations for the social-exchange condition in right fronto-parietal regions. According to 
Canessa et al. (2005), these right hemispheric activations seem to be required for reasoning 
given social contents. 
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The reported studies so far indicate that theoretical reasoning is based on a wide-
spread network of brain areas. Moreover, investigating theoretical reasoning yielded 
evidences that reasoning might be based on more than just rational processes, but is also 
influenced by emotions (e.g., Goel & Dolan, 2003a), prior knowledge (e.g., Goel & Dolan, 
2003b), and the imageability of the reasoning problems’ content, for example (e.g., Knauff, 
2009b; Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003; Ruff, Knauff, Fangmeier, & Spreer, 
2003). 
A few articles present overviews about the results of theoretical reasoning brain 
imaging research –as for practical reasoning research– (e.g., Evans, 2008; Goel, 2007; 
Knauff, 2007, 2009a). Knauff (2007), for example, describes a fronto-parieto-temporo-
occipital network with hemispheric specialization, depending on stimulus material/content, 
task demands, etc., for deductive reasoning. Lieberman (2003, cited in Evans, 2008) proposes 
a reflexive (System 1) and a reflective (System 2) system for cognitive processes, which 
correspond to neurological X- and C-systems. The X-system includes the basal ganglia, the 
amygdala, and the lateral temporal cortex, whereas the C-system encompasses the ACC, the 
prefrontal cortex, and the medial temporal cortex (including hippocampus). Evans (2008), in 
turn, assumes that these two systems yield evidence for a ‘dual-process’ account of deductive 
reasoning. A summary of the same diversity –as suggested in moral reasoning– for deductive 
reasoning is presented by Goel (2007): “[…] human reasoning is underwritten by a fractioned 
system that is dynamically configured in response to specific task and environmental cues.” 
(p. 439). He also proposes that “The main effect of reasoning activates a large bilateral 
network including occipital, parietal, temporal, and frontal lobes, basal ganglia, and cerebellar 
regions.” (Goel, 2007, p. 438). As with the practical reasoning research domain, Goel (2007) 
also suggests a ‘dual-process/-system’ account for deductive reasoning since the brain regions 
involved are associated with emotional/intuitive and rational processes. 
 
1.7 Brain imaging experiments on practical reasoning 
One of the first brain imaging studies investigating practical reasoning, especially moral 
reasoning and judgment making, has already been reported above (Greene et al., 2001). Since 
then, many experiments on moral reasoning and decision making have been conducted. As 
mentioned earlier, many of these studies utilized moral dilemmas, but pictures, sentences, or 
stories were also used. Heekeren and colleagues (Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, 
Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2003) for example applied simple ethical sentences that were 
unambiguous and not highly emotional laden describing morally appropriate or inappropriate 
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actions according to the norms of our culture. As control condition they used neutral 
sentences that were semantically correct or incorrect. They found activations for the moral 
tasks compared to the semantical tasks in the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS, BA 
39), the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), bilaterally temporal poles (BA 38), the lateral 
PFC (BA 47), the bilateral VMPFC (BA 9/10), and the right cuneus (BA 17/18). The 
semantic task activated the bilateral DLPFC (BA 46), the right precentral gyrus, and the left 
caudate gray. The authors conclude that especially the posterior STS and the VMPFC are 
involved in moral decision making, independent of complexity or emotional aspects. Further, 
Heekeren et al. (2003) associate the temporal pole activations with the fact that their 
participants had to judge the actions of others (i.e., whether they are good or not). The authors 
therefore suggest that these decision processes include reasoning about intentions which is a 
feature of the Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM is known as “[…] the ability to think about mental 
states, such as thoughts and beliefs, in oneself and others […]” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, 
cited in Carrington, & Bailey, 2009). Heekeren et al. (2003) also associate the STS with 
detecting intentionality and ToM since it has been proposed that the STS is involved in the 
representation of the actions of others (cp., Frith & Frith, 1999). 
Another study by Heekeren and colleagues (Heekeren, Wartenburger, Schmidt, Prehn, 
Schwintowski, & Villringer, 2005) investigated the influence of bodily harm/highly arousing 
emotions on moral decision making. This time, they used semantic correct/incorrect and 
morally appropriate/inappropriate sentences with and without bodily harm in the scanner. 
Materials with moral decisions and the sentences with bodily harm were processed faster than 
the semantic sentences or the sentences devoid of bodily harm. Moral decision making in 
contrast to semantic decision making produced greater activations in the VMPFC (bilateral, 
BA 10/11), the right VMPFC (BA 9), the  posterior STS (bilateral, BA 39), the right posterior 
cingulated cortex (PCC, BA 31), and the temporal pole (bilateral, BA 21). Comparing 
semantic decision making and moral decision making yielded increased activations in the 
DLPFC (middle frontal gyrus, BA 46), the insula (BA 13), and the supramarginal gyrus (BA 
40). Bodily harm compared to no harm in both conditions showed reduced activation in the 
bilateral temporal poles (middle temporal gyrus, BA 21). Heekeren et al. (2005) assume that 
the reduced activation in the temporal poles coupled with the faster reaction times might be a 
sign of processing advantage and reduced processing depth for items containing bodily harm. 
The authors then propose: “Weaker activity in the temporal poles might be a correlate of 
limited generation of the semantic and emotional context during the evaluation of actions of 
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another agent related to bodily harm that is made with respect to the norms and values guiding 
our behavior in a community.” (Heekeren et al., 2005, p. 895). 
Moll, Eslinger, and De Oliveira-Souza (2001) also investigated participants in the 
scanner using moral sentences and factual/neutral control sentences. However, they were not 
only interested in potential emotional influences on moral reasoning, but also in differences 
concerning the judgment complexity of the various sentences applied. The participants had to 
decide silently whether the content of the sentences was right (i.e., factual correct or morally 
appropriate) or wrong (i.e., factual false or morally inappropriate). After scanning, the 
participants had to rate the moral content, the emotional load, and the judgment difficulty of 
each sentence. To control the emotional proportions of the judgments in the brain activations, 
the emotional ratings served as additional regressor in the fMRI data analysis. The moral 
sentences showed the highest degree of moral content and emotional load. In the moral 
judgment condition the authors found the frontopolar cortex (FPC), the medial frontal gyrus, 
the right anterior temporal cortex, the lenticular nucleus, and the cerebellum more activated 
compared to the control condition. Activation of the FPC and the medial frontal gyrus (BA 
10/46 and 9) was still present after controlling for emotional load. The authors therefore 
conclude that the frontal and temporal regions especially contribute to complex judgment 
processes that encompass moral decision making. A further Study by Moll and colleagues 
(Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002) presenting short statements with 
unpleasant emotional, unpleasant moral, and neutral content yielded similar brain activations 
for the moral sentences. The moral items activated the medial OFC, the temporal pole, and the 
left STS. In another experiment, Moll and colleagues (Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, 
Bramati, Mourão-Miranda, Andreiuolo, & Pessoa, 2002) did not apply sentences or 
statements, but used pictures of the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995) with moral (unpleasant), negative emotional, and neutral content. 
The results revealed a basic emotional network consisting of amygdala, thalamus, and upper 
midbrain, which was activated in the moral and in the emotional condition as compared to the 
neutral one. Additionally, the authors found the orbital and medial PFC as well as the STS 
only activated for the moral pictures compared to the emotional or neutral ones (notably, these 
structures were still activated after controlling for emotional valence and visual arousal). 
Since the activated brain structures somewhat differed from the Moll et al. study in 2001 
(where participants had to make active judgments), the authors postulate that the OFC might 
be more involved in automatic processing of moral emotions, while explicit moral reasoning 
requires additional prefrontal regions. These slightly diverging findings and interpretations of 
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their two experiments seem to indicate that task demands per se might also influence the brain 
activations found in moral reasoning and judgment making experiments. 
Therefore, Luo and colleagues (Luo et al., 2006) chose a totally different approach 
investigating morals. They criticize existing studies about moral reasoning and decision 
making (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). Their main point is that former studies required explicit 
decisions about moral questions from the participants. “However, such measures are 
susceptible to voluntary control and allow a participant the ability to conceal their genuine 
attitudes.” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 1450). Therefore, the authors adopted the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) which assesses automatic and implicit 
attitudes, and filled it with moral content. Furthermore, they used pictures of the IAPS (Lang 
et al., 1995; Lang & Greenwald, 1985) depicting legal or illegal scenes with either highly 
arousing or low arousing character. They also applied pictures with animals, eliciting negative 
or positive emotions. Due to the fact that they presented pictures with illegal scenes and 
positively associated animals as well as pictures with legal scenes and negatively associated 
animals (and vice versa), their stimulus material contained congruent and incongruent 
conditions. Luo et al. (2006) found that participants responded slower in the incongruent trials 
as compared to the congruent ones. Participants were also slower for the low arousing stimuli 
as compared to the high arousing ones, and were finally slower for the legal stimuli as 
compared to the illegal ones. They suggest that this IAT effect (i.e., incongruence effect) 
“[…] is consistent with our suggestion that healthy individuals have an “automatic” 
association between, in particular, illegal/immoral behaviors and negative valence.” (Luo et 
al., 2006, p. 1452). Concerning the brain imaging results, they obtained increased activity for 
the high arousing stimuli in the ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex and the right amygdala. The 
incongruent trials yielded increased activity in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 
47), left subgenual cingulate gyrus (BA 25), bilateral premotor cortex (BA 6), and the left 
caudate. Comparing illegal with legal trials revealed activations in the right medial frontal 
gyrus (BA 6), left precentral gyrus (BA 4/6), the postcentral gyrus (BA 3), and the superior 
temporal gyrus (bilateral, BA 22/41). The authors interpret their results proposing “[…] that 
an individual’s automatic moral attitude to an event involves an integrated neural response 
involving both the amygdala and medial orbitofrontal cortex that is proportional to the 
emotive strength (due to previous learning) of the stimulus.” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 1454). They 
believe that this neural circuit provides the evaluation of an event or stimulus as good or bad, 
but does not provide the final moral judgment: “[…] a full judgment of an action’s immorality 
is more than an automatic moral attitude of the action’s ‘badness’.” (Luo et al., 2006, p. 
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1455). As in the other studies referred above, Luo et al. (2006) associate the STS activations 
with processing intentionality and therefore, ToM. 
An interesting attempt investigating practical reasoning may be seen in the brain 
imaging study done by Fiddick and colleagues (Fiddick, Spampinato, & Grafman, 2005). This 
seemed to be the first study which combined theoretical reasoning tasks (i.e., conditionals) 
with practical reasoning. However, they did not investigate theoretical reasoning directly, but 
only used conditionals as a basis for investigating practical reasoning. They contrasted social 
contract rules with non-social precaution rules, both based on conditional sentence structures. 
The social contract rules activated the dorsomedial PFC (BA 6/8), the bilateral ventrolateral 
PFC (BA 47), the left angular gyrus (BA 39), and the left orbitofrontal cortex (BA 10). In 
contrast, the precaution trials used activated the bilateral insula, the left lentiform nucleus, the 
posterior cingulate (BA 29/31), the anterior cingulate (BA 24), and the right postcentral gyrus 
(BA 3). The final conjunction analysis which the authors conducted to find common 
activations for reasoning about prescriptive rules yielded activations in the dorsomedial PFC 
(BA 6/8). Since Fiddick et al. (2005) found different brain structures that were activated for 
social and non-social rules, they conclude “[…] that human reasoning is not a unified 
phenomenon, but is content-sensitive.” (Fiddick et al., 2005, p. 778). Due to their findings, 
they do not believe that reasoning could be explained by ‘dual-process’ accounts with its 
intuitive, context-sensitive processes on the one hand, and the more rational, decontextualized 
processes on the other hand. However, Fiddick et al. (2005) also admit that their results 
cannot exclude the possibility of rational processes involved in reasoning, but they reject 
proposals that “[…] nonlogical reasoning is collectively assigned to the realm of intuition.” 
(p. 785). As a critic of this study it could be commented that they did not investigate 
theoretical reasoning but only practical reasoning, thus drawing such far reaching conclusions 
seems inadequate. Further, it seems as if they misleadingly intersperse the terms ‘intuition’, 
‘context’, and ‘content’. Finally, the multiple content-dependent reasoning systems they 
propose appear to refer only to the well-known fact that diverse contents can influence 
reasoning differently (e.g., Evans, 2008). In particular, when this content is emotionally laden, 
a fact (c.p., Goel & Dolan, 2003a) Fiddick et al. (2005) did not control in their study. 
At this point, the studies reported seem to indicate that moral reasoning and judgment 
making is based on a large network of brain areas, which are associated with diverse 
processes and concepts. Several review articles describe and merge different findings of even 
more studies and come up with similar assumptions (e.g., Allison, 2001; Casebeer, 2003a; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Moll et al., 2005; Raine & 
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Yang, 2006; Young & Koenigs, 2007). Allison (2001), for example, summarizes that the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the amygdala, the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), the motor cortex, and the basal ganglia are involved in moral reasoning and 
judgment making. Others, like Greene and Haidt (2002), claim that the medial frontal gyrus 
(MFG, BA 9/10), the posterior cingulate gyrus, the precuneus, the retrospenial cortex (BA 
31/7), the STS, the inferior parietal lobe (IPL, BA 39), the orbitofrontal and ventromedial 
frontal cortex (VMPFC, BA 10/11), the temporal pole (BA 38), the amygdala, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, BA 9/10/46), and the parietal lobe (BA 7/40) represent the 
structures involved. 
Despite some variety between studies, the following brain structures are repeatedly 
and consistently discussed as being involved in moral reasoning8
A further critique (e.g., Wiedenmann & Knauff, 2008) on many studies is that they 
deal with items (mainly dilemmas), not validated and not evaluated according to an external 
(standardized) criterion (e.g., Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, & Di Pellegrino, 2007). 
Moreover, these items are far from ‘everyday morality’, are complicated, highly negative 
emotional laden (Casebeer & Churchland, 2003; Harenski & Hamann, 2006; Moll et al., 
2005; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), and thus not really adequate for exploring moral 
reasoning (we rarely get to choose between killing one person instead of five as required in 
the trolley-dilemma or footbridge-dilemma). 
: DLPFC, mPFC, VMPFC, 
OFC, cingulate cortex (anterior and posterior), STS-region, and temporal pole (quite often 
also parietal and occipital regions). This list demonstrates some unity or overlap of brain 
structures involved in moral reasoning, yet it seems astounding that so many studies using 
different tasks and different stimuli produce such an extreme overlap (cp., Goodenough & 
Prehn, 2004; Moll et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, these findings again seem to support ‘dual-process’ accounts as well as 
some overlap between the brain areas involved in practical and theoretical reasoning. 
However, before integrating the different findings and explaining the subsequent paradigm 
applied in the current work as well as the leading questions derived from the former findings, 
three excurses need to be done. Since mediating influences of working memory (WM) on 
reasoning have been discussed, a short explanation of WM processes and models seems 
appropriate. Further, two of the following experiments also implemented a recognition task, 
thus, a short overview on recognition memory research shall be presented. Finally, there are a 
                                                 
8 Different concepts or labels are used quite often for similar brain areas, leading to irritations about which brain 
structures are involved. Especially for the frontal brain areas and the STS-region, no commonly accepted labels 
with clear borders seem available. 
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few researches that have already postulated a common basis for theoretical and practical 
reasoning, or else, a “unique” reasoning system per se. Therefore, these models will also be 
briefly referred. 
 
1.8 Working memory 
“Working memory is a limited capacity system required for the ability to maintain and 
manipulate information over short periods of time (e.g., a few seconds) in the service of other 
cognitive tasks (e.g., problem solving) […]” (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, p. 378). Thus, 
working memory provides the necessary information at a specific time and a specific point 
that is required to execute a specific problem (Johnson-Laird, 2006). However, as mentioned 
above, emotionally laden material can disturb reasoning performance on deductive reasoning 
problems, for example (Blanchette & Richards, 2004). Other tasks may also impede working 
memory performance due to influences of emotional salient material (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003). 
One of the best known working memory models has been proposed by Baddeley and 
Hitch in 1974. The model was modified and developed further, but its current version seems 
to resemble the one suggested over 30 years ago (Baddeley, 2007). It contains three 
components which serve different purposes: the phonological loop, the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad, and the central executive (cp., Baddeley, 2003).The phonological loop stores and 
manipulates auditory and verbal information, whereas the visuo-spatial sketchpad is 
concerned with visual and spatial information. Both systems have only limited capacity and 
information gets lost, if it is not held actively in memory, e.g. via sub-vocal rehearsal. The 
central executive coordinates and monitors these systems and guides attention to focus on task 
demands and relevant details as well as to inhibit processing of task irrelevant information 
(e.g., Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998). Thereby, the attentional functions of the 
central executive seem to correspond to the ‘Supervisory Attentional System’ proposed by 
Norman and Shallice (1986). Involved working memory brain areas, especially for central 
executive-related processes are the frontal lobes and parietal lobes (cp., Baddeley, 2003). 
A totally different working memory model has been proposed by Postle (2006), in 
which “Working memory functions arise through the coordinated recruitment, via attention, 
of brain systems that have evolved to accomplish sensory-, representation-, and action-related 
functions.” (p. 23). Postle (2006) argues with his ‘emergent-property-model’ against the 
assumptions suggested by Baddeley and colleagues, who stated that working memory 
functions require specific and specialized sub-systems. Instead, he assumes that working 
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memory functions are based on the same systems that serve these functions while processing 
information independent of working memory processes (e.g., perception). 
Apart from the chosen working memory model, many experiments have been 
conducted to investigate working memory processes and their influences on deductive 
reasoning as well as the relationship between working memory and intelligence. Thus, 
working memory and deductive reasoning tasks are often presented in combination to test 
which kind of working memory load interferes most with the reasoning processes, and is 
therefore involved in reasoning. The influence of competing working memory tasks on 
syllogistic reasoning has been investigated for example by Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick, and 
Wynn (1993). They found performance decrements in syllogistic reasoning when participants 
had to solve a random number task in parallel. The generation of random numbers in turn is 
associated with central executive WM functions. In contrast, enhancing the cognitive load of 
the phonological loop via repeating a series of numbers did not influence the reasoning 
performance. An additional burden on the visuo-spatial sketchpad also yielded no interfering 
effects. Vice versa, Gilhooly et al. (1993) showed that syllogistic reasoning impaired the 
working memory functions and thus performance of the phonological loop and the central 
executive. Gilhooly and colleagues (Gilhooly, Logie, & Wynn, 2002) conducted a further 
experiment, but modified the procedure. They presented the premises of the syllogisms 
successively, which resulted in even worse reasoning performance. This time, the 
performance of all competing working memory tasks was affected. The authors conclude that 
successive premise presentation increases working memory load in syllogistic reasoning. 
Another study by Toms, Morris, and Ward (1993) applying a ‘dual-task’ paradigm with 
conditionals provided further support that the central executive is involved in deductive 
reasoning. A further study conducted by Klauer, Stegmaier, and Meiser (1997) points in the 
same direction. 
Other studies could show that participants with a higher working memory capacity 
solve syllogistic reasoning problems as well as conditional reasoning problems better than 
persons with lower working memory capacity (e.g., Barrouillet & Lecas., 1999; Capon, 
Handley, & Dennis, 2003; Copeland & Radvansky, 2004; Markovits, Doyon, & Simoneau, 
2002; Verschueren, Schaeken, & D'Ydewalle, 2005a, 2005b). Verschueren et al. (2005a, 
2005b) explain these findings by relating that persons with superior WM capacity have an 
easier access to deliberate analytical reasoning processes, whereas those with lower WM 
capacity rely more on intuitive and heuristic processes. Working memory capacity in turn is 
often associated with reasoning abilities in general (e.g., Bara, Bucciarelli, & Johnson-Laird, 
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1995; Barrouillet & Leças, 1999), which again are associated with intelligence (e.g., 
Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998; Stanovich & West 2000). Stanovich (1999), for 
example, cites numerous studies revealing a strong correlation between higher intelligence 
levels and better reasoning performance as well as higher working memory capacities. He 
concludes that persons with a superior IQ (i.e., intelligence quotient) have either an easier 
access recruiting rational processes or are able to use these rational processes more efficiently. 
To sum it up, working memory processes seem to be involved in reasoning, especially 
the central executive of Baddeley’s (2007) WM model, and reasoning performance appears to 
depend on WM capacity which is strongly related to intelligence level. Besides WM 
influences on theoretical and practical reasoning, the bearings of prior knowledge and beliefs 
are often discussed. Therefore, two of the experiments reported in the following section 
additionally applied a recognition test implementing prior knowledge about morals. So, as 
was mentioned earlier, it is only helpful to refer to a few findings on recognition research. 
 
1.9 Recognition 
Recognition is “[…] the ability to judge a recently encountered item as having been presented 
previously.” (Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007, p. 872). Within recognition memory, two 
components are usually differentiated: recollection and familiarity (Mandler, 1980). 
“Recollection involves remembering specific contextual details about a prior learning 
episode; familiarity involves simply knowing that an item was presented, without having 
available any additional information about the learning episode.” (Squire et al., 2007, p. 872). 
Tulving (1985, 2002) introduced similar terms (i.e., remember/know) to differentiate between 
episodic and semantic memory processes. These terms are also used for experimental 
paradigms (remember/know procedure) exploring the influences of familiarity and 
recollection on recognition performance (Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2009). 
Recollection is assumed to be a controlled, slow, effortful, conscious, and attention 
demanding process, whereas familiarity judgments are fast, unconscious, automatic, and 
require less effort (Yonelinas, 2002). Apart from the concrete memory model, which actually 
seems to be the case, all models propose two processes involved recognition memory thus 
representing ‘dual-process’ accounts. In the following, a few experimental paradigms and 
methods investigating recognition memory as well as the results of diverse studies will be 
reported. 
A typical word recognition test requires participants to learn a list of words which 
should be recognized later. After a delay period, participants are presented with a list of words 
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again. However, this time, not only the learned words (i.e., targets) are included, but also new, 
unlearned ones (i.e., distracters/foils). The participants’ task then is to judge whether they 
have seen/learned the word before or not. To evaluate participants’ recognition performance, 
it is important to consider not only correct (i.e., hits) or incorrect recognized words (i.e., false 
alarms), but also missed words that were on the list before (i.e., misses) as well as correctly 
rejected words (i.e., rejections) that were not earlier on the list. Calculating the ratio of the 
participants’ answers according to these different categories allows evaluating the recognition 
memory performance. This could be done with the ‘signal-detection’ theory for example, 
illustrated in a ‘receiver operating characteristic’ (ROC) graph (Squire et al., 2007). The “[…] 
signal-detection theory holds that each old item (or target) or new item (foil) is associated 
with a particular memory strength, which reflects the degree of certainty that an item did or 
did not appear on a recently presented list.” (Squire et al., 2007, p. 874). Plotting the results of 
such an experiment on a graph illustrates potential performance differences of discriminating 
targets from foils since “[…] the mean and variance of the target distribution are greater than 
those of the foil distribution.” (Squire et al., 2007, p. 874). The ROC curve shows the false 
alarms and hit rates of the participants together with a criterion value. Targets above the 
criterion value are correctly recognized, whereas foils above the criterion represent false 
alarms. 
Other recognition tests are the ‘remember/know procedure’ by Tulving (1985) or the 
‘process dissociation procedure’ by Jacoby (1991). These methods aim to explore the 
differential influences of recollection and familiarity on recognition performance. The 
remember/know procedure explicitly asks participants in the test phase whether they can 
remember the word together with additional details of the learning period, or whether they 
only have a feeling of familiarity with the item at hand. It is assumed that remember responses 
indicate recollection processes, whereas know responses measure familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002). The process dissociation procedure allows an even more reliable measure. Participants 
are split in two groups. Both groups learn two lists of words, presented once visually and once 
auditory. Then, in the test phase, one group should answer “Yes” to all words it recognizes 
(i.e., inclusion condition), the other group to only words it recognizes from the auditory 
learning condition (i.e., exclusion condition). If participants of the second group answer 
“Yes” to an old item that was on the visually presented learning list, these judgments are 
counted as familiarity-based. The ratio of the errors as compared to the overall correct 
recognized words of the inclusion group is then taken as evidence for the involved 
recollection performance (cp., Baddeley et al., 2009). 
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Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) investigated the influence 
of divided attention on recollection and familiarity-based recognition processes. Divided 
attention impaired only recollection performance, whereas familiarity-based judgments were 
unaffected. In an overview of diverse experiments, Jacoby (1991) takes these and further 
results as evidence that recognition depends on two separate processes, thereby concluding 
that recollection is an intentional, attention demanding process, and familiarity is unconscious 
and automatic. Yonelinas (2002) also mentions a few evidences in his review that support 
‘dual-process’ models explaining recognition performance as based on recollection and 
familiarity processes. First, recollection processes seem to be easier to disturb by distracters, 
both at the learning phase and in the test phase. A possible explanation might be that attention 
is divided and thus easily distracted that encoding of the learning situation fails, but a feeling 
of familiarity with the items could be built. Further, recollection judgments normally require 
much more time than familiarity judgments. Moreover, recognition performance decreases 
especially in older adults or patients with prefrontal cortex damages, when attentional 
resources are impaired. Yonelinas (2002) follows from these findings that recognition 
retrieval is based on two qualitatively distinct processes. These effects of divided attention 
tasks on recollection might also be linked to dual task effects on working memory. From 
experiments on working memory performance, it is known that a secondary task impairs 
performance (e.g., De Neys, Schaeken, & D`Ydewalle, 2005). Furthermore, working memory, 
especially the central executive in Baddeley’s (cp., Baddeley, 2003) working memory model, 
has been associated with attentional processes. Thus, the impairing effects on recollection of 
the divided attention tasks in recognition could account for reduced working memory 
capacities which also explain impaired performance in dual task experiments. 
Another explanation of the two different processes involved in recognition might be 
that, in general, different learning processes occur. Some materials are processed more deeply 
(i.e., ‘depth of processing), thus are remembered better, whereas other materials are processed 
more cursorily (i.e., shallow processing), activating only a feeling of familiarity (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). 
In addition, the content of the learning material seems to play an important role in 
recognition performance. Ohira, Winton, and Oyama (1998) for example, investigated the 
recognition performance with negative and positive as well as neutral words, and found a 
better recollection-based recognition performance for the negative emotional stimuli as 
compared to both of the other conditions. These results were replicated in a study by Inaba, 
Nomura, and Ohira, (2005), with the negative emotional words being recognized best, 
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followed by the positive emotional ones, and finally the neutral stimuli. They had however, 
reported a side effect where positive emotional words resulted in higher false alarm rates. In 
contrast to these experiments, Phelps, LaBar, and Spencer (1997) found a slightly better 
retrieval performance of positive compared to negative emotional stimuli, even though all 
affective laden words were recognized better than the neutral controls. An interesting study 
investigating attentional as well as emotional influences on recognition performance was 
conducted by Ferré (2003). He found that emotionally laden materials are always recognized 
better than neutral materials, even if participants did not focus on the affective valence of the 
items during the learning phase. To sum up, these studies show that emotionally laden 
materials are better recognized than neutral stimuli. An explanation might be that emotional 
material ‘catches’ attention, and is thus processed deeper (Kensinger & Corking, 2003). 
However, the last study particularly showed that attention cannot be the only factor 
accounting for these effects. The side effect found in the study by Inaba et al. (2005) might 
also be a hint for disturbing effects of emotional material on recognition performance. 
Another factor that might influence recognition is prior knowledge. Anderson (1974) 
conducted a study where participants had to learn sentences containing particular locations or 
persons. Some of the persons and locations appeared in two or three sentences thus could be 
associated with different sentences, whereas other persons and locations were only presented 
once. Later, in the test condition, the learned sentences and new sentences were presented and 
participants had to judge whether a sentence was from the study list or not. Participants 
needed more time to recognize sentences with multiple associations than sentences with 
persons and locations that only appeared once. This associative interference effect has become 
known as the ‘fan effect’ (Anderson, 1999), since the more associations a memory record has, 
the longer the serial search through all stored records takes till the correct one is found. In 
turn, interference increases the more associations with one and the same cue have to be 
learned. A study by Pirolli and Anderson (1985) revealed evidence that also highly over-
learned memories could still be interfered by multiple associations, although in total practice 
had positive effects on recognition performance. Peterson and Potts (1982) also investigated 
the impact of prior knowledge on recognition performance. However, they used true and false 
new facts as well as facts participants already knew before, thus implementing a far more 
realistic study design than the experiments before. They also found that newly learned 
information interfered with the retrieval of previously known facts. In contrast, the newly 
learned facts consistent with prior knowledge revealed a facilitating effect on recognition 
performance. 
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The referred studies so far seem to indicate the recognition memory and thus 
recognition performance is related to and influenced by prior knowledge, emotional load of 
the material applied, attentional processes, and working memory capacities. Furthermore, 
‘dual-process’ models of recognition assuming differential influences of recollection and 
familiarity might account best for the processes involved. Thus, there is evidence that 
recognition is concerned with similar processes and influencing factors as theoretical and 
practical reasoning. Now, three proposals will be reported that tried to combine some of the 
findings reported so far in “all-encompassing” models. 
 
1.10 Reasoning, emotion, and the human brain 
A few researchers already postulated some kind of common basis for practical and theoretical 
reasoning based on interactions of emotional/intuitive and rational processes in relation to 
diverse influencing factors (e.g., Adolphs, 1999, 2006; Damasio, 2006; Dolan, 2002; Le 
Doux, 2006; Thagard, 2006). They did not however, explicitly investigate theoretical and 
practical reasoning processes in combination, but instead tried to explore and to describe 
reasoning per se starting at a “more emotional perspective” since emotions were almost 
condemned for a while, only known as impairing factor of humans’ higher reasoning abilities 
(cp., Damasio, 2006). The resulting models range from Damasio’s (2006) ‘somatic marker 
hypothesis’ mainly based on patient studies, over Thagard’s (2006) computer-based 
assumptions about ‘hot thoughts’, to LeDoux’s (2006) ‘high and low road’ proposal in the 
emotional brain. 
Damasio (2006) proposed his ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ in 1994, stating that 
emotions are in the loop of reason, and “[…] that emotion could assist the reasoning process 
rather than necessarily disturb it, as was commonly assumed.” (preface, p. xvii). His 
suggestions are based on the idea that emotions are the source of the development of the 
human reasoning system via phylogeny. “[…] Emotions marked certain aspects of a situation, 
or certain outcomes of possible actions. Emotions achieved this marking quite overtly, as in a 
“gut feeling”, or covertly, via signals occurring below the radar of our awareness […]” 
(Damasio, 2006, preface, p. xviii). Further, he suggests that emotions play a role in intuition. 
Intuition is accumulated knowledge which comes unconsciously into the mind guiding or 
influencing decisions. These intuitions are therefore part of all reasoning processes that deal 
with prior knowledge. Often, they provide fast decisions, based on an automatic and 
unconscious process, and are emotionally ‘marked’. However, “the quality of one’s intuition 
depends on how well we have reasoned in the past […]” (Damasio, 2006, preface, p. xix). In 
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opposition to many misinterpretations of his proposals however, Damasio (2006) explicitly 
denotes that reasoning processes are based on emotions, rationality, and intuitions (i.e., over 
learned or over practiced prior knowledge), thus making emotions provide “[…] cognitive 
information, directly and via feelings.” (preface, p. xix). This means that the reasoning 
processes can be unconscious and automatic via intuitions, or deliberative and conscious, and 
both of these processes can be influenced by emotions, either directly or via feelings. Hence, 
Damasio (2006) subsumes emotional/intuitive and rational processes under the term cognition 
and states “[...] that the brain systems that are jointly engaged in emotion and decision-making 
are generally involved in the management of social cognition and behavior.” (preface, p. xix). 
He obtained evidences for his hypothesis and for the connection of intuitions and emotions as 
well as for the influence of emotionally laden knowledge on ethical decision making due to 
numerous patient studies. Comparing late-onset (i.e., in adulthood) and early-onset (i.e., in 
childhood) patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) provided 
insights in the development of human morality and the important function of emotions and 
intuitions: 
“[…] the early-onset patient appeared not to have learned the social conventions and 
ethical rules that should have governed their behavior. Whereas the adult-onset 
patients knew the rules but failed to act according to them, the early-onset case had 
never learned the rules to begin with. In other words, while the adult-onset cases told 
us that emotions were required for the deployment of proper social behavior; the early-
onset cases showed that emotions were also needed for mastering the know-how 
behind proper social behavior.” (Damasio, 2006, preface, p. xx). 
So far, the general assumptions of the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio, 2006) have 
been outlined. Now, the basic ideas behind the terms ‘somatic’ and ‘marker’ will be explained 
more explicitly. If we are confronted, for example, with a decision between two choices, a 
rationalist view requires reasoning about the different possibilities accurately, perhaps 
conducting a cost/benefit analysis, weighing losses and gains, and applying formal logic to 
arrive at the best solution available. Unfortunately, attention and working memory are of 
limited capacity, thus, even simple decisions would lead to a “cognitive overload”. This 
scenario provides the arguments for Damasio’s proposal of ‘somatic markers’ influencing and 
therefore enabling us to even achieve a decision at all. Damasio (2006) claims that before we 
start to do a cost/benefit analysis we imagine different possible outcomes of a decision. Good 
outcomes are experienced as prospective ‘good feelings’, bad outcomes as prospective ‘bad 
feelings’. These feelings are about the body and Damasio (2006) “[…] gave the phenomenon 
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the technical term somatic state (“soma” is Greek for body); and because it “marks” an image, 
[he] called it a marker.” (p. 173). So, ‘somatic markers’ reduce the number of possible 
alternatives via emotional feelings and prior knowledge, but do not exclude subsequent 
rational reasoning processes. “Somatic markers may not be sufficient for normal human 
decision-making since a subsequent process of reasoning and final selection will still take 
place in many though not all instances. Somatic markers probably increase the accuracy and 
efficiency of the decision process. Their absence reduces them.” (Damasio, 2006, p. 173). In 
essence, these feelings based on emotions always activate the whole body while a person 
imagining various potential outcomes of possible decisions seems to be the main point for 
critics. However, the overall assumption that decisions are influenced by prior knowledge and 
emotions seems to be a position currently shared by many researchers. 
An example of another researcher assuming an involvement of emotional and rational 
processes in reasoning is LeDoux (2006) and his suggestions about the emotional brain. The 
main difference to Damasio’s proposal is that LeDoux derived his suggestions from animal 
research and focuses therefore on one special emotion, namely fear. LeDoux however, 
extends his assumptions to humans and embeds his theory in the broader framework of 
cognition. He starts with the proposal that emotions represent a biological function of the 
nervous system which appears to be rather automatic and unintended than controlled and 
planned. LeDoux (2006) thinks that this is due to the fact that the connections of the 
emotional brain systems to the more rational ones are stronger than the reverse connections. 
He also states that basic emotions like fear are inborn and that we humans share them with 
many animals. Further, he assumes that emotions and cognitions (i.e., rational processes in 
LeDoux’s proposal) operate unconsciously and only the results of these processes are 
conscious. He also claims that emotions and cognitions are separated but interacting mental 
functions based on separated but interacting brain systems. Then, he defines the fear system 
as a system to detect dangers and produce defense reactions to increase the probability of 
survival. Therefore, this system has been developed before any conscious feelings of fear 
during phylogeny. LeDoux follows from this assumption that feelings of fear are only a 
byproduct of the evolution of two neural systems, one producing defense reactions and the 
other causing consciousness. Due to animal experiments investigating the amygdala, LeDoux 
found diverse evidences for his suggestions. He could show that animals react on threatening 
stimuli for example by releasing stress hormones, increasing blood pressure, and a startle 
response or by freezing. These reactions and somatic responses depend on diverse brain areas 
as the central grey, the lateral hypothalamus, the paraventricular hypothalamus, and the 
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reticulopontine caudate to which the central core of the amygdala projects. However, if one or 
several of these output pathways of the amygdala to the respective areas are lesioned, the 
specific reactions and responses are missing. The interesting fact about this system is that the 
amygdala itself receives two kinds of input. First, it receives input directly from the thalamus, 
and then later on it receives input from cortical areas like the visual or auditory system. 
Humans possess a so-called ‘high-road’ (i.e., cortical pathway) and a ‘low-road’ (i.e., sub-
cortical pathway) as pathways in the brain. The low-road is a fast and imprecise way 
preparing us to react to a threatening stimulus as fast as possible, even if we did not have the 
total information about the stimulus. It might be that the stimulus is not threatening at all. For 
example, while walking through the forest, one detects something looking like a snake. The 
low-road activates the fear system so that we could react with a flight response. If the high-
road then provides us with the information that the potential snake is only a stock of a tree, the 
flight response may be deemed inadequate. Therefore, the high-road represents the analyzing 
system, telling us what kind of stimulus we are really confronted with, enabling us therefore 
to suppress a potential flight-or-fight response. Before the amygdala received the input from 
the sensory cortices, it does not know whether the occurring stimulus is really a threatening 
one or not; thus one might say the amygdala is blind and deaf. Another important structure 
contributing to the fear system is the hippocampus formation. The hippocampus and 
circumjacent brain regions provide us with the necessary information to analyze more 
complex situations and to store memories of emotional experiences. However, if the 
Hippocampus is damaged we are still able to perceive threatening situations and create an 
implicit emotional memory of them. Interestingly, implicit emotional memories and explicit 
memories of emotional experiences are connected via working memory which is responsible 
for our immediate conscious experiences. The interplay of all these cortical and sub-cortical 
areas enables us to evaluate stimuli as threatening or not, and provides us with the adequate 
reactions, the emotional feelings, and the memories required in adequately handling similar 
situations in the future. 
Although LeDoux (2006) focuses almost exclusively on fear, the preceding 
explanations revealed evidences that emotion and cognition (i.e., rationality) are closely 
related and interdependent. Thus, it seems as if emotion and rationality belong together and 
are based on each other, or as LeDoux (2006) puts it: ‘also the neurologist Antonio Damasio 
underlines in his book Descartes’ Error the rationality of emotion’ (p. 41, loose translation 
from the German version). 
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Similar to Damasio’s and LeDoux’s proposals, Thagard (2006) stresses the importance 
of interacting emotions, intuitions, and rationality during decision making, a procedure he 
calls ‘informed intuition’. He provides diverse examples as to why intuitions and emotions are 
necessary for coherent and efficient reasoning processes and proposes several computer-based 
models to illustrate his assumptions. Thagard (2006) especially tries to show that classical 
philosophical theories as well as research based on logic-related tasks (e.g., syllogistic 
reasoning) are insufficient to explain or to investigate human reasoning. He states for 
example: 
“Practical inference is not simply produced by practical syllogisms or cost-benefit 
calculations, but requires assessment of the coherence of positively and negatively 
interconnected goals and actions. This assessment is an unconscious process based in 
part on emotional valences attached to the various goals to be taken into consideration, 
and yields a conscious judgment that is not just a belief about what is the best action to 
perform but also a positive emotional attitude toward that action. Reason and emotion 
need not be in conflict with each other […].” (Thagard, 2006, p. 24 f). 
Thagard (2006) also implements Damasio’s (2006) ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ with its 
neural foundations of integrative cognitive-affective processes into a neurocomputational 
theory of decision making, named GAGE. The brain structures involved in his model are the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, and the ventral tegmental area. The hippocampus provides the contextual 
information, and associated with the amygdala and the VMPFC, and, depending on memories, 
an emotional evaluation is provided making predictions about future outcomes. The NAcc 
receives dopaminergic VTA projections and represents a gateway for somatic markers, 
whereby “[…] the hippocampus determines what passes through this gateway by limiting 
throughput to those responses that are consistent with the current environment.” (Thagard, 
2006, p. 95). The emotionally laden predicted outcome of these circuits is then passed to brain 
areas associated with higher-level cognitive processes. Although Thagard (2006) tried to 
model the brain processes of ‘informed intuition’ with a computer-based approach, he admits 
that computer-based models will run into difficulties and may never resemble human 
reasoning and problem solving abilities due to the fact that they lack emotions. When open 
and fuzzy problems appear or non-routine directions are necessary, computer models will fail. 
Thagard (2006) regards this insufficiency of computer models and artificial intelligence as 
further evidence for the necessary involvement of emotional cognition in human reasoning 
and problem solving. 
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The only one of the three cited researches explicitly referring to theoretical and 
practical reasoning is Thagard (2006) in his chapter about ‘critique of emotional reason’. He 
claims that “Emotion is relevant to theoretical reason, which concerns what to believe, and to 
practical reason, which concerns what to do.” (p. 251). However, since the chapter is mainly 
concerned with abductive reasoning and the generation and evaluation of scientific research 
hypotheses no further details will be reported. Instead, the following outlet tries to integrate 
and subsume the different research areas and findings reported to derive appropriate 
assumptions for the following experiments and propose the leading research idea. However, a 
final methodological excursus on brain imaging seems necessary beforehand since one of the 
following experiments applied this sophisticated technique. 
 
1.11 Excursus – The method of brain imaging 
Brain imaging techniques, especially functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
represent a sophisticated, non-invasive method for cognitive neuroscience to explore the 
human brain and its functions while executing cognitive processes (cp. Raichle, 1994). 
Thereby, “understanding the brain depends on conceptual, anatomical, statistical, and causal 
models that link ideas about how it works to observations and experimental data.” (Friston, 
2005, p. 58). Besides relating anatomical correlates to cognitive processes, research also aims 
at investigating the functional correlates of cognitive processes, exploring causal 
dependencies, and finally, predicting human behavior through brain activity (cp. Friston, 
2005). The basic idea behind the MR-technology is that neurons in the brain show similar 
properties like neurons in the rest of the body. This means, they need energy (i.e., oxygen and 
glucose) delivered via blood flow to “[…] sustain their cellular integrity and to perform their 
specialized functions.” (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2009, p. 152). fMRI measures these 
metabolic changes which are assumed to correlate with neural activity (Jäncke, 2005). If parts 
of the brain become more active than others, they need more energy. This leads to a 
hemodynamic response, which increases the regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in these 
specific parts of the brain to provide the increased energy needs (Jäncke, 2005). The required 
oxygen is transported by hemoglobin which has specific magnetic properties. The different 
magnetic properties of the hemoglobin as well as those of the encompassing brain tissue rely 
on the nuclear spins of the hydrogen atoms involved. When oxygenated, diamagnetic 
hemoglobin reaches the activated cells, the oxygen is absorbed and the hemoglobin becomes 
deoxygenated, and thus paramagnetic. Importantly, the rCBF delivers much more oxygen as 
could be absorbed by the active cells, therefore results in a surplus of oxygenated hemoglobin. 
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A magnetic resonance tomograph (MRT) measures the ratio between oxygenated and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin, which is referred to as the blood oxygenation level-dependent 
(BOLD) effect (Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & Glynn, 1990). The measured BOLD signal intensities 
increase if the concentration of oxygenated hemoglobin rises, since the blood magnetic 
susceptibility of oxygenated hemoglobin changes. It then closely matches the magnetic 
susceptibility of the circumjacent biological tissue (Kwong, Belliveau, Chesler, Goldberg, 
Weisskoff, Poncelet, Kennedy, Hoppel, Cohen, Turner, Cheng, Brady, & Rosen, 1992). 
Deoxygenated hemoglobin in contrast leads to susceptibility artifacts and signal decrements. 
To detect the small ratio differences in the brain, an MRT-scanner produces a powerful 
magnetic field (e.g., 1.5, or 3, or 7 Tesla). The magnetic moments of the protons of the water 
molecules (i.e., hydrogen atoms) in a brain align to this magnetic field. Then, a short 
electromagnetic radio frequency pulse is given to disturb this alignment for a few of these 
protons. When this pulse is turned off, the protons turn back to their original magnetization 
alignment (Jäncke, 2005). These alignment changes can be measured. However, the measured 
ratio or BOLD effect is extremely small, reflecting only one to five percent signal change. 
This small signal change relies on the fact that the whole brain is permanently active, so that 
an additional task requiring specific cognitive processes and associated brain areas only leads 
to a minimal change of activity. Thus, repeated measures of the same cognitive processes, and 
therefore activated brain areas, are necessary to obtain a better signal-to-noise ratio via 
averaging of trials. 
Up to now, it has been stated that fMRI measures increased blood flow correlated with 
increased brain activity of specific neurons executing specific cognitive processes. However, 
the increased blood flow with its oxygenated hemoglobin takes a few seconds to be directed 
to a specific brain area. Furthermore, this blood flow reaches its maximum not before 5 to 6 
seconds. In contrast, the neural firing of active neurons only requires milliseconds (Jäncke, 
2005). One might assume therefore, that there is some kind of critical shortage of the brain 
cells involved before new energy is delivered by the blood stream. This should be reflected in 
an initial dip of the oxygen-deoxygen-hemoglobin ratio. In fact, scanners with higher 
magnetic fields (e.g., 7 Tesla) are able to detect this undershoot or initial dip (Jäncke, 2005). 
This initial dip in turn seems to represent neural firing better than the “classical” BOLD 
signal. Nevertheless, this initial dip is part of the whole BOLD effect and therefore the BOLD 
signal is useful to measure brain activity (Jäncke, 2005). Applying high magnetic fields (e.g., 
7 Tesla) to humans appears to still be critical concerning duration, sensations of vertigo, and 
the like (cp., Theysohn, Maderwald, Kraff, Moenninghoff, Ladd, & Ladd, 2008). 
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Apart from the latest findings “[…] the exact relationship between the measured fMRI 
signal [i.e., the ‘BOLD’ contrast] and the underlying neural activity is [still] unclear.” 
(Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001, p. 150). According to Logothetis 
and colleagues for example, it reflects the “[…] input and intracortical processing of a given 
area rather than its spiking output.” (Logothetis et al., 2001, p. 150). That is, the obtained 
fMRI signal reflects rather synaptic activity than action potentials (i.e., spikes). Others then 
showed that an increment of rCBF can be independent from spike activity, but always 
correlates with local field potentials (Thomsen, Offenhauser, & Lauritzen, 2004). Local field 
potentials are “[…] electrical fields recorded from microelectrodes in the brain thought to 
reflect the weighted average of input signals on the dendrites and cell bodies of neurons in the 
vicinity of the electrode.” (Raichle & Mintun, 2006, p. 452). Viswanathan and Freeman 
(2007) then provided evidences that also the oxygen concentration can be independent from 
spiking activity, but again is correlated to LFPs. Actually, there is evidence that the brain 
activity measured by fMRI reflects rather synaptic input processes to neurons than cellular 
firing (Raichle & Mintun, 2006). Nevertheless, this seems to not prohibit applying this 
technique in measuring brain activity and inferring the associated cognitive processes from 
these activations since other researchers showed that LFPs and spiking activity could be used 
interchangeably to predict the measured imaging signals reliably (Mukamel, 
As was mentioned above, applying fMRI in research on cognitive processes requires 
the presentation of several stimuli of the same category to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. 
More importantly, due to the permanent background activity in the whole brain, fMRI data 
analyses not only deals with averaging images of one participant, but also calculates contrasts 
between a condition and the average of this background activity. Moreover, research also 
aims at exploring the specific functional areas executing specific cognitive processes. Thus, 
the subtraction method is also used to identify functionally specific brain areas by calculating 
regionally specific activity differences associated with the execution of different tasks. 
Gelbard, Arieli, 
Hasson, Fried, & Malach, 2005). 
Experimental designs for an fMRI experiment can be block-designs or event-related 
designs. Block-designs are used to present several stimuli of one category in succession. This 
often leads to an increased BOLD signal, since the same brain regions require more and more 
energy (Jäncke, 2005). However, effects of habituation or fatigue of the participants might 
then occur, and the BOLD signal might not increase, instead, it may reach a steady state or 
even decrease (be reminded that fMRI measures oxygen-deoxygen-hemoglobin differences, 
thus the BOLD signal changes with the time course of the blood flow). Furthermore, the 
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single events cannot be analyzed in separation. In contrast, an fMRI experiment can also 
apply an event-related design resulting in a series of images that can be analyzed time-locked 
to specific single events. Most often, effects of habituation, fatigue, or preparedness can be 
excluded by implementing this procedure. Since most experimental studies are conducted to 
draw inferences about effects in populations, fMRI data are also analyzed averaging over 
several persons. This further improves the signal-to-noise ratio. 
The current section described the most important technical aspects of one brain 
imaging method (i.e., fMRI) since this technique was also applied in the last experiment 
reported in the following. The advantage and reason for implementing such an experimental 
procedure depends on the fact that fMRI allows to measure brain processes and associate 
these brain processes to cognitive processes presumably involved in the execution of a 
specific task. Since numerous brain imaging studies in the domains of theoretical and 
practical reasoning are available, there are diverse evidences which brain areas are associated 
with specific cognitive processes involved in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. Thus, 
using fMRI seemed an appropriate way to explore the brain areas involved in the execution of 
the experimental task applied here in relation to the known findings, and subsequently, to 
infer the associated cognitive processes. This would provide further evidences for the findings 
and assumptions based on the preceding behavioral experiments within this thesis. Now, the 
findings referred so far will be integrated, and the leading research ideas as well as the applied 
research paradigm for the following experiments will be presented. Also, a few term 
clarifications will be proposed. The concrete hypotheses for each single experiment could be 
found in the respective experimental section. 
 
1.12 Integration part and derivation of experimental paradigm 
The preceding introduction reported diverse findings of theoretical and practical reasoning 
research based on behavioral and brain imaging experiments. However, as mentioned already, 
these studies were either on theoretical reasoning or on practical reasoning, but few 
investigated these reasoning domains together. An exception, at least partly, is the brain 
imaging study by Fiddick et al. (2005) reported above. Although theoretical and practical 
reasoning were mainly investigated in isolation, the referred studies and findings seem to 
provide some overlap and similarities between these two reasoning domains. Numerous 
studies of both domains yielded evidences that reasoning, both theoretical and practical, is 
based on rational and emotional/intuitive processes. The ‘dual-process’ models seem to be 
currently the most promising approaches in accounting for the reasoning processes involved 
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in both reasoning domains. Theoretical and practical reasoning furthermore, can be influenced 
by and depend on working memory capacity and intelligence level as well as prior 
knowledge/beliefs. The content and the emotional load of a reasoning problem as well as the 
context in which it is embedded and therefore the relationship to the kind and level of prior 
knowledge seem to be critical for humans’ reasoning performance. Interestingly, nearly all of 
these influencing and mediating factors can facilitate or impair reasoning processes. Conflicts 
in reasoning especially appear if the task at hand contains incongruities due to its structure or 
offers two or more possible decisions which contradict each other, especially, when 
participants are forced to come to an immediate decision. A ‘classical’ example of such a 
conflict is the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), where over practiced/learned knowledge (i.e., 
reading, comprehending, and naming of color words, thus language processing/language 
skills) conflicts with the task demand of explicitly naming the ink color of the presented color 
words. Thus, automatic, perhaps unconscious, fast reasoning processes conflict with 
deliberatively more demanding, slow, and conscious ones. This is one of the oldest examples 
of an incongruence embedded in a task, resulting in heightened decision times and/or error 
rates. This incongruity refers to conflicting reasoning processes caused by the task demands. 
In deductive reasoning, similar effects might occur if the content of the problem conflicts with 
its logical form, representing an interaction of content and logic. In fact, Wilkins (1928) 
showed that persons’ reasoning abilities are affected due to an interaction of the content of a 
reasoning task and its logical structure/form. A more current example for such an interaction 
has been reported above (i.e., ‘belief bias’, Evans et al., 1983). Other examples outside the 
theoretical reasoning research domain are dilemmas, where either decision leads to a negative 
outcome (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). However, only the contents related to the possible 
decisions are in conflict, and not content and logical structure of the task. 
There are many more examples, but most of them seem to coerce persons to stop or to 
override upcoming intuitions (i.e., prior knowledge, beliefs, attitudes) and/or emotions, 
starting to reason more extensively, thus deliberative and rational about the actual problem. 
One might say such problems require an individual to switch from the low-road to the high-
road (cp., LeDoux, 2006), or to monitor and to guide upcoming ‘somatic markers’ in the 
‘right’ reasoning direction (cp., Damasio, 2006), or else, to control ‘hot thoughts/informed 
intuitions’ and turn them into ‘cold reasoning processes’ (cp., Thagard, 2006). Whatever 
explanation and model is chosen, errors or increasing decision times occurring in the 
reasoning process solving problems/dilemmas/tasks like those mentioned above seem to 
denote that diverse (sub)-processes are involved in human reasoning. Therefore, ‘dual-
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process’ accounts or even ‘threefold-process’ models appear to explain human reasoning best. 
It seems to be more important that rational and emotional/intuitive processes are involved in 
human reasoning, but the proportions of these processes involved in an actual problem are 
varied and weighted by the reasoner (e.g., WM capacity, prior knowledge, intelligence) as 
well as by the reasoning problem at hand (e.g., problem complexity, emotional load of the 
problem, problem content). Additionally, the brain imaging results of diverse studies of both 
reasoning domains yielded evidences that there are specialized brain areas for specific 
cognitive processes. Reasoning per se however, seems to activate almost always a kind of 
“basic” brain network independent from the actual task, which has been shown in the 
application of conjunction analysis. 
Taken all these findings on human reasoning, both theoretical and practical, into 
account leads to several assumptions about human reasoning: 
- Theoretical and practical reasoning are partly based on a common neural network 
in the brain. 
- Theoretical and practical reasoning are similarly based on rational and 
emotional/intuitive cognitive processes. 
- The brain areas and associated cognitive processes involved in a specific reasoning 
problem/task vary with the specific cognitive abilities of the reasoner (e.g., 
working memory capacity, intelligence level, prior knowledge/beliefs/attitudes) 
and the specific problem characteristics (e.g., problem complexity, emotional load 
of the problem, problem structure, decision alternatives). Thus, the contributions of 
specific brain areas and associated cognitive processes involved in solving a 
reasoning problem vary. However, a kind of ‘basic’ or common neural network, 
and seemingly similar associated processes are always involved. This ‘basic’ 
network and its associated cognitive processes are similar for theoretical and 
practical reasoning, whereby the involved processes represent rational and 
emotional/intuitive proportions. 
- Theoretical and practical reasoning should and can be investigated together to 
provide evidence for these assumptions. 
A few term clarifications seem necessary for the following work in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. ‘Intuitive’ means processes based on (over) learned prior knowledge, thus 
automatic and fast processes. ‘Emotional’ means emotional load/evaluations of these 
‘intuitive’ processes, presumably activating emotional feelings again, when a specific 
‘emotionally’ laden prior knowledge is retrieved. Therefore, a very sketchy connection is 
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assumed between the terms ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006) and ‘emotional/intuitive’, 
representing almost the same. ‘Rational’ means processes related to the broad term of ‘pure’ 
reason, thus slow and deliberative processes. There is no assumption about conscious or 
unconscious processes or whether the assumed ‘somatic markers’ really activate somatic 
bodily states, since this is far beyond the scope of the current work. Furthermore, the 
suggestion of ‘emotional/intuitive’ and ‘rational’ processes denotes both as ‘cognitive 
processes’. Finally, both processes are derived from the proposal of ‘dual-process’ accounts 
explaining human reasoning by Evans (2008). In accordance with Evans, ‘emotional/intuitive’ 
processes refer to ‘System 1/Type 1’ processes, and ‘rational’ processes to ‘System 2/Type 2’ 
processes. The same constraints, Evans (2008) proposes himself, account for these 
assumptions since different terms and ‘dual-process’ accounts are available, although it seems 
that they share a common basis. 
To investigate these assumptions it seemed necessary to create stimulus material 
combining theoretical and practical reasoning. A sub-goal of the following experiments was 
to avoid the weaknesses of the practical reasoning items, such as dilemmas, as mentioned 
above. To fulfill the aspect of a task concerning theoretical reasoning, deductive inference 
problems (in the following often short: ‘problems’) were chosen. To obtain practical 
proportions within these reasoning problems, they were partly filled with moral-related (i.e., 
moral, unmoral) content. This moral-related content was derived from the articles of the 
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ which seemed to be the only existing external 
criterion for morals available (see also methods). 
The reasoning problems contained moral, unmoral, abstract, and neutral content for 
Pre-Study I and Experiment I. Pre-Study II and Experiments II + V applied additional positive 
and negative emotional control problems. Pre-Study III as well as the Experiments III + IV 
dealt with moral and unmoral reasoning problems and newly developed neutral content 
problems as well as an additional recognition task. Recognition items contained also moral, 
unmoral, and neutral content-laden sentences. The second sentence however, was rearranged 
so that drawing a deductive inference was made impossible. Participants’ task in all 
experiments was to judge the validity of the given conclusion of the problems as valid or 
invalid.9
                                                 
9 Note that for the current purposes of the following experiments a valid deductive inference was one, whose 
conclusion is true in every case in which all its premises are true (cp., Jeffrey, 1981). 
 Concerning the recognition items in Experiments III + IV, participants had to judge 
whether the third sentence matched a part of the first one literally or not. The experiments 
contained the within-subject factors content and validity, whereby Experiments III + IV had 
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one extra task (within-subject factors content and ‘matching’) and three or two groups, 
respectively, encompassing the between-subject factor group and representing a mixed 
factorial design (task by group). Dependent variables were error rates and decision times for 
all experiments (i.e., reasoning performance), but Experiment III and IV also measured 
participants’ moral judgment competence level by applying an additional test (i.e., MJT by 
Lind, 1978, 2008, see corresponding methods sections) as well as participants’ recognition 
performance. Experiment V also recorded participants’ brain activity while solving the 
reasoning problems. Participants, different groups, or treatments of different groups 
represented the independent variables. 
All moral-related content (i.e., moral, unmoral) problems were derived from the 
articles of the ‘Declaration of Human Rights’. Moral problems were according to these 
articles, but unmoral ones contradicted them. Abstract problems represented ‘pure’ deductive 
problems according to formal logic, as reported above. Neutral reasoning problems contained 
statements about daily tasks (e.g., visit a coiffeur) and emotional ones about highly emotional 
arousing situations (e.g., friendships, winning the jackpot, loneliness). The latter problems 
served only as controls. All of these problems were deductive inference problems borrowed 
from the Modus Ponens version of ‘classical’ conditional reasoning (see above). Since 
participants should judge the conclusion according to its validity, they were asked to reason 
deductively, independent of any content. However, because half of the moral-related 
problems were constructed with a kind of incongruity, participants should also show some 
reasoning and answering according to the moral-related content indicated by an incongruence 
effect. 
The incongruity of the moral-related problems is related to the moral-invalid and 
unmoral-valid reasoning problems (congruent problems were moral-valid and unmoral-
invalid) where validity status and morality status of the conclusion contradicted each other. 
For example, the conclusion “The person must be killed.” contradicts common moral beliefs 
(and the ‘Human Rights Articles’), but would follow necessarily from the premises if this 
conclusion is valid. This incongruence of the moral-related problems was assumed to be 
related to prior knowledge of morals. Knowledge of morals seems to be learned, especially 
concerning the contents of the human rights articles, and might be represented as beliefs or 
attitudes about moral issues. Further, it could be suggested that morals are learned through 
parents, school, religion, and the like, and represents highly emotional laden content due to its 
relation to obedience, guilt, and punishment. Thus, morals as emotionally laden prior 
knowledge could also reflect ‘somatic markers’ or strong personal attitudes. The 
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incongruence should therefore lead to a reasoning process about morals. If participants would 
answer in the incongruent conditions according to morals, and ignore the deductive task 
demands of the reasoning problems, this would indicate that they did practical reasoning 
instead of ‘pure’ theoretical reasoning. This would be reflected in errors on these incongruent 
reasoning problems. In turn, if participants would answer correctly in the incongruent cases, 
this might serve as a hint for suppressed upcoming emotional/intuitive processes due to 
rational ones, perhaps mediated via working memory processes. 
Concerning the neutral reasoning problems, a potential content effect was expected. If 
this neutral content improves reasoning performance compared to the abstract problems, this 
could also represent influences of prior knowledge since the neutral problems contained 
contents about daily and familiar situations. 
The abstract problems in turn were assumed to represent ‘pure’ deductive, formal 
logical reasoning processes, and therefore ‘pure’ rational ones. There seems no possibility of 
emotional or intuitive influences, since they encompassed no content at all (although this 
assumption could be questioned; cp., Manktelow, 2004). If participants would have great 
difficulties with these problems, this could indicate that they are not able to reason in a ‘pure’ 
rational way, according to logic. 
These were the basic ideas behind the experimental paradigm applied in the following 
experiments. For further details concerning the applied reasoning problems and recognition 
items as well as specific settings, groups, and measuring techniques, please see the particular 
introduction and methods section of each experiment. The same accounts for the concrete 
hypotheses for each single experiment. In the following chapter, the development and 
evaluation of the reasoning problems, and thus the first pre-study, will be reported. 
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2. Pre-Study I 
The first pre-study was conducted to evaluate the moral, unmoral, abstract, and neutral 
deductive reasoning problems concerning their intended applicability. It was of interest as to 
how people perceive these problems according to their inherent logical structure (all problems 
were deductive inference problems), according to their content (differences between moral-
related content, neutral content, and “no content” problems), and according to their emotional 
load. 
 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
A total of 20 participants, 3 males with a mean age of 24.67 years (S.D. = standard deviation 
= ±1.53) and 17 females with a mean age of 24.41 years (S.D. ±6.15), participated in the pre-
study. Participants came from local universities and gave written informed consent. 
 
2.1.2 Material 
The stimulus material for all following experiments was based on logical reasoning problems: 
deductive inference problems borrowed from the Modus Ponens version of ‘classical’ 
conditional reasoning problems. These deductive inference problems consisted of three 
sentences (major premise, minor premise, and conclusion). The first premise, the conditional 
(“If A, then B.”), is followed by a second premise, the categorical (“A.”), and finally a 
conclusion (“B.”). This conclusion follows necessarily from the two premises, irrelevant of 
content. To obtain a variation in the problems and create a task that could be executed by the 
participants, all problems were presented once with a valid (“B.”) and in the other instance 
with an invalid (“Not B.”) conclusion. Thus, half of the problems contained a conclusion that 
followed necessarily from the premises whereas in the other half of the cases the conclusion 
did not follow from the premises. 
Since letters or numbers were assumed to be ‘the content-free version’ of such a 
deductive inference problem, they seem to represent ‘pure’ deductive reasoning best (i.e., 
theoretical reasoning according to logic/rationality, see also introduction on logic above). 
Therefore, the version with varying letters was chosen to make up the ‘pure’ deductive (i.e., 
abstract) problem condition (original German abstract problems of Pre-Study I and 
Experiments I + II + V could be found in the Appendix A, p. 168). 
The problems concerning practical reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning) were derived from 
the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, adopted and proclaimed by the General 
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Assembly of United Nations in 1948 (http://un.org/Overview/rights.html, 09/27/2008, 10.28 
a.m.). It was chosen since it seems that there is no generally accepted basis for morality thus 
its articles were assumed to represent the only existing external criterion for an (almost) 
worldwide shared moral standard. The deductive inference problems for the morality 
condition were filled with moral (according to common moral beliefs) or unmoral 
(contradicting common moral beliefs) content. Thus, moral-related contents of the major 
premises were either in accordance with the articles of the ‘Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(e.g., “If a person is a prisoner of war, he must not be enslaved.”) or contradicting these 
articles (e.g., “If a person is a prisoner of war, he must be enslaved.”). The moral status of a 
problem was determined by the conclusion which was either moral or unmoral (e.g., “The 
person must not be enslaved” vs. “The person must be enslaved.”). This last sentence was also 
varied by validity. The deductive inferences therefore, resulted in moral-valid, moral-invalid, 
unmoral-valid, and unmoral-invalid problems.10
The neutral content problems served as content-filled, theoretical reasoning related 
controls and contained statements about daily tasks (e.g., visit a coiffeur), again with a valid 
or invalid conclusion (original German neutral problems applied in Pre-Study I and 
Experiments I + II + V could be found in Appendix A, p.168). 
 
Four deductive inference problems per condition were presented. Since each problem 
was presented twice, once with a valid conclusion and in the other instance with an invalid 
conclusion, a total of 32 reasoning problems resulted, representing a 4 (content) × 2 (validity) 
within-subject factorial design (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Design of Pre-Study I and Experiment I. 
content factor 
moral unmoral abstract neutral 
validity 
factor 
valid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
invalid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
 
For the pre-study, Questionnaires were constructed with one problem per page (all 
three sentences). Participants were then asked how much this proposition is in their opinion 
related to logical reasoning, morals, and emotions, respectively (see Appendix C for an 
                                                 
10 Note that problems were presented in German language, hence, were according to the German version of the 
‘Declaration of Human Rights’. Original German moral-related problems for all Experiments and Pre-Studies 
could be found in the Appendix A (p. 167). 
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example, p. 173). To avoid order-effects problems were randomly arranged. Participants 
could answer on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (nothing) up to 4 (very much) points. 
 
2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants received a short instruction with an exemplary problem on page one. Then they 
were requested to fill out the questionnaire without a time limit. The questionnaire also asked 
for demographic data. 
 
2.2 Results 
Analyses were done with SPSS©
Calculating the effects of the ratings for all problems differentiated by content and 
validity yielded significant effects in the logic dimension (χ
 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA 1989 - 2009) and 
significance level for all analyses was set to p = .05. Non-parametric Friedman and Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests were used for the analysis of all pre-studies. 
2(df = degrees of freedom = 7) = 
40.281, p < .001), the morality dimension (χ2(7) = 113.564, p < .001), and the emotionality 
dimension (χ2(7) = 92.381, p < .001). The single comparisons according to Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests are reported in Appendix D (p. 174).11
Regarding only the effects according to the content without validity revealed 
significant differences in the logic dimension (χ
 
2(3) = 15.278, p = .002), the morality 
dimension (χ2(3) = 50.455, p < .001), and the emotionality dimension (χ2
                                                 
11 Note that for all experiments, particularly the pre-studies, many contrasts were calculated due to the 
explorative character of this work. These contrasts however, might not have been orthogonal. 
(3) = 40.901, p < 
.001). The Wilcoxon signed rank tests (Figure 4) showed significant differences in the logic 
dimension for the unmoral problems as compared to all others (vs. moral: z = -2.829, p = 
.005; vs. neutral: z = -2.399, p = .016; vs. abstract: z = -3.183, p = .001), and for the abstract 
problems compared to the neutral ones (z = -2.462, p = .014). The other contrasts were 
insignificant (moral vs. neutral: z = -.143, p = .886; moral vs. abstract: z = -1.677, p = .094). 
In the morality dimension, the moral-related problems (moral and unmoral) yielded higher 
values than the neutral and abstract ones (moral vs. neutral: z = -3.828, p < .001; moral vs. 
abstract: z = -3.828, p < .001; unmoral vs. neutral: z = -3.728, p < .001; unmoral vs. abstract: 
z = -3.730, p < .001). The moral-related problems did not differ (moral vs. unmoral: z = -
1.747, p = .081), and so did the abstract and neutral ones (z = -1.000, p = .317). Additionally, 
the moral-related problems were rated higher in the emotionality dimension than all other 
conditions (moral vs. neutral: z = -3.578, p < .001; moral vs. abstract: z = -3.520, p < .001; 
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unmoral vs. neutral: z = -3.578, p < .001; unmoral vs. abstract: z = -3.623, p < .001). Finally, 
the neutral problems differed in the emotionality dimension from the abstract ones (z = -
3.189, p = .001), whereas the moral and unmoral ones showed no differences (z = -.106, p = 
.916). 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean ratings and standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral, and abstract problems in the dimensions 
logic, morality, and emotionality. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of the pre-study seemed to confirm the applicability of the reasoning problems. 
They were rated almost equally in the logic dimension, even though the invalid problems 
received lower ratings. This reflects the fact that participants did not only consider a problem 
as based on a logical structure, but also tried to draw an inference. With respect to the invalid 
problems making a valid inference is impossible, so that these ratings are appropriate. In the 
morality dimension, only the moral and unmoral problems were rated as containing moral-
related content, thus differing from the neutral and the abstract problems. Finally, the moral-
related problems appeared to be perceived as more emotionally laden than the other problem 
categories, providing first evidence for a ‘learned morality’ representing emotionally laden 
prior knowledge. In the following, the first experiment is reported, testing the stimulus 
material to a new group of participants. 
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3. Experiment I 
The first experiment used the deductive reasoning problems evaluated in the first pre-study, to 
obtain answers to questions like: “Could participants deal with ‘pure’ deductive reasoning 
tasks?”; “Are participants influenced by the moral-related content, and do they show the 
intended incongruence effect, thus practical reasoning?”. Therefore, the concrete hypotheses 
are: 
- Participants are faster and less prone to errors when dealing with the abstract 
reasoning problems as compared to all others, indicating therefore that they are 
able to reason ‘pure’ rationally. 
- Participants are slower and show increased error rates when handling the moral-
related reasoning problems as compared to all others, indicating the use of 
practical reasoning processes within a theoretical reasoning task. 
- Participants produce higher decision times and error rates when given the 
incongruent moral-related reasoning problems as compared to the congruent 
moral-related ones, indicating therefore an incongruence effect. 
 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
In this first experiment, 21 participants were tested. The sample consisted of 10 male 
participants with a mean age of 23.30 years (S.D. ±3.53) and 11 female participants with a 
mean age of 21.82 years (S.D. ±0.98). All were native German speakers, naïve with respect to 
deductive reasoning tasks, and right-handed according to Salmaso and Longoni’s Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI, 1985, modified version of Oldfield, 1971). Participants came 
from local universities and gave informed written consent according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki (1964/2008). Participants were financially compensated or received course credits 
for an approximate of 30 minutes experimental session. 
 
3.1.2 Material 
The stimulus material for this first experiment consisted of the above described deductive 
inference problems with valid and invalid conclusion and moral, unmoral, neutral, or abstract 
content, thus representing a 4 (content) by 2 (validity) factorial within-subject design. The 
decision times and error rates (dependent variables) measured and recorded during the 
computer experiment represented the reasoning performance of the participants (independent 
variable). 
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Additionally, the “Freiburger personality inventory” (FPI-R.; Fahrenberg, Hampel, & 
Selg, 2001) was applied to control for influences or dysfunctions of personality traits. 
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The 32 problems (4 problems per category) were randomly presented on a standard Dell 
personal computer (©Dell Inc., 1999–2009), using Super-Lab 4.0 software (©
 
Cedrus 
Corporation, 1991–2006). Reasoning problems were shown twice, once with a valid 
conclusion and in the other instance with an invalid conclusion. Sentences were presented 
successively with self-paced reading (see Figure 5). The third sentence/conclusion (in red) 
had to be judged as valid or invalid according to the two premises/sentences before. 
 
Figure 5: Procedure of the computer experiment. 
 
Validity decisions were counted using a response-box (©
 
Cedrus Corporation, 1991–
2006), whereby response buttons were counterbalanced with hand preference between 
participants. Between each problem, a fixation cross was presented for 2 seconds. After 
completing the computer experiment, participants filled out the paper and pencil FPI-R 
questionnaire. 
3.2 Results 
Analyses were done with SPSS©
 
 17.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA 1989 - 2009) and 
significance level for all analyses was set to p = .05. Analyses include Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected F-values of the general linear model for repeated measures, followed by post hoc t-
tests. Decision times are solely made up of correct answers. Since the personality inventory 
showed no anomalies, no further analyses are reported. 
3.2.1 Error rates 
In total, the moral-related deductive inference problems produced higher error rates than the 
abstract and neutral ones. On a descriptive level, it could be seen that moral problems 
revealed 14.88% errors and unmoral ones showed 10.12%. Neutral problems resulted in 
1.79% errors and abstract ones in 4.17%.12
                                                 
12 Descriptive values for this and all following experiments represent mean values, whereby standard errors for 
error rates and decision times could be found in the respective figures. 
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Analysis of error rates showed main effects (ME) for validity and content (ME 
validity: F(1, 20) = 9.474, p = .006; ME content: F(2.385, 47.696) = 6.278, p = .002) with an 
additional interaction effect (IE: F(1.310, 26.206) = 8.946, p = .003). 
The analysis of the content main effect revealed that moral problems produced more 
errors than neutral (t(20) = 3.532, p = .002) and abstract ones (t(20) = 2.631, p = .016), but did 
not differ from the unmoral problems (t(20) = 1.793, p = .088). The unmoral problems yielded 
higher error rates than the neutral ones (t(20) = 3.005, p = .007), whereas the contrast with the 
abstract condition was insignificant (t(20) = 1.693, p = .106). Comparing the abstract and 
neutral conditions showed no differences (t(20) = -.777, p = .446). See Figure 6 below. 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral and abstract problems. 
 
Analyzing the validity main effect indicated that invalid problems were more prone to 
errors than valid ones (t(20) = -3.078, p = .006). Results of the post hoc t-tests for the 
significant interaction effect are reported in Appendix E (p. 175). 
Finally, only the moral-related inference problems (moral and unmoral) concerning 
their inherent congruence-incongruence dichotomy, where logical validity and moral status of 
the conclusion conflict with each other, were analyzed with an additional General Linear 
Model. This GLM for repeated measures revealed that incongruent problems (moral-
invalid/unmoral-valid) were more prone to errors than congruent (moral-valid/unmoral-
invalid) ones (F(1, 20) = 9.931, p = .005; t(20) = -3.151, p = .005; Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for congruent (moral-valid + unmoral-invalid) and 
incongruent (moral-invalid + unmoral-valid) problems. 
 
3.2.2 Decision times 
Decision times, as error rates, showed higher values, namely longer decision times, for the 
moral-related inference problems (moral: 3162.84 ms, unmoral: 3868.40 ms) compared to 
neutral and abstract ones (neutral: 2310.25 ms, abstract: 1703.02 ms). 
The analysis of the decision times yielded similar results for validity (ME: F(1,20) = 
4.635, p = .044) and content (ME: F(1.841, 36.813) = 25.329, p < .001), but no interaction 
effect (IE: F(2.299, 45.984) = 2.421, p = .093). 
Post hoc t-tests for validity revealed significantly faster decisions in the valid 
compared to the invalid problems (t(20) = -2.153, p = .044). 
The content main effect analysis showed that unmoral problems took longest as 
compared to moral (t(20) = -2.467, p = .023), neutral (t(20) = 5.038, p < .001), and abstract 
ones (t(20) = 5.930, p < .001), followed by moral problems (moral vs. neutral: t(20) = 3.863, p 
= .001; moral vs. abstract: t(20) = 6.785, p < .001). Finally, the abstract condition was 
answered faster than the neutral ones (t(20) = 4.072, p = .001). See Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 8: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral and abstract 
problems. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Experiment I showed that deductive inference problems with moral-related content are more 
prone to errors and require longer decision times than neutral or abstract ones. Participants 
encountered difficulties with the incongruent condition, showing that the intended 
incongruence effect when logical form and content of the task interact leads to conflicts in the 
reasoning process. This incongruity effect might be labeled ‘belief bias’, although the current 
response pattern does not perfectly match the one found in experiments yielding the ‘classical 
belief bias’ effects (Evans et al., 1983). As explained in the introduction, ‘belief biases’ occur 
if a person’s beliefs/prior knowledge related to the problem content conflict or contradict with 
the logical form of the arguments. According to the original ‘belief bias’ effect, the 
participants should have shown the highest error rate for the unmoral-invalid problems, since 
‘belief bias’ effects are stronger for invalid and unbelievable problems. This was clearly not 
the case. In contrast, the incongruent conditions of moral-invalid and unmoral-valid problems 
revealed the highest error rates. Assuming intuitive/emotional reasoning processes getting in 
conflict with rational ones as responsible for these performance results might indeed be 
labeled as a kind of (new) ‘belief bias’. In the moral-invalid cases, participants might have 
thought and answered according to “Yes, this is moral”, although they should have thought 
and answered according to “No, this is invalid”. Vice versa, in the unmoral-valid condition 
they might have thought and answered according to “No, this is unmoral”, although they 
should have thought and answered according to “Yes, this is valid”. Apart from this possible 
interpretation, the occurring incongruence effect might be interpreted as participants indeed 
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reasoned about and according to the moral-related content, therefore showing practical 
reasoning. 
Another potential explanation of this incongruity effect might refer to moral attitudes 
(cp., Luo et al., 2006). These moral attitudes, in place of beliefs, could have played the major 
role in the participants’ decisions. As reported above, Luo et al. (2006) criticized former 
studies on moral reasoning that they required explicit decisions from the participants and were 
therefore not able to measure the “real” underlying moral attitudes these persons might have. 
However, the current experiments did not even require from the participants to make a moral 
decision or to reason about morals. Instead, the embedded incongruence should ensure that 
automatic processes lead to moral reasoning. These processes might indeed represent moral 
attitudes. Furthermore, Luo et al. (2006) stated that a moral decision requires more than just 
upcoming automatic moral attitudes. In turn, these attitudes could also be based on prior 
knowledge stressing the special emotional load of morals, since also attitudes need to have 
been built. This means that also attitudes have to be developed via learning and experience. 
Moreover, the cognitive processes representing moral attitudes might indeed reflect 
emotional/intuitive processes, therefore emotionally laden prior knowledge represented as fast 
and automatic processes in moral reasoning and decision making. More importantly, these 
incongruence effects indicate emotional/intuitive processes involved in practical reasoning, 
but do not allow inferences to potential influences of rational processes in practical reasoning. 
Apart from these issues, the results reveal that participants were unable to ignore the 
moral-related content and to just focus on validity. The errors participants made in the moral-
related cases imply that they reasoned and answered according to the moral-related content. 
However, they had almost no problems correctly evaluating the conclusions of the moral-
valid or unmoral-invalid cases, indicating that moral-related content per se did not perturb 
reasoning and decision making processes. This seems not astonishing since in the congruent 
conditions theoretical reasoning (i.e., ‘pure’ deductive reasoning) and practical reasoning (i.e., 
moral reasoning) should lead to the same outcome. It remains unclear therefore, whether 
participants reasoned morally or deductively when faced with congruent problems. Invalid 
problems resulted in more errors and higher decision times than valid ones indicating that the 
conflicting moral-invalid problems were affected more than the unmoral-valid ones, an effect 
that has been reported and described earlier (e.g., Evans et al., 1983). 
Concerning the abstract problems, the results indicate that participants are able to deal 
with ‘pure’ deductive inferences, hence to reason rational. This assumption is limited 
however, by the fact that only ‘simple’ inference problems were chosen (cp., Knauff, 2007). 
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Shorter decision times of the abstract problems might just reflect the fact that abstract 
sentence length was much shorter than that of all other problems. Therefore, reading time 
alone had an effect contributing to the validity judgment.13
The results lead to a few preliminary conclusions. Persons are able to reason ‘pure’ 
rationally, but performance is even better if prior knowledge could be used. Thus, theoretical 
reasoning processes seem to involve not only rational but also intuitive processes. Moral-
related content, when constructed with an incongruity, reveals evidence that people tend to 
reason according to this content, i.e. to show practical reasoning. This might be taken as a hint 
that prior knowledge, perhaps emotionally laden, influences theoretical reasoning, and thus, in 
this special experimental paradigm, results in practical reasoning. Since the congruent moral-
related problems were not affected this way, one might further assume that also practical 
reasoning involves rational processes aside from the emotional/intuitive ones. However, this 
assumption remains very speculative since there is also a possibility that no practical 
reasoning occurred in the congruent cases. Nevertheless, the strong content influences of the 
moral-related reasoning problems yield evidence of a learned morality according to the 
human rights articles. Another possible explanation might be that only the moral-related 
problems were highly emotional laden, and thus resulted in these strong content effects due to 
their emotional load. Whether participants showed practical reasoning related to prior 
knowledge or whether these content effects just reflected strong moral attitudes seems 
unclear. Nonetheless, moral attitudes might be based on over learned knowledge, particularly 
emotionally laden. In total, the preceding experiment and its results seem to support the 
assumption that the human rights articles represent an adequate means for investigating 
practical reasoning in combination with theoretical reasoning. 
 Apart from the decision times and 
the inherent problem of sentence length of the abstract problems compared to all others, the 
neutral-valid problems produced the lowest error rates. This indicates a facilitative content 
effect (e.g., Johnson-Laird et al., 1972). Participants therefore, are able to reasoning according 
to logic, especially if only ‘simple’ reasoning problems are presented, but are even better if 
they could use prior knowledge. 
To further explore the potential influences and proportions of emotions/emotional load 
on and in reasoning, the second experiment implemented additional emotional control 
problems, which were firstly evaluated in the second pre-study. 
 
                                                 
13 Note that abstract problems were necessarily presented in this form to represent ‘pure’ deductive reasoning. 
There was no control therefore, of sentence length for the other problems, since this seemed to be not valuable. 
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4. Pre-Study II 
In the second pre-study, the newly developed positive and negative emotional control 
problems should be evaluated together with the moral-related ones. The new evaluation of the 
moral-related problems seemed necessary due to this division in positive and negative 
emotional controls. The reason for this segregation is that it is unknown as to whether morals 
are associated with positive emotions over negative ones, or vice versa. One might assume for 
example that morality has been learned via commandments, prohibitions, obedience, 
punishment, and the like during childhood and is therefore associated with negative emotions. 
It could also that morality is associated more with positive emotions due to its helpful 
function in regulating a peaceful and fruitful coexistence of human beings. Hence, the 
following pre-study was also a first step in exploring these different possible connotations of 
morals. Presenting moral-related problems together with the new emotional ones also ensured 
to avoid influences of task length or moral content per se. Abstract and neutral conditions 
were excluded since they had shown no affinities to morality or emotionality, respectively. 
 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
In this second pre-study, 10 males with a mean age of 26.1 years (S.D. ± 6.54) and 10 females 
with a mean age of 21 years (S.D. ± 2.98), not involved in one of the former studies, took 
part. Participants came from local universities and gave written informed consent. 
 
4.1.2 Material 
Equivalent to the deductive inference problems implemented in the first experiment, control 
problems with emotional contents (almost matched for sentence length with the moral-related 
and neutral problems) were developed. These emotional problems contained either positive or 
negative emotional contents. They also consisted of a first premise (e.g., “If a person is 
successful, then he is lucky.”, or “If a person has no friends, then he is lonely.”), followed by 
a second premise (e.g., “A person is successful.”, or “A person has no friends.”), and finally a 
conclusion (e.g., “The person is lucky.”, or “The person is lonely.”). Each problem appeared 
twice, once with a valid conclusion (see example), and in the other instance with an invalid 
conclusion (all problems could be found in Appendix A, p. 169). Hence, Pre-Study II and 
Experiment II represented a 6 (content) by 2 (validity) factorial within-subject design 
applying a total of 48 reasoning problems (see Table 9). 
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Table 9: Design of Pre-Study II and Experiment II. 
content factor 
moral unmoral abstract neutral positive emotional 
negative 
emotional 
validity 
factor 
valid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
invalid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
 
4.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure for this second pre-study was equivalent to that of the first pre-study. 
 
4.2 Results 
Analyses were equivalent to that used in Pre-Study I as presented earlier. 
The Friedman tests for all problem categories separated into content and validity 
yielded significant differences in the logic dimension (χ2(7) = 36.810, p < .001), the morality 
dimension (χ2(7) = 69.080, p < .001), and the positive emotionality dimension (χ2(7) = 95.800, 
p < .001) as well as the negative emotionality one (χ2
Concerning only the analysis of the ratings according to content revealed significant 
effects for the logic dimension (χ
(7) = 89.502, p < .001). The single 
comparisons with Wilcoxon signed rank tests are reported in Appendix F (p. 176). 
2(3) = 11.158, p = .011), the morality dimension (χ2(3) = 
21.785, p < .001), the positive emotionality (χ2(3) = 44.299, p < .001), and the negative 
emotionality dimensions (χ2
The post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the logic dimension showed that unmoral 
problems received lower ratings than moral (z = -2.493, p = .013), positive emotional (z = -
2.851, p = .004), and negative emotional ones (z = -2.364, p = .018). The emotional problems 
differed slightly from each other (z = -2.651, p = .008), whereas the moral ones yielded no 
differences at all as compared to the positive (z = -.175, p = .861) and the negative emotional 
problems (z = -1.226, p = .220). 
(3) = 43.015, p < .001). 
In the morality dimension the moral problems contained the maximum moral content 
(moral vs. unmoral: z = -2.010, p = .044; moral vs. positive-emotional: z = -3.737, p < .001; 
moral vs. negative-emotional: z = -3.699, p < .001), followed by the unmoral ones (unmoral 
vs. positive-emotional: z = -3.044, p = .002; unmoral vs. negative-emotional: z = -2.962, p = 
.003). The emotional problems revealed no differences in the morality dimension (z = -1.262, 
p = .297). 
In the positive emotionality dimension the positive emotional controls obtained the 
highest ratings (positive emotional vs. moral: z = -2.529, p = .011; positive emotional vs. 
unmoral: z = -3.924, p < .001; positive emotional vs. negative-emotional: z = -3.923, p < 
Pre-Study II 
65 
 
.001), followed by the moral problems (moral vs. unmoral: z = -3.849, p < .001; moral vs. 
negative-emotional: z = -3.329, p = .001), and the negative-emotional ones before the 
unmoral problems (z = -2.022, p = .043). 
Finally, the negative emotionality dimension showed that the unmoral (unmoral vs. 
moral: z = -3.925, p < .001; unmoral vs. positive-emotional: z = -3.851, p < .001) and 
negative emotional problems (negative emotional vs. moral: z = -3.932, p < .001; negative 
emotional vs. positive emotional: z = -3.767, p < .001) were rated as the most negative ones. 
Positive emotional and moral problems (z = -1.291, p = .197) as well as unmoral and negative 
emotional ones (z = -1.535, p = .125) revealed no differences. For an overview see Figure 9 
below. 
 
 
Figure 9: Mean ratings and standard errors for moral, unmoral, positive and negative emotional problems in the 
dimensions logic, morality, positive and negative emotionality. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
The pre-study implied that the problems comprise the intended contents. The logic dimension 
did not differ between moral-related or emotional reasoning problems, which may seem 
reasonable since all contents were embedded in deductive inference problems. The moral-
related problems were perceived as carrying the most moral content, and positive and 
negative emotional dimensions were assigned to the corresponding control problems. 
Therefore, negative emotional problems enabled controlling for negative emotional aspects of 
moral-related problems, as did the positive emotional ones for positive emotions. 
Additionally, participants experienced unmoral problems and negative emotional 
problems almost equally negative, but interestingly, the moral inference problems were 
perceived as positively emotional laden. This supports the above made assumptions about 
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morality as a whole. It seems as if moral content refers to the useful functions of morals, and 
unmoral content refers to the negative effects and potential negative consequences associated 
with unmoral behavior. Independent of these speculative suggestions, the reasoning problems 
seemed to contain the anticipated contents and could therefore be used for the following 
experiments. 
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5. Experiment II 
Since the second pre-study yielded the applicability of the newly developed reasoning 
problems, the second experiment was carried out to investigate the effects of the emotional 
controls particularly in contrast to the moral and unmoral problems. Additional hypotheses for 
this experiment are: 
- If the emotional load of morals is much stronger than the knowledge about morals, 
performance on moral-related and emotional problems should be similar. 
- Performance on positive emotional problems is more comparable to that on the 
moral problems, and performance on the negative emotional problems is more 
comparable to that on the unmoral problems. 
 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
In Experiment II 33 newly recruited participants were investigated. The 16 males had a mean 
age of 23.13 years (S.D. ±3.74) and the 17 females had a mean age of 21.47 years (S.D. 
±3.36). All participants were again native German speakers, naïve to deductive reasoning 
tasks, right-handed according to Salmaso and Longoni’s EHI (1985, modified version of 
Oldfield, 1971), and showed no previous mental illness or psychotropic medication. 
Participants came from local universities, and gave informed written consent according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (1964/2008). Participants were financially compensated or received 
course credits for the approximately 30 minutes of testing. 
 
5.1.2 Material 
All of the evaluated reasoning problems with moral, unmoral, neutral, abstract, positive and 
negative emotional content (4 per category) were included. Each problem was shown twice, 
once with a valid conclusion and in the other instance with an invalid conclusion. This time, a 
total of 48 reasoning problems was presented, representing a 6 (content) by 2 (validity) 
factorial within-subject design. As in Experiment I, participants had to deal with the 
“Freiburger personality inventory” (FPI-R.; Fahrenberg, Hampel, & Selg, 2001) to control for 
influences or dysfunctions of personality traits. 
 
5.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment I. 
 
Experiment II 
68 
 
5.2 Results 
Analyses were equivalent to Experiment I. Since the personality inventory showed no 
anomalies, no further analyses were conducted. 
 
5.2.1 Error rates 
Descriptively, Experiment II yielded increased error rates for moral and unmoral problems as 
compared to all other conditions. Participants produced 17.80% errors in the moral condition 
and 13.26% in the unmoral condition, whereas they made 3.03% in the neutral, 5.30% in the 
abstract, 3.79% in the positive emotional, and 4.92% in the negative emotional condition. 
These descriptive values are reflected in significant main effects of content (ME 
content: F(2.593, 82.973) = 10.256, p < .001) and validity (F(1, 32) = 5.408, p = .027) as well 
as an interaction effect (IE: F(1.974, 63.161) = 9.578, p < .001). The corresponding post hoc 
t-tests showed that invalid problems were more prone to errors than valid ones (t(32) = -
2.326, p = .027). Analyzing the content main effect revealed that moral problems produced 
the highest error rates (moral vs. neutral: t(32) = 4.695, p < .001; moral vs. abstract: t(32) = 
4.195, p < .001; moral vs. positive emotional: t(32) = 4.645, p < .001; moral vs. negative-
emotional: t(32) = 4.690, p < .001), whereby the comparison to the unmoral problems did not 
reach significance (t(32) = 1.712, p = .097). The unmoral condition also revealed higher error 
rates than all other conditions (unmoral vs. neutral: t(32) = 3.032, p = .005; unmoral vs. 
positive emotional: t(32) = 2.861, p = .007; unmoral vs. negative emotional: t(32) = 2.432, p = 
.021; unmoral vs. abstract: t(32) = 2.235, p = .033). The abstract problems did not differ from 
the positive emotional (t(32) = .780, p = .441), the negative emotional (t(32) = .215, p = .831), 
and the neutral control conditions (t(32) = -1.139, p = .263). Neutral problems showed no 
differences from both of the emotional inference tasks (neutral vs. positive emotional: t(32) = 
-.702, p = .488; neutral vs. negative emotional: t(32) = -1.153, p = .258), which did not differ 
from each other too (t(32) = -.649, p = .521). The post hoc t-tests regarding the interaction 
effect of content and validity are reported in Appendix G (pp. 177-178). See Figure 10 for 
illustration of the content main effect. 
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Figure 10: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral, abstract, positive and 
negative emotional problems. 
 
Finally, only the moral-related inference problems were analyzed again concerning the 
potential incongruence effect. Again, as in Experiment I, the incongruent problems produced 
more errors than the congruent ones (F(1, 32) = 13.361, p = .001; t(32) = -3.655, p = .001). 
 
5.2.2 Decision times 
Participants answered slowest in the moral (3189.29 ms) and unmoral (2831.54 ms) 
conditions in contrast to the neutral (2058.23 ms) or abstract (1603.11 ms) ones, and also as 
compared to the newly developed positive (2147.12 ms) and negative (2359.42 ms) emotional 
controls. 
Decision times revealed similar results leading to main effects of content (F(3.195, 
102.225) = 23.974, p < .001) and validity (F(1, 32) = 34.958, p < .001) as well as an 
interaction effect (F(3.079, 98.522) = 7.267, p < .001). Participants needed more time to judge 
invalid problems compared to valid ones (t(32) = -5.913, p < .001). The analyses of the 
content main effect (Figure 11) yielded higher decision times for moral problems compared to 
abstract (t(32) = 7.785, p < .001), neutral (t(32) = 5.389, p < .001), positive (t(32) = 4.581, p < 
.001), and negative emotional ones (t(32) = 3.932, p < .001), however did not differ 
significantly from the unmoral inferences (t(32) = 1.789, p = .083). The unmoral problems led 
to higher decision times than the abstract (t(32) = 8.513, p < .001), the neutral (t(32) = 5.659, 
p < .001), the positive (t(32) = 4.566, p < .001), and the negative emotional ones (t(32) = 
3.171, p = .003). The abstract condition in turn showed the lowest decision times compared to 
the neutral (t(32) = 5.366, p < .001), the positive (t(32) = -3.335, p = .002) as well as the 
negative emotional one (t(32) = -6.410, p < .001). Neutral inferences differed from negative 
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emotional ones (t(32) = -3.593, p = .001), but not from positive emotional problems (t(32) = -
.617, p = .541). Finally, the emotional controls revealed no differences (t(32) = -1.378, p = 
.178). Post hoc t-tests of the interaction effect are shown in Appendix G (pp. 177-178). 
 
 
Figure 11: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral, abstract, 
positive and negative emotional problems. 
 
Finally, decision times exhibited an incongruence effect (F(1,32) = 9.762, p = .004) 
with incongruent problems resulting in significantly higher decision times than congruent 
ones (t(32) = -3.124, p = .004). 
 
5.3 Discussion 
Experiment II again showed (see Experiment I) that participants had more difficulties 
handling the moral-related problems than all of the others. This was reflected in higher error 
rates and longer decision times for the moral-related problems. Again, the incongruent moral-
related inferences played a crucial part in these results, whereby the invalid problems had 
even higher error rates and longer decision times than the valid ones. The effect that valid 
deductive problems are easier to solve than invalid ones is well known from former studies 
(e.g., Evans et al., 1983), and has also been shown in Experiment I. The same accounts for the 
intended incongruence effect. In contrast, the abstract reasoning problems (i.e., ‘pure’ 
deductive) revealed that participants can perform ‘pure’ deductive reasoning (with the 
restriction that only the ‘simplest’ reasoning problems were used, see also discussion on 
Experiment I above), but the neutral content even facilitates reasoning, however the 
comparisons were this time insignificant. 
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Contrasting the moral-related problems with the newly created emotional problems 
yielded further insights in the potential causes of the content effects of morals. Participants 
produced about 15 percent errors in the moral-related conditions, whereas they had only 4.5 
percent errors in the emotional control conditions. This leads to the assumption that moral-
related content is apparently strongly emotionally laden than emotional material itself. In turn, 
this rather might reflect the influence of prior knowledge and thus support proposals that 
morality is indeed learned (Bore et al., 2005; Bucciarelli et al., 2008; Churchland, 1998; 
Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Hare, 1981; Luo et al., 2006; Moll et al., 2005; Pasupathi & 
Staudinger, 2001). Strong prior knowledge therefore, that of beliefs or attitudes, might have 
influenced the reasoning processes of the participants who were apparently unable to ignore 
the moral-related content and focus only on task demands. This seems to contradict the first 
hypotheses above. However, taking only the congruent moral-related cases into account 
reveals a different picture. These problems were solved almost comparably to the emotional 
ones. Moral-valid problems had comparable error rates to the positive emotional valid ones, 
and unmoral-invalid problems were similar to the negative emotional invalid ones. 
Unfortunately, no clear suggestion can be made for the congruent moral-related cases whether 
participants showed practical reasoning, or whether their theoretical reasoning processes were 
unaffected. This then limits possible conclusions. Apart from that, the major performance 
decrements of the moral-related problems can be ascribed to the incongruity effect caused by 
the incongruent problems. Therefore, the mixture of theoretical and practical reasoning, 
particularly in conflicting cases, seemed to cause the participants’ severities. 
Aside from this unresolved issue, moral-valid and unmoral-invalid problems were 
solved almost comparable to the positive and negative emotional ones. This seems to 
contradict the conclusion made earlier that morals are more emotionally laden than ‘pure’ 
emotional contents. It appears rather plausible that emotional and moral-related contents do 
not differ much, concerning their impact on deductive reasoning problems. The effects of 
prior knowledge on reasoning support proposals of intuitive proportions in moral reasoning, 
but does not explain whether there are strong or weak emotional contributions as well, 
especially since also the emotional controls were, at least partly, related to prior knowledge. It 
would have been better therefore to create incongruent emotional reasoning problems and 
compare them with the incongruent moral-related ones. 
Apart of these methodological weaknesses, the results paved way to a few preliminary 
conclusions. Participants were able to reason rationally, but content facilitated the reasoning 
process indicating the involvement of intuitive processes in theoretical reasoning. Moral-valid 
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and emotional-valid problems showed performance improvements as compared to the abstract 
problems, perhaps related to facilitative influences of positive emotional load besides prior 
knowledge. This shows clear indications for the involvement of emotional and intuitive 
processes in theoretical and practical reasoning (if participants reasoned according to morals 
in the moral-valid condition). The same might explain the similar impairing influences on the 
unmoral-invalid and negative emotional-invalid problems as compared to the abstract-invalid 
ones, revealing disturbing influences of negative emotional load and prior knowledge. These 
assumptions however, remain speculative since there is no clear evidence as to whether 
participants’ reasoned morally in the congruent cases or not, particularly since some of these 
differences did not reach significance. 
Another problematic aspect which needs to be addressed might have been the special 
structure of some moral-related reasoning problems, inherent to the derivation from the 
human rights articles. This refers to the fact that the last sentence denoted the moral status of a 
problem and some problems changed their moral status between the first sentence (e.g., 
formulated as moral) and the last sentence (e.g., formulated as unmoral). This abrupt change 
in the moral status of an inference problem could have caused some confusion in the 
reasoning processes of some of the participants. Furthermore, some moral-related and 
emotional problems might have already produced a content effect in the first sentence. The 
effect of the first premise refers to the fact that some of the problems had to be constructed to 
allow their applicability in all possible conditions, therefore avoiding content differences 
between conditions. The first premise could already contain a conflict between the two partial 
statements of the ‘if’ and ‘then’ part related to prior knowledge/beliefs/attitudes (see 
Appendix A for examples on the variation of the first sentence of the problem “If a person is a 
prisoner of war, then he must not be enslaved”). 
Nevertheless, the results give a first hint that theoretical and practical reasoning could 
not only be investigated together, but are also based on similar processes, namely 
emotional/intuitive and rational ones. The evidence for similar processes however, remains 
vague concerning the experiments conducted up to now. 
It would be of interest therefore, to further explore the different processes involved. 
Another way to test the potential proportions of these processes would be to manipulate one 
and examine the effects of this manipulation in contrast to a not manipulated one. A well 
known procedure of manipulation is to train participants in deductive reasoning (for an 
overview see Klauer & Meiser, 2007). The following experiment implemented a logic 
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training for one group as well as a pseudo training and no training for two other groups, which 
served as controls. 
Since the ‘training’ experiment as well as the following ‘intelligence’ experiment dealt 
with newly developed neutral problems, the third pre-study will be reported first. 
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6. Pre-Study III 
Experiments I and II used ‘pure’ deductive reasoning problems (i.e., abstract condition) to 
explore the theoretical reasoning abilities of individuals in comparison to practical reasoning. 
As could be seen in the results, participants made almost no errors and were very fast in their 
decisions concerning these theoretical problems. However, a meaningful comparison between 
decision times of the abstract problems together with the moral-related ones appears to be 
critical, since sentence length between both conditions extremely differs. In turn, the neutral 
reasoning problems seemed closely related to the abstract ones, although they also represented 
some facilitative content effects. This led to the assumption that theoretical reasoning might 
also be investigated using only these neutral reasoning problems. Hence, for a better 
comparison on decision times, in the two following experiments, new neutral problems were 
developed and exactly matched for sentence length between conditions. Furthermore, the 
emotional controls were excluded since they did not provide so much additional explanatory 
value. 
This pre-study also contained newly developed recognition items as an additional task. 
The idea to implement a recognition task refers to the fact that also recognition performance 
depends on two processes such as prior knowledge or emotional load. It only seems rational 
to obtain further evidences for the involvement of intuitive/emotional processes in practical 
reasoning due to the performance with these items. 
 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
In this pre-study, 30 naïve participants took part. The 11 male participants had a mean age of 
24.91 years (S.D. ±1.81) and the 19 female participants had a mean age of 24.74 years (S.D. 
±4.16). Participants came from local universities and gave informed written consent. 
 
6.1.2 Material 
This pre-study was conducted to evaluate the newly developed neutral reasoning problems in 
comparison to the already evaluated moral-related ones. These neutral problems were now 
exactly matched in word number/sentence length controlling reading and decision time 
differences. Since the moral-related problems were further divided into moral and unmoral 
ones, the neutral problems were adjusted by splitting them into two categories: ‘everyday life’ 
(neutral1) and ‘leisure time’ (neutral2). This assignment in neutral 1 and 2 was just for 
analytical reasons and not content related. Thus, the reasoning problems (within-subject 
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factors) for the following two experiments represented a 4 (content) by 2 (validity) factorial 
design (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Design of deductive reasoning problems of Pre-Study III. 
content factor 
moral unmoral neutral1 neutral2 
validity 
factor 
valid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
invalid 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 4 problems 
 
The newly developed recognition items should also be evaluated. The additional 
recognition items were similar to the deductive reasoning problems, except for their second 
sentence. Their second sentences were rearranged (word replacements) in such a manner 
where drawing of a logical inference was made impossible. The third sentence of these 
recognition items literally matched a part of the first sentence (‘literal match’ condition or 
short ‘match’) or not (‘no literal match’ condition or short ‘no match’). These recognition 
items also contained moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 contents comparable to the 
deductive reasoning problems (see all items in German version in Appendix B, pp. 171-172). 
Thus, these recognition items (within-subject factors) for the following two experiments 
represented a 4 (content) by 2 (matching) factorial design (see Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Design of recognition items of Pre-Study III. 
content factor 
moral unmoral neutral1 neutral2 
matching 
factor 
match 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 
no match 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 4 recognition items 
 
The structure and rating-scale of the questionnaires used was the same as for the 
second pre-study, but this time containing additional recognition items. 
 
6.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was equivalent to the two former pre-studies. 
 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Deductive reasoning problems 
Analysis of the pre-study corresponded to the ones reported above. 
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Friedman tests revealed significant main effects for the logic dimension (χ2(7) = 
118.574, p < .001), the morality dimension (χ2(7) = 173.145, p < .001) as well as the positive 
(χ2(7) = 69.102, p < .001) and negative (χ2
Analyzing the ratings according to the content yielded significant effects for the logic 
dimension (χ
(7) = 146.918, p < .001) emotionality dimensions. 
Post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests for all categories differentiated according to content and 
validity are reported in Appendix H (p. 179). 
2(3) = 9.057, p = .029), the morality dimension (χ2(3) = 75.111, p < .001), the 
positive emotionality dimension (χ2(3) = 27.938, p < .001), and the negative emotionality 
dimension (χ2
Comparing the different content categories in the logic dimension exhibited higher 
ratings for the moral problems compared to the unmoral (z = -3.217, p = .001) and the 
neutral2 ones (z = -2.240, p = .025), but not compared to the neutral1 problems (z = -1.277, p 
= .201). Unmoral problems in turn received lower values compared to the neutral1 (z = -
2.464, p = .014) and the neutral2 ones (z = -2.498, p = .012). The neutral problems themselves 
did not differ in the logic dimension (z = -.863, p = .388). 
(3) = 66.583, p < .001). 
In the morality dimension, the moral-related problems yielded almost the same ratings 
(moral vs. unmoral: z = -1.260, p = .208), and so did the neutral ones (neutral1 vs. neutral2: z 
= -1.312, p = .190). In contrast, the moral problems were rated higher than the neutral1 (z = -
4.715, p < .001) and the neutral2 ones (z = -4.712, p < .001), and so were the unmoral 
problems compared to both neutral conditions (vs. neutral1: z = -4.712, p < .001; vs. neutral2: 
z = -4.711, p < .001). 
In the positive emotionality dimension the moral problems received higher values than 
the unmoral (z = -3.982, p < .001), the neutral1 (z = -3.675, p < .001), and the neutral2 ones (z 
= -2.926, p = .003). The unmoral problems were also rated lower than the neutral1 (z = -
2.145, p = .032) and neutral2 problems (z = -2.511, p = .012) which did also slightly differ 
from each other (neutral1 vs. neutral2: z = -2.379, p = .017). 
Lastly, in the negative emotionality dimension, the unmoral problems were evaluated 
more negatively than the moral (z = -4.401, p < .001), the neutral1 (z = -4.545, p < .001), and 
the neutral2 ones (z = -4.545, p < .001). Also, the moral problems received higher values than 
the neutral1 (z = -4.310, p < .001) and the neutral2 conditions (z = -4.264, p < .001). Finally, 
the neutral1 problems differed slightly from the neutral2 ones (z = -2.236, p < .025). 
A graphical illustration of the results of Pre-Study III according to the content 
categories of the deductive reasoning problems is shown in Figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12: Mean ratings (points 1 to 4) and standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 problems 
in the dimensions logic, morality, positive and negative emotionality. 
 
6.2.2 Recognition items 
The Friedman tests for the ratings of the recognition items yielded significant main effects in 
the logic dimension (χ2(7) = 29.756, p < .001), the morality dimension (χ2(7) = 162.369, p < 
.001) as well as the positive (χ2(7) = 34.683, p < .001) and negative (χ2
Analyzing the ratings according to the content yielded significant main effects of the 
morality dimension (χ
(7) = 147.549, p < 
.001) emotionality dimensions. Post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests for all categories 
differentiated according to content and literal sentence matching are reported in Appendix H 
(p. 180). 
2(3) = 72.918, p < .001), the positive emotionality dimension (χ2(3) = 
15.652, p = .001), and the negative emotionality dimension (χ2(3) = 69.339, p < .001), but not 
for the logic dimension (χ2
The morality dimension showed that the moral-related recognition items (moral vs. 
neutral1: z = -4.684, p < .001; moral vs. neutral2: z = -4.707, p < .001; unmoral vs. neutral1: z 
= -4.707, p < .001; unmoral vs. neutral2: z = -4.709, p < .001) were rated higher than both of 
the neutral ones. The moral-related items did not differ from each other (z = -.367, p = .714), 
and so did the neutral ones (z = -.747, p = .455). 
(3) = 7.688, p = .053). 
Concerning the positive emotionality dimension, the unmoral items were rated lower 
than the moral ones (z = -3.085, p = .002) and the neutral2 items (z = -2.159, p = .031), but 
did not differ from the neutral1 items (z = -1.348, p = .178). The moral items showed no 
significant differences to both of the neutral recognition items (moral vs. neutral1: z = -1.635, 
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p = .102; moral vs. neutral2: z = -1.199, p = .230), and the controls were also rated similar 
(neutral1 vs. neutral2: z = -1.040, p = .298). 
The negative emotionality dimension revealed higher ratings for both moral-related 
recognition items as compared to the neutral ones (moral vs. neutral1: z = -4.291, p < .001; 
moral vs. neutral2: z = -4.410, p < .001; unmoral vs. neutral1: z = -4.546, p < .001; unmoral 
vs. neutral2: z = -4.548, p < .001), whereby the unmoral items received even higher ratings 
than the moral ones (z = -3.825, p < .001). The neutral recognition items yielded no 
differences (z = -1.405, p = .160). A graphical illustration of the results of the ratings 
according to the content categories for the recognition items is shown in Figure 13 below. 
 
 
Figure 13: Mean ratings (points 1 to 4) and standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 recognition 
items in the dimensions logic, morality, positive and negative emotionality. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
The pre-study yields evidences that all deductive reasoning problems were rated as intended. 
They were rated as almost equal in the logic dimension, and moral-related deductive inference 
problems contained more moral content than the neutral problems. Furthermore, as already 
found in the second pre-study, the moral-related problems received higher emotional ratings 
than the neutral controls. Moral problems were rated higher in the positive emotional 
dimension and unmoral ones in the negative emotional dimension. Therefore, there was a 
clear distinction between moral-related and neutral content.  
The recognition items did not differ in their ratings on the logic dimension, but the 
ratings were explicitly lower than those for the deductive reasoning problems. The moral-
related recognition items received higher ratings in the morality dimension as well as in the 
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emotionality dimension as compared to the neutral items. This time, the emotional ratings of 
the moral-related items were particularly pronounced in the negative emotionality dimension. 
Since the moral-related problems were rated as more affectively laden, this seems to once 
again underpin assumptions that morals are emotionally laden. In totality, the reasoning 
problems and the recognition items seemed to be useful for the next experiments, which will 
now be reported. 
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7. Experiment III – Training14
The third experiment implemented a training in logic prior to the computer experiment, 
manipulating the deductive reasoning abilities of one group of participants. Since this training 
was based on findings of former training studies, it seems necessary to give a short overview 
on training studies first, and then report the experiment. 
 
 
7.1 Excursus - Training in theoretical reasoning 
As reported above, misunderstanding the premises of a deductive reasoning problem is the 
first error a participant can make while solving deductive inference problems. Thus, different 
studies (e.g., O’Brien & Overton, 1980, 1982; Ziegler, 1990) focused on a better 
comprehension of the premises and trained participants to avoid such comprehension errors. 
O’Brien and Overton (1980, 1982) and Overton, Byrnes, and O’Brien (1985) 
Klauer and colleagues (Klauer, Meiser, & Naumer, 2000) compared different training 
conditions according to different theories of deductive reasoning. They used a syntactic 
training based on the mental logic theory (Rips, 1994), an abstract semantic training with 
truth-tables according to the theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2006), a domain-
specific semantic training, and a control training practicing an inductive reasoning task. Both 
semantic training conditions improved performance, but the syntactic training and the control 
training did not differ and showed no improvements in performance. Klauer et al. (2000) 
conclude that the effects are related to a better understanding of the propositional premises 
and therefore caused facilitation of the construction of appropriate mental models. This 
assumption is further supported by Klauer et al. (1997), where a truth-table training also 
used a 
contradiction training according to the mental model theory and improved the reasoning 
abilities of young adults in conditional and syllogism reasoning problems. Ziegler (1990) 
trained his participants in the Wason Selection Task and found that the group receiving all 
components of the different training conditions showed the best results as well as transfer 
effects. Similarly, Klaczynski and Laipple (1993) varied the contents of the selection 
problems in the trainings and in the later test phase, and found transfer effects as well as 
facilitation effects of domain independent rules, whereby their training was according to the 
theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). Another study 
investigating the pragmatic reasoning schemas was done by Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and 
Oliver (1986), who could show that only training with learning and exercising rules via 
examples produces performance improvements. 
                                                 
14 This experiment was conducted within the work for the diploma thesis of Michaela Kandl (Kandl, 2009). 
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produced substantial training effects in propositional syllogisms. Thus, both of these studies 
obtained performance improvements in deductive reasoning with trainings aiming at a better 
understanding of the propositional premises, indicating facilitation of the construction of 
appropriate mental models. In turn, this supports trainings according to the mental model 
theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
Another approach including training investigates the involvement of working memory 
in deductive reasoning. In particular, the working memory model of Baddeley (1986, 2003) 
with its phonological loop, visuo-spatial sketchpad, and central executive has been the focus 
of diverse experiments. Generally, dual task designs are used presenting a concurrent task 
according to one specific working memory component testing the disturbing influences of the 
secondary task and its involvement. The findings concerning the phonological loop are 
inconsistent (Knauff, 2009a), but for the involvement of the central executive some evidences 
of studies with conditional and syllogistic reasoning problems exist (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 
1993; Klauer et al., 1997). 
Using this concurrent task design, Meiser, Klauer, and Naumer (2001) could show that 
training reduces the impact of heuristics and enhances analytic inference processes which are 
normally and easily disturbed by the concurrent task. This further supports the mental models 
theory since mental models also depend on working memory constraints. 
To integrate and summarize the different training studies, the main finding is that 
training can indeed improve deductive reasoning. Hence, the most promising training 
conditions are those that aid in improving the understanding of the premises by using abstract 
semantic material like truth tables and/or providing concrete semantic contexts. In addition, 
training with explanations and examples as well as practical exercises seems to be most 
effective. Finally, there are hints that trainings according to the mental model theory do not 
only result in performance increments, but also support this theory due to these 
improvements. 
The training studies described previously yielded evidences that not only rule learning 
and the like is sufficient in the improvement of reasoning abilities, but also practical exercises 
and feedback are necessary, thus a very intensive training version was developed for the 
following experiment. Klauer, and Meiser (2007) stated in their review on training studies in 
deductive reasoning that it seems helpful to use a training according to the mental model 
theory, which particularly focuses on improving the ‘pure’ deductive (i.e., rational) reasoning 
abilities of the participants. 
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The preceding pre-studies and experiments have revealed some preliminary evidences 
that theoretical and practical reasoning are based on ‘pure’ deductive processes (i.e., rational) 
as well as emotional/intuitive processes. Therefore, a logic training improving the rational 
proportions of reasoning processes should have no effect in the experiment if reasoning is 
solely based on emotional/intuitive processes. In contrast, it is not as easy to provide an 
explanation about the “positive” effects of the training. If the training provides the intended 
outcomes, participants should not show content effects or incongruity effects. This would 
endorse assumptions of rational processes involved in theoretical reasoning which could be 
improved. Since content effects would have occurred without training and underpinned 
influences of emotional/intuitive processes, such “positive” training effects would strengthen 
‘dual-process’ accounts of theoretical reasoning. With regards to practical reasoning, 
however, to draw conclusions may seem much more difficult and possible attempts will be 
reserved for the discussion section below. The newly developed recognition items served as 
additional task to investigate on the emotional/intuitive processes involved in practical 
reasoning. Therefore, the concrete hypotheses for the following experiment are: 
- Participants receiving logic training should show reasoning improvements due to 
this training measured by the comparison of the pre- versus the post-test. 
- Participants receiving logic training are less prone to errors and show shorter 
decision times for all deductive reasoning problems versus persons receiving no 
training or pseudo training. 
- Training should result in no performance differences between the three reasoning 
problem conditions. 
- Trained participants should not show an incongruence effect. 
- Participants with pseudo training or no training should show an incongruence 
effect. 
- Logic training should not affect the recognition task performance since the training 
encompasses no components improving recognition memory, thus the groups 
should not differ in their recognition task performance. 
- Moral-related content leads to faster decisions and fewer errors in the recognition 
task for all participants, especially if the recognition processes involved are solely 
based on automatic, intuitive, and emotional processes. 
- The three groups should not differ in their moral judgment competence (i.e., MJT). 
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7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Participants, 12 per condition, were randomly assigned to the training, pseudo training, or no 
training group. In total 36 participants, not formerly tested, participated in the experiment. 
The group without training consisted of 7 females with a mean age of 23 years (S.D. ±1.73) 
and 5 males with a mean age of 26.2 years (S.D. ±1.48). The pseudo training group included 7 
females with a mean age of 25.43 years (S.D. ±3.51) and 5 males with a mean age of 26.4 
years (S.D. ±3.91). The training group encompassed 7 females with a mean age of 23.43 years 
(S.D. ±3.55) and 5 males with a mean age of 22.40 years (S.D. ±1.14). Again, all participants 
were native German speakers, naïve to deductive reasoning tasks, right-handed according to 
Salmaso and Longoni’s Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire (1985, modified version of 
Oldfield, 1971) and showed no previous mental illness or psychotropic medication. 
Participants came from local universities and gave informed written consent according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (1964/2008). Participants were financially compensated or received 
course credits for approximately 80 minutes of testing. 
 
7.2.2 Material 
7.2.2.1 Logic Training 
The training group received logic training composed of four steps similar to the abstract 
semantic training used by Klauer and colleagues (2000). First, participants passed a pretest 
before they received an introductory text about propositional logic, followed by practicing 
deductive inference problems, and finally, a posttest to measure performance improvements 
(Figure 14). To avoid additional training effects of working on a computer, especially with 
deductive inferences, the exercises were done with paper and pencil. 
The pretest contained an instruction and an example, followed by 20 deductive 
inference problems, half of them with a valid or invalid conclusion. These problems had 
abstract, neutral, absurd, or emotional content, and participants had to judge their logical 
validity by checking “Yes” or “No” boxes below each problem (problems for the pre-test and 
post-test as well as the problems and example material of the training can be found in 
Appendix I, pp. 181-187). 
The text about propositional logic, which the participants received after the pretest, 
started with a brief introduction on the history of logic, followed by an example with an 
explanatory text about the structure and the elements of a deductive inference problem. After 
clarifying the terminology and illustrating how deductive inferences are made, emphasizing 
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on the notion that the content is irrelevant for the validity of the inference, simple inference 
rules were further explained in detail. All contents of the text were supplemented with 
examples to further support understanding. The text itself was based on an introductory 
textbook about philosophical logic by Hoyningen-Huene (2006). 
After studying the text and clarifying comprehension problems, participants received a 
worksheet with deductive inference problems and the training phase started. A total of 7 
worksheets with 48 problems were used. Half of the deductive inference problems were valid, 
the other half invalid. Half of the cases contained no conclusion, so participants had to 
produce it by themselves, whereas the other half included a given conclusion and the validity 
had to be judged by checking “Yes” and “No” boxes below the problems. The problems used 
had abstract (4 problems), neutral (4), absurd (8), and emotional (8) content. Abstract 
problems were presented to familiarize participants with content-free inferences and pointing 
on the ‘pure’ deductive form of inferences. Neutral content was according to world-/general-
knowledge and served as a first step in disrupting the pure analytic reasoning process. 
Negative emotional as well as absurd content, contradicting our world-knowledge, forced the 
participants to answer by only using the learned rules while ignoring the content. After 
completing a worksheet, the answers of the participants were corrected and participants 
received feedback. If necessary, further explanations were given and difficulties were 
discussed. 
Finally, after all worksheets were processed, a posttest, with the same structure as the 
pretest, had to be filled out. Comparing the number of errors between pre- and posttest served 
as an indicator for training success. 
 
 
Figure 14: Procedure of the logic training. 
 
7.2.2.2 Pseudo Training 
The pseudo training, like the logic training, was similar to that used by Klauer et al. (2000) 
and was based on the “Bochumer Matrizen Test” (Hossiep, Turck, & Hasella, 1999). The 
problems of this training were matrices, namely visual analogy problems, and consisted of 
rectangles with 15 fields (three rows and five columns) containing symbols arranged by a 
certain principle. One of the 15 fields is empty and the task requires from the participants to 
select one symbol from six given symbols which logically complements the pattern of the 
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other 14 icons. This pseudo training was chosen since it resembles an inductive reasoning task 
without any semantic aspects and should therefore not affect the deductive reasoning 
problems in the experiment. On the other hand, the pseudo training allows to control for 
general effects of training in problem solving strategies, e.g., systematically following a 
procedure, as well as for motivational aspects of training per se. 
The pseudo training had no pre- or post-test, but was, apart from that, matched to the 
logic training (see Figure 15). First, participants received an introductory text with examples 
and a description of the 13 problem solving strategies, as being relevant in solving inductive 
problems. Then, a practice phase followed in which 10 problems had to be completed by 
using the learned strategies. Participants had to complete 5 pages with two tasks per page and 
again, after each page, their tests were corrected and participants received feedback.The 
duration of both types of training was equivalent. Problems and training material for the 
pseudo-training are reported in Appendix J (pp. 188-193). 
 
 
Figure 15: Procedure of the pseudo training. 
 
7.2.2.3 Moral Judgment Test 
To obtain an external criterion for the participants’ moral judgment level, the ‘Moral 
Judgment Test’ (MJT) by Lind (1978, 2008) was used to measure moral judgment 
competence. The MJT is an advancement of Kohlberg’s dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1969) or Rest’s 
‘Defining Issue Test’ (DIT, Rest, 1974), as these tests assess individual moral attitudes 
(Prehn, Wartenburger, Mériau, Scheibe, Goodenough, Villringer, van der Meer, & Heekeren, 
2008) rather than moral decision making competences. The MJT is based on a kind of ‘dual-
process’ model with rational and affective components explaining the moral behavior and 
moral ideals of a person. Both portions of this model influence a so-called competence-score 
(c-score). This c-score could range from zero to 100 (Lind, 2008), whereby higher values 
indicate higher moral judgment competence (Table 12). The MJT consists of two dilemmas, 
each including two competing moral principles. The protagonists involved violate one of 
these two moral principles. Participants read these stories and are asked to judge the actions of 
the protagonists in general. Then, six pro and contra arguments concerning the protagonists 
behavior have to be rated on a scale ranging from “I strongly reject (-4)” to “I strongly accept 
(+4)”. These ratings and the answers to the general questions lead to the c-score. 
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Table 12: Categorization of c-scores and related moral judgment competence (adapted from Lind, 2008). 
 
Moral Judgment Competence (c-score) 
1 – 9  very low 30 – 39  high 
10 – 19  low 40 – 49  very high 
20 – 29  medium 50 – 100  extraordinary high 
 
7.2.2.4 Computer Experiment 
The stimulus material for the experiment consisted of the deductive inference problems with 
moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 content as well as the recognition items with 
equivalent contents as was evaluated in Pre-Study III reported earlier. All problems appeared 
twice, once with a valid conclusion and in the other instance with an invalid conclusion, 
totaling 32 inference problems. The recognition items on the other hand, appeared twice, once 
with a third sentence literally matching a part of the first sentence presented previously, and in 
the other instance with no literal match. This third experiment therefore, contained the 
between-subject factor group (training, pseudo training, and no training) and the within-
subject factor task (deductive inference problems and recognition items) representing a 3 
(group) by 2 (task) mixed factorial design (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Design of Experiment III  
 group logic training pseudo training no training 
task 
deductive reasoning 32 reasoning problems 
32 reasoning 
problems 
32 reasoning 
problems 
recognition 32 reasoning problems 
32 reasoning 
problems 
32 reasoning 
problems 
 
Separated into categories according to the task, the part with the reasoning problems 
represented a 4 (content) by 2 (validity) by 3 (group) mixed factorial design containing the 
within-subject factors content and validity and the between-subject factor group. The part 
with recognition items also represented a 4 (content) by 2 (matching) by 2 (group) mixed 
factorial design containing the within-subject factors content and matching and the between-
subject factor group (see also Pre-Study III above for graphical illustration of the within-
subject factorial design). 
 
7.2.3 Procedure 
Participants without training were directly tested on the computer experiment and 
subsequently completed the MJT. In the training and the pseudo training condition, a 
maximum of four participants at a time participated. They received their training, followed by 
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a 20 minute break for refreshment. The break was strategically given to avoid a lack of 
concentration or attention, since it is known that the attention span of students is only about 
15 – 20 minutes (e.g., Middendorf & Kalish, 1996). Then, two of the participants were 
immediately subjected to the computer experiment and the MJT, followed by the two others 
shortly thereafter. 
A fundamental change compared to Experiments I and II pertained to reading and 
response time limits for this experiment. A preliminary training study, not reported here, had 
shown that training effects could be obtained easier if time limits are introduced. Thus, the 
first premise/sentence was presented for 4 seconds, the second one lasted 2 seconds, and 
finally the conclusion/third sentence offered a time window for making the validity/matching 
judgment of 3.5 seconds (answers given after 3.5 seconds were labeled as errors). Answers 
were given on a response-box (“Yes” for valid/match, “No” for invalid/no match), whereby 
response buttons were counterbalanced for hand preference between participants. After each 
reasoning problem/recognition item, a fixation cross was shown for two seconds. Reasoning 
problems and recognition items were presented intermittently and in random. The conclusion 
of a reasoning problem was presented in red color, the third sentence of a recognition item in 
green color, to indicate which task had to be executed by the participants. Participants 
absolved four practice trials after a short introduction on the computer, familiarizing 
themselves with the procedure. See Figure 16 for an illustration of the procedure. 
The remainder of the procedure was identical to Experiment I. 
 
 
Figure 16: Procedure of the computer experiment showing an example of a recognition item followed by a 
deductive reasoning problem. 
 
7.3 Results 
The analysis included a general linear model to control that the two tasks did not influence the 
performance of the three groups differently. Then, a pre-post-test comparison of the group 
receiving logic training was calculated with a paired-sample t-test to explore the intended 
performance enhancement in deductive reasoning. It was made sure that no moral judgment 
competence differences between the groups exist. The error rates and decision times of the 
deductive reasoning problems and the recognition items were analyzed separately, between 
and within the groups, applying GLMs and post hoc t-tests. Due to the fact that the reasoning 
problems and recognition items of the two different tasks were presented intermittently and 
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randomly, and that each stimulus sub-category only contained four reasoning 
problems/recognition items, it was impossible to control influences of one stimulus class on 
the other concerning participants’ performance. A potential analysis failed since no values 
were available or the number of values varied extremely between stimulus sub-categories and 
participants that no serious statistical approach could be chosen. Thus, whether reasoning 
problems preceding recognition items affected participants’ performance, or vice versa, could 
not be controlled and therefore possible influences on performance could not be excluded. 
 
7.3.1 Task by group analysis 
On a descriptive level, error rates yielded higher values for the recognition items (32.30%) 
than for the deductive reasoning problems (11.37%). Trained participants (15.63%) were less 
prone to errors in both tasks as compared to those with pseudo training (23.83%) and 
participants without training (25.91%). Figures 17 and 18 illustrate these descriptive results. 
The GLM for repeated measures of the error rates showed a task main effect (F(1,33) = 
31.119, p < .001), but no group main effect (F(2, 33) = 1.876, p = .169) and no interaction 
effect for group by task (F(2, 33) = .045, p = .956). 
 
Figure 17: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for deductive reasoning problems and 
recognition items. 
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Figure 18: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for the group without training, the group with 
pseudo training, and the group with logic training. 
 
Decision times yielded higher values for the recognition items (1735.45 ms) as compared to 
the deductive reasoning problems (1623.62 ms), and the group receiving logic training 
(1438.03 ms) was faster than both of the control groups (pseudo training: 1790.90 ms; no 
training: 1809.69 ms). See Figures 19 and 20 for an illustration. Statistically, a task main 
effect also occurred (F(1, 33) = 9.487, p = .004), and a group main effect (F(2, 33) = 4.319, p 
= .022), but again no interaction effect could be found (F(2, 33) = 1.972, p = .155). Since 
these analyses revealed that the groups were not affected differently by the two tasks, further 
analyses were conducted separately for the two tasks. 
 
Figure 19: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for deductive reasoning problems and 
recognition items. 
 
0
10
20
30
no training pseudo training logic training
er
ro
r i
n 
%
0
1000
2000
reasoning problems recognition items
de
ci
si
on
 ti
m
e 
in
 m
s
Experiment III – Training 
90 
 
 
Figure 20: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for the group without training, the 
group with pseudo training, and the group with logic training. 
 
7.3.2 Pre-post-test comparison and MJT 
The paired-sample t-test for the comparison of the errors in the pre- versus the post-test 
revealed a significant difference (t(11) = 2.327, p = .040) indicating that participants produced 
less errors in the post test and therefore benefited from the training. 
For the Moral Judgment test, the trained group reached a c-score of 29.37 points, the 
group with pseudo training 23.73 points, and the untrained participants 30.34 points. 
Although the c-score values were different, these differences did not reach significance. The 
trained group did not differ from the untrained one (t(22) = .134, p = .895) and neither from 
the group with pseudo training (t(22) = .848, p = .406) as well as the untrained group did not 
discern from the other control group with the pseudo training (t(22) = .986, p = .335). 
 
7.3.3 Deductive reasoning problems 
7.3.3.1 Error rates 
Descriptively, participants with pseudo training (13.80%) or without training (15.89%) were 
more prone to errors than the trained participants (4.43%). Thereby, the moral (18.06%) and 
unmoral (16.67%) inference problems had higher error rates than the neutral1 (7.29%) or 
neutral2 (3.47%) ones. 
The general linear model revealed main effects for content (F(2.568, 84.744) = 18.394, 
p < .001) and group (F(2, 33) = 5.930, p = .006), but not for validity (F(1, 33) = 2.026, p = 
.164). Content and validity (F(1.824, 60.207) = 11.706, p < .001) showed an interaction 
effect, whereas content and group (F(5.136, 84.744) = 1.461, p = .210) as well as validity and 
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group (F(2, 33) = .533, p = .592) were insignificant. The three-way interaction of content, 
validity and group (F(3.649, 60.207) = 2.527, p = .055) showed a trend and with the Huynh-
Feldt correction (F(4.085, 67.407) = 2.527, p = .047) it reached significance. 
Post hoc t-tests for the content effect (Figure 21) revealed that moral (vs. neutral1: 
t(35) = 3.872, p < .001; vs. neutral2: t(35) = 6.468, p < .001) and unmoral problems (vs. 
neutral1: t(35) = 3.666, p = .001; vs. neutral2: t(35) = 5.414, p < .001) were more prone to 
errors than the neutral problems. Additionally, neutral1 problems also resulted in higher error 
rates than the neutral2 ones (t(35) = 2.142, p = .039). Moral-related problems did not differ 
(t(35) = .598, p = .554). 
 
 
Figure 21: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 
problems. 
 
Group comparisons (Figure 22) demonstrated that the trained participants made less 
errors than the group with the pseudo training (t(22) = 2.585, p = .017) and the group without 
training (t(22) = 4.057, p = .001), whereas the pseudo training and the no training group did 
not differ (t(22) = .512, p = .614, p = .614). 
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Figure 22: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for the group without training, the group with 
pseudo training, and the group with logic training. 
 
The single contrasts concerning the significant interaction of content and validity are 
shown in Appendix K (p. 194, table also includes decision times). 
Following the significant three-way interaction of content, validity and group, the 
second General Linear Model showed significant interaction effects only for the group 
without training (F(1.508, 16.590) = 10.437, p = .002), whereas for the group with the pseudo 
training it barely failed significance, but revealed a trend (F(2.159, 23.746) = 2.548, p = .096). 
For the trained group no significant difference could be found (F(1.522, 16.739) = .641, p = 
.498). Paired-sample t-tests for the untrained group are shown in Appendix K (p. 194). It can 
be seen that mainly the moral-invalid and the unmoral-valid problems (incongruent problems) 
differed from all others in this group. Descriptively, the same is true for the group with the 
pseudo training (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 
problems, separated for validity (v = valid, iv = invalid) with the group without training, the group with pseudo 
training, and the group with logic training. 
 
The independent sample t-tests for the content and validity interaction pair wise 
comparing the different groups for the single conditions are also reported in Appendix K (p 
195). 
 
 
Figure 24: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for congruent (moral-valid + unmoral-invalid) 
and incongruent (moral-invalid + unmoral-valid) moral-related problems for the group without training, the 
group with pseudo training, and the group with logic training. 
 
Analyzing only the moral-related problems concerning the incongruence effect 
revealed main effects for content (F(1, 33) = 16.578, p < .001) and group (F(2, 33) = 6.076, p 
= .006) as well as an interaction effect (F(2, 33) = 3.416, p = .045), basically indicating that 
congruent problems (moral-valid and unmoral-invalid) were less prone to errors than 
incongruent ones (t(35) = -3.817, p = .001). For graphical illustration see Figure 24 above. 
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Independent-sample t-tests showed that training reduced error rates (training vs. pseudo-
training: t(22) = 2.727, p = .014; training vs. no training: t(22) = 3.897, p = .001; pseudo-
training vs. no training: t(22) = .188, p = .853). However, this effect was especially related to 
the incongruent problems (training vs. pseudo training: t(22) = 2.501, p = .020; training vs. no 
training: t(22) = 3.722, p = .001; pseudo-training vs. no training: t(22) = .899, p = .379). This 
simply means that only the untrained participants (t(11) = -3.626, p = .004) and the 
participants with the pseudo training (t(11) = -2.028, p = .067) showed the incongruence 
effect, at least as a trend, whereas the trained participants were not affected by the conflict 
between validity status and morality status (t(11) = -.886, p = .394). The congruent problems 
revealed no significant group differences. 
 
7.3.3.2 Decision times 
Descriptively, trained participants (1428.66 ms) answered faster than those with pseudo 
training (1693.69 ms) or without training (1748.51 ms). Mainly the moral (1740.19 ms) and 
unmoral (1673.65 ms) inference problems were affected compared to the neutral1 (1509.69 
ms) or neutral2 (1570.97 ms) problems. 
Decision times yielded significant main effects for validity (F(1, 33) = 20.050, p < 
.001) and content (F(2.285, 75.391) = 12.011, p < .001), whereas the group factor missed 
significance (F(2, 33) = 2.861, p = .071). In addition, content and group showed a trend for an 
interaction effect (F(4.569, 75.391) = 2.389, p = .051) significantly in the Huynh-Feldt 
corrected analysis (F(5.225, 86.213) = 2.389, p = .042). The interaction of content and 
validity reached significance (F(2.929, 96.664) = 3.582, p = .017) with details of the single 
comparisons shown in Appendix K (p. 194, together with error rate comparisons). There was 
no significant interaction of group by validity (F(2,33) = .397, p = .676) and no three-way 
interaction (F(5.858, 96.664) = .971, p = .448). 
Post hoc t-tests revealed that valid deductive inferences were answered faster than 
invalid ones (t(35) = -4.557, p < .001), whereas moral (vs. neutral1: t(35) = 4.588, p < .001; 
vs. neutral2: t(35) = 3.176, p = .003) and unmoral problems (vs. neutral1: t(35) = 3.983, p < 
.001; vs. neutral2: t(35) = 2.241, p = .031) required significantly more time than the neutral 
ones, which also differed from each other (neutral1 faster than neutral2: t(35) = -2.317, p = 
.026). See Figure 25 below. 
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Figure 25: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and 
neutral2 problems. 
 
Following the content and group interaction, it could be shown that the group without 
training and the trained participants differed (unmoral: t(22) = 2.083, p = .049; neutral1: t(22) 
= 3.672, p = .001; neutral2: t(22) = 3.089, p = .005), indicating that the untrained participants 
needed more time for decision making than the trained group. The group with logic training 
was always faster than the groups without training or with pseudo training (Figure 26), even 
though these differences barely missed significance (see Appendix K, p. 196 for all 
independent-sample t-test comparisons). 
 
Figure 26: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and 
neutral2 problems for the group without training, the group with pseudo training, and the group with logic 
training. 
 
Separated for the groups, the group with pseudo training had higher decision times for 
the moral (vs. neutral1: t(11) = 2.983, p = .012; vs. neutral2: t(11) = 2.477, p = .031) and 
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unmoral problems (vs. neutral1: t(11) = 3.304, p = .007; vs. neutral2: t(11) = 2.555, p = .027) 
compared to the neutral problems. The moral-related problems (t(11) = .606, p = .557) and the 
neutral ones (t(11) = -1.182, p = .262) did not differ in the pseudo training group. This is 
similar to what could be found for the trained group (moral vs. unmoral: t(11) = 2.304, p = 
.042; moral vs. neutral1: t(11) = 6.107, p < .001; moral vs. neutral2: t(11) = 3.411, p = .006; 
unmoral vs. neutral1: t(11) = 3.034, p = .011, unmoral vs. neutral2: t(11) = 1.790, p = .101; 
neutral1 vs. neutral2: t(11) = -.943, p = .366). In contrast, the group without training showed 
almost the same decision times in all categories (moral vs. unmoral: t(11) = .394, p = .701; 
moral vs. neutral1: t(11) = .805, p = .438; moral vs. neutral2: t(11) = -.248, p = 808; unmoral 
vs. neutral1: t(11) = .715, p = 489; unmoral vs. neutral2: t(11) = -.697, p = .556; neutral1 vs. 
neutral2: t(11) = -1.771, p = .104). 
Since the three-way interaction and main effect of group failed to reach significance, 
no incongruence effect with respect to group differences could be reported for decision times. 
It could only be mentioned that all groups were slower in answering the congruent problems 
as compared to the incongruent ones (ME content: F(1, 33) = 6.050, p = .019; t(35) = 2.529, p 
= .016). 
 
7.3.4 Recognition items 
7.3.4.1 Error rates 
On a descriptive level, trained participants (26.82 %) were less prone to errors than the group 
with the pseudo training (33.85 %) or the untrained participants (35.94 %). With respect to the 
different contents, both of the neutral item conditions (35.76 % each) showed higher error 
rates than the moral (27.78 %) and unmoral ones (29.51 %). 
The general linear model for repeated measures analyzing the recognition items 
revealed a main effect of content (F(2.479, 81.805) = 3.838, p = .018), but no main effects of 
‘matching’ (F(1, 33) = 2.375, p = .133) or group (F(2, 33) = .493, p = .615). Furthermore, no 
two-way interaction effects (content by group: F(4.958, 81.805) = 1.098, p = .368; content by 
matching: F(2.748, 90.691) = 2.452, p = .074; group by matching: F(2, 33) = .278, p = .759) 
or three-way interaction occurred (content by group by matching: F(5.496, 90.691) = 1.114, p 
= .360). 
Comparing the different content conditions yielded significant differences of the moral 
items as compared to the neutral1 (t(35) = -2.242, p = .031) and neutral2 ones (t(35) = -2.360, 
p = .024) as well as of the unmoral items as compared to the neutral1 (t(35) = -2.168, p = 
.037) and neutral2 ones (t(35) = -2.311, p = .027). The moral-related (t(35) = -.564, p = .576) 
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and the neutral recognition items (t(35) = .000, p = 1.000) did not differ from each other. A 
graphical illustration of these results is shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 
recognition items. 
 
7.3.4.2 Decision times 
Descriptively, the group with logic training (1447.39 ms) had shorter decision times than the 
groups with pseudo training (1888.10 ms) or without training (1870.86 ms). The content 
categories did not really differ, but the literal match items (1609.32 ms) were answered faster 
than the no literal match ones (1861.58 ms). 
The general linear model revealed main effects of matching (F(1, 33) = 20.524, p < 
.001) and group (F(2, 33) = 5.172, p = .011), but no effect of content (F(2.746, 90.606) = 
1.026, p = .380). Again, as for the error rates, no two-way interactions (content by group: 
F(5.491, 90.606) = 2.025, p = .076; matching by group: F(2, 33) = .189, p = .829; content by 
matching: F(2.502, 82.580) = 1.796, p = .163) or three-way interaction occurred (content by 
group by matching: F(5.005, 82.580) = 2.066, p = .078). 
The difference of the decisions for the literal match and no literal match items is 
shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for the literal match and the no literal 
match recognition items. 
 
The post hoc t-tests according to the different groups showed that trained subjects 
differed from the group without training (t(22) = 2.724, p = .012) and the group with the 
pseudo training (t(22) = 2.910, p = .008), whereas the control groups did not differ (t(22) = -
.109, p = .914). See Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for the group without training, the 
group with pseudo training, and the group with logic training. 
 
7.4 Discussion 
The trained participants made less errors comparing pre- and post-test, and also showed 
transfer effects and performance increments in the deductive inferences in the computer 
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experiment. They made fewer errors than both control groups, were not subjected to 
incongruity effects, and were also faster in solving the reasoning problems, but one group 
comparison (trainings versus pseudo training) barely failed significance. It could be 
concluded therefore, that the logic training revealed the intended positive outcomes and 
replicated the effects of the training study by Klauer et al. (2000). This further indicates that 
an abstract semantic training with practical examples and exercises improves reasoning 
performance. 
Furthermore, the results seem to support the assumption of rational and 
emotional/intuitive processes involved in theoretical reasoning, thus supporting ‘dual-process’ 
accounts of theoretical reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2003, 2008). Since participants without or with 
pseudo training showed content effects, as has been shown also in the two preceding 
experiments, there is evidence of influences of (perhaps emotional laden) prior knowledge on 
theoretical reasoning. Moreover, the training of rational reasoning proportions which enabled 
trained participants to suppress these content influences shows the impact of these rational 
process proportions on theoretical reasoning. If rational processes were not involved in 
theoretical reasoning, training these proportions of reasoning processes would have revealed 
no effects. With regards to practical reasoning however, it seems a little bit more complicated 
to draw serious conclusions. One might still suggest that practical reasoning is based on 
emotional/intuitive processes, and especially prior knowledge. This accounts for both of the 
control groups and the content effects of the moral-related problems, which again indicated 
that participants did some kind of moral reasoning and moral decision making. Descriptively, 
the same applies to the trained participants where moral-related problems still differed slightly 
from the neutral ones. Regarding potential rational proportions of the reasoning processes 
involved in practical reasoning however, reveals no clear and serious conclusion, since 
training of rational processes almost eliminated practical reasoning. This practical reasoning 
has only occurred before due to the influence of prior knowledge on deductive reasoning 
problems, therefore validating the involvement of emotional/intuitive processes in practical 
reasoning. Thus, additional experiments seemed necessary, brought upon by the current 
experimental design, to further explore the potential rational processes contributing to 
practical reasoning. 
The recognition items yielded evidences that prior knowledge, when highly emotional 
or salient information is taken into account, facilitates recognition of familiar content in 
contrast to unrelated, less familiar and less salient neutral material (Ferré, 2003; Inaba et al., 
2005; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Phelps et al., 1997). In particular, participants produced 
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fewer errors with the moral-related recognition items as compared to the neutral ones, 
although decision times were almost equal between these conditions. These diminished error 
rates for the moral-related recognition items, probably caused by prior knowledge, provide 
further evidence for learned morality or strong moral attitudes. However, there is again no 
possibility of gaining insight via the recognition task performance on the potential 
involvement of rational processes in practical reasoning. 
Interestingly, the training also improved the performance of the trained participants 
concerning the decision times for the recognition items. Although training should not 
influence recognition performance, trained participants had shorter decision times (and lower 
error rates) than both of the control groups. This improvement in performance might be due to 
the task structure and due to the fact that trained participants have already been familiarized 
with it especially since differentiation between the two task requirements could already be 
done after the second sentence appeared which did not match the form of a deductive 
inference problem in the recognition task. Another interesting point to take note of is that all 
groups showed worse performance in the recognition task as compared to the deductive 
reasoning problems, even though recognition is believed to be one of the easiest (memory) 
tasks among others (Anderson, 1999). This might be due to the fact that all participants were 
recruited to take part in an experiment on logical thinking and were therefore primed. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that participants reasoned utilizing emotional/intuitive and 
rational processes in solving deductive reasoning problems. If the rational proportions of these 
reasoning processes involved are based on mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006), 
participants might have built mental models after presentation of the first premise. 
Constructing a mental model means to build a semantic representation of the first 
premise/sentence, but that the literal wording gets lost. If then the second sentence appears 
indicating that no deductive inference has to be drawn but recognition is required, the 
necessary information is no longer available. 
So far, there is evidence that theoretical and practical reasoning are based on 
emotional/intuitive processes, and that theoretical reasoning alone is also based on rational 
processes. For Practical reasoning, empirical evidence for the involvement of rational 
processes is still missing. The next experiment tried to investigate this assumption. Concerns 
related to mediating influences of working memory on deductive reasoning and recognition 
will be discussed after the next experiment and in the general discussion, respectively. 
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8. Experiment IV – Intelligence15
The fourth experiment was conducted to further explore the up to date yet still unclear 
involvement of rational processes in practical reasoning as well as the influences of 
intelligence and working memory on practical and theoretical reasoning. A relation between 
intelligence level and moral reasoning/judgment competence has already been proposed by 
Kohlberg (1969) who denoted “higher”/mature moral judgment levels with preceding 
cognitive development (see also introduction above). Also, connections between deductive 
reasoning and intelligence have been proposed (e.g., Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007). 
The main focus of this experiment however, was on differences in adult moral judgment and 
intelligence level, and whether these differences are based on crystallized or fluid intelligence 
(Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001). The concept of fluid and crystallized intelligence proportions 
was of special interest due to its affinities to working memory capacity (fluid IQ) and 
accumulated knowledge (crystallized IQ). Thus, not only ‘simple’ group differences were 
calculated for the following experiment, but also a correlative analysis to obtain evidence for 
the particular influences of these two different intelligence components. As external criterion 
of participants’ moral judgment competence, the MJT was applied (Lind, 2008). As was in the 
preceding experiments, the recognition task was also included to obtain further evidences for 
the involvement of emotional/intuitive processes in practical reasoning. To obtain clear 
performance differences, extreme groups were chosen; one with average IQ and the other 
with superior IQ (see methods section below). The concrete hypotheses for the following 
experiment are: 
 
- Participants with high intelligence quotient should produce lower error rates and 
shorter decision times than participants with average intelligence quotient in both 
tasks. 
- Participants with high intelligence should not be subject to an incongruence effect 
in the moral-related reasoning problems as compared to the group with average 
intelligence. 
- Participants of superior intelligence should have a higher moral judgment 
competence in the MJT than participants of average intelligence. 
- Both groups should show shorter decision times and lower error rates for the 
moral-related recognition items compared to the neutral ones. 
                                                 
15This experiment was conducted within the work for the diploma thesis of Alexandra Schmoranzer 
(Schmoranzer, 2009). 
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- The different intelligence components (fluid and crystallized) should correlate 
specifically with experimental performance on deductive reasoning problems: fluid 
intelligence with overall performance and crystallized intelligence with 
knowledge, thus performance on moral-related problems. 
 
8.1 Method 
8.1.1 Participants 
Participants came from local universities, internet, and the ‘Mensa club’ (a society for high-
intelligence people) as well as the German ‘Schülerkademie’. At a first appointment all 
participants had to fill out two intelligence tests. Fluid intelligence level was obtained by 
implementing the first part of the ‘culture-fair-test’ (CFT-20-R; Weiß, 2006) and for 
crystallized intelligence the ‘knowledge test’ of the ‘intelligence-structure-test’ (IST-2000-R, 
Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & Amthauer, 2001) was applied. After screening 47 
participants, 14 participants met the intelligence score criteria. Just a fair match for age or 
gender could be provided here, due to the difficulty of finding such extreme IQ values. The 
seven high intelligence participants (2 females) had an IQ-score of 136.57 (S.D. ±5.13) in the 
CFT-20-R, and 131.92 (S.D. ±9.98) in the IST-2000-R, aged 22 to 37 years, while the average 
intelligence group (6 females) reached an IQ-score of 106.86 (S.D. ±5.87) in the CFT-20-R, 
and 100.86 (S. D. ±9.4) in the IST-2000-R, aged 19 to 25 years. Groups differed significantly 
in CFT (z = -3.155, p = .001) and IST (z = -3.148, p = .001). Again, all participants were 
native German speakers, naïve with respect to logical reasoning tasks, right-handed, and did 
not participate in one of the previous experiments. In turn, participants gave informed written 
consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki (1964/2008), and were financially 
compensated. 
 
8.1.2 Material 
Two intelligence tests (see also above) were used to select participants with high and average 
intelligence. The computer experiment applied the reasoning problems and the recognition 
items described in Pre-Study III with moral, unmoral, and neutral contents, thus representing 
a 2 (task) by 2 (group) mixed factorial design with the between-subject factor group and the 
within-subject factor task. Separated according to the task category, the part with the 
reasoning problems represented a 4 (content) by 2 (validity) by 2 (group) mixed factorial 
design, whereby the first two factors represent within-subject factors, and the third factor the 
between-subject factor. The recognition items in turn represented also a 4 (content) by 2 
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(matching) by 2 (group) mixed factorial design, with the first two factors as within-subject 
factors, and the third one as the between-subject factor. Finally, the MJT (Lind, 1978, 2008) 
was implemented to obtain an external criterion for potential group differences concerning 
moral judgment competence due to intelligence differences. 
The CFT-20-R (Weiß, 2006) is an advanced paper and pencil test based on the concept 
of fluid intelligence by Cattell (1943, 1963). It is independent of language, but graphically 
dependent and consists of two parts with four subtests. The tasks involved demand series 
continuation, classifications, matrices, and topologies, where the correct answers have to be 
chosen out of five (Weiß, 2006). Since both main parts contain the same thematic subtests, a 
short form could be applied resulting in a validated IQ-Score for fluid intelligence. This 
version was chosen for the current experiment. 
The IST-2000-R (Liepmann et al., 2001) represents an advancement of the IST 
(Amthauer, 1953) and IST-70 (Amthauer, 1973) intelligence tests. The basic part measures 
several intelligence factors according to the intelligence concept by Thurstone, whereas the 
additional part allows for obtaining crystallized IQ values (Liepmann et al., 2001). The 
current experiment exclusively dealt with the knowledge test, which measures verbal, 
numeric, and figural knowledge. 
 
8.1.3 Procedure 
At a first appointment, participants were invited for a group testing session to obtain their 
intelligence scores. Three to five persons were investigated in one session, tested in the same 
room and at the same time, to avoid influences of forms on the day or setting differences. 
First, participants had to handle the CFT-20-R which lasted approximately 30 minutes, and 
then dealt with the IST, lasting for approximately 40 minutes. Afterwards, participants 
matching the IQ-score criteria were tested on a second appointment with the computer 
experiment and finally the MJT. 
The remainder of the procedure was identical to Experiment III, except of the pre-test 
selecting the participants. 
 
8.2 Results 
Data analysis was done with SPSS© 17.0 again (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA 1989 - 
2009). However, since two extreme groups were tested and only 14 participants remained in 
the final analysis, non-parametric analyses were conducted, which do not presuppose 
homogeny dispersion and the like (Janssen & Laatz, 2005). As for the training experiment 
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above, first, the possible differential influences of the two tasks on the two groups were 
controlled, with Friedman tests for a potential main effect of task and for a potential 
interaction effect of group by task. A potential main effect of group was calculated with the 
Mann-Whitney-U-test for independent samples. Further analyses were then conducted for the 
two tasks separately. Potential group differences (ME group) were also calculated with Mann-
Whitney-U-tests for independent samples and Friedman tests for dependent samples were 
implemented for a potential content main effect. A potential main effect of validity or 
matching was computed with the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were 
also executed for detailed post hoc analyses of the significant main effects, whereby post hoc 
calculations of detailed group differences still required Mann-Whitney-U-tests. Since non-
parametric statistics does not allow a direct calculation of interaction effects, difference values 
between groups and/or problems/sentences according to their dimensions of ‘content’ and 
‘validity/matching’ were built and then inserted in further Friedman analyses. Results were 
again calculated with Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The significance level for comparisons with 
Friedman tests was set to p = .05 (asymptotic significance) with three degrees of freedom (df) 
and χ2
 
 = 7.815 as critical value. For Mann-Whitney-U-tests (exact significance) and Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests (asymptotic significance) critical z-values with 1.96, and accordingly also p 
= .05 were used. The final correlation analysis was based on non-parametric Spearman’s rho 
with a significance level of p = .05. 
8.2.1 Task by group analysis 
Evidently, the participants with superior intelligence made fewer errors (2.46%) than those 
with average intelligence (18.75%), whereby the deductive reasoning problems were less 
prone to errors (9.38%) than the recognition items (11.83%). See graphical illustrations in 
Figures 30 and 31 below. The subsequent Friedman test for a potential task main effect was 
not significant (χ2 = .333, p = .564), whereas the Mann-Whitney-U-test yielded a main effect 
of group (z = -3.148, p = .001). No interaction effect of task by group occurred (χ2
 
 = .667, p = 
.414). 
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Figure 30: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for deductive reasoning problems and 
recognition items. 
 
 
Figure 31: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for the group with high intelligence and the 
group with average intelligence. 
 
Concerning decision times, the deductive reasoning problems required more time 
(1802.52 ms) than the recognition items (1772.45 ms), whereby the group with high 
intelligence (1644.85 ms) was faster than the group with average intelligence (1930.12 ms). 
See Figures 32 and 33 below. The calculated Friedman test revealed no main effect of task (χ2 
= .000, p = 1.000), and the Mann-Whitney-U-test yielded no main effect of group (z = -1.597, 
p = .128). In addition, no interaction effect occurred (χ2
 
 = 3.571, p = .059). Therefore, as in 
the training experiment, further analyses were conducted for the two tasks in separation. 
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Figure 32: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for deductive reasoning problems and 
recognition items. 
 
 
Figure 33: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for the group with high intelligence 
and the group with average intelligence. 
 
8.2.2 MJT 
The high intelligence group reached an average c-score in the MJT of 35.91 points (S.D. 
±12.76; high, according to standardization; Lind, 2008) whereas the average intelligence 
group achieved a value of 22.21 points (S.D. ±17.63; average). However, since there was an 
outlier in the average intelligence group (58 points), the groups did not differ significantly (z 
= -1.725, p = .097). Since the outlier did not show any anomalies in the error rates or decision 
times, it remained in the analyses of the computer experiment, but was excluded for the 
correlation analysis, because the MJT was also taken into account in this analysis. After 
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exclusion of the outlier in the average intelligence group and the person with the lowest c-
score of the high intelligence group (to retain equal group sizes), the groups differed 
significantly in the MJT (z = -2.562, p = .009). Now, the high intelligent participants had an 
average c-score of 38.77 points (S.D. ±11.26), and the average intelligent participants reached 
16.31 points (S.D. ±9.01). 
 
8.2.3 Deductive reasoning problems 
8.2.3.1 Error rates 
Participants with high intelligence made almost no errors (1.34%) compared to participants 
with average intelligence level (17.41%). See Figure 34. Thereby, moral (10.71%) and 
unmoral (13.39%) inference problems led to higher error rates compared to both of the neutral 
conditions (neutral1: 8.04%; neutral2: 5.36%). 
 
 
Figure 34: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for the group with high intelligence and the 
group with average intelligence. 
 
The statistical analysis revealed a significant main effect of group (z = -2.842, p = 
.004; Figure 34), whereas no main effect of validity (z = -.741, p = .458) or content (χ2 = 
3.446, p = .328) occurred. The interaction of content and validity yielded significant 
differences (χ2 = 8.520, p = .036, Figure 35), while there was no interaction of content and 
group (χ2
 
 = 2.143, p = .543) or validity and group (z = -1.029, p = .303). 
0
10
20
30
high average
er
ro
r i
n 
%
Experiment IV – Intelligence 
108 
 
 
Figure 35: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and neutral2 
problems, separated for validity (v = valid, iv = invalid). 
 
Post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests for the interaction effect of content and validity 
are reported in Appendix L (p. 197). The three-way interaction of content, validity, and group 
also reached significance (χ2 = 7.981, p = .046). The resulting tests concerning the interaction 
of content and validity separated for the groups showed no significant effect for the high 
intelligence participants (χ2 = 1.000, p = .801), but for the average intelligence participants (χ2
Regarding only moral-related problems concerning a potential incongruence effect 
yielded trends for a content main effect (z = -1.774, p = -.076) and an interaction of content 
and group (z = -1.802, p = .072) as well as a significant group difference (z = -2.695, p = 
.007). This demonstrates, at least descriptively, that all participants were affected by the 
incongruent problems compared to the congruent ones, but participants with average 
intelligence were even more prone to errors than the high intelligent participants (Figure 36). 
 
= 9.000, p = .029). The single contrasts for this group with the effects of content and validity 
are reported in Appendix L (p. 197). The significant three-way interaction also allowed 
calculating differences between groups for each single problem category. Thereby, only 
moral-invalid problems revealed a significant effect (z = -2.992, p = .004) indicating that both 
groups made more errors in this condition compared to all others. 
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Figure 36: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for congruent (moral-valid + unmoral-invalid) 
and incongruent (moral-invalid + unmoral-valid) moral-related problems for the group with high intelligence and 
the group with average intelligence. 
 
8.2.3.2 Decision times 
High intelligent participants answered faster (1614.71 ms) than participants with average 
intelligence (1990.33 ms). Moral problems had the highest decision times (1912.22 ms), 
followed by neutral2 (17.87.86 ms) and unmoral ones (1770.57 ms), and finally the neutral1 
inference condition (1739.43). 
 
 
Figure 37: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for high and average intelligence 
group. 
 
The main effect of group showed only a trend (z = -1.853, p = .073) indicating that 
high intelligent participants were faster than the average intelligence group (Figure 37). The 
validity main effect did not reach significance (z = -.031, p = .975), whereas content revealed 
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a significant main effect (χ2 = 10.371, p = .016). Post hoc Wilcoxon signed rank tests then 
yielded a difference between moral and neutral1 problems (z = -2.229, p = .026) and a trend 
for the comparison of moral and neutral2 ones (z = -1.726, p = .084) which demonstrates that 
moral problems had the highest decision times (see Figure 38). The other contrasts were 
insignificant (moral vs. unmoral: z = -1.601, p = .109; unmoral vs. neutral1: z = -.973, p = 
.331; unmoral vs. neutral2: z = .408, p = .683; neutral1 vs. neutral2: z = -.659, p = .510). 
Neither the two-way interactions of content and validity (χ2 = .943, p = .815), content and 
group (χ2 = 2.143, p = .543), and validity and group (z = -1.859, p = .856), nor the three-way 
interaction of content, validity and group (χ2
 
 = .771, p = .856) yielded significant effects. 
 
Figure 38: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and 
neutral2 problems. 
 
Concerning the moral-related problems, there was a trend for a group difference (z = -
1.725, p = .097) illustrating that participants with average intelligence showed the 
incongruence effect, whereas participants with high intelligence did not (Figure 39). 
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Figure 39: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for congruent (moral-valid + unmoral-
invalid) and incongruent (moral-invalid + unmoral-valid) moral-related problems for the high and the average 
intelligence group. 
 
8.2.4 Recognition items 
8.2.4.1 Error rates 
On the descriptive level participants with high intelligence (3.57 %) were less prone to errors 
than those with average intelligence (20.09 %). Moral recognition items (10.71 %) resulted in 
fewer errors than the unmoral ones (14.29 %) and the neutral1 items (14.29 %). The lowest 
error rate had the neutral2 items (8.04 %). 
The Mann-Whitney test revealed a group main effect (z = -3.033, p = .001), but no 
main effects of matching (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z = -.522, p = .602) or content 
(Friedman test: χ2 = -719, p = .869) occurred. Furthermore, there were no significant 
interaction effects (content by matching: χ2 =5.300, p = .151; content by group: χ2 = 3.141, p 
= .370; group by matching: z = -1.706, p = .088; group by content by matching: χ2
 
 = 4.918, p 
= .178). The group difference is shown in Figure 40 below. 
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Figure 40: Mean error rates in percent (%) with standard errors for the group with high intelligence and the 
group with average intelligence. 
 
8.2.4.2 Decision times 
Descriptively, the participants with high intelligence (1674.99 ms) were faster than those with 
average intelligence (1869.91 ms). Thereby, moral (1893.90 ms) and unmoral items (1838.43 
ms) required more decision time than the neutral1 (1620.64 ms) and neutral2 ones (1736.84 
ms). In particular, the literal match recognition items were answered faster (1623.74 ms) than 
the ones with no literal match (1921.16 ms). 
Statistical analysis yielded a main effect of content (χ2 = 13.457, p = .004) and 
matching (z = -3.170, p = .002, see Figure 41), but no group effect (z = -.575, p = .620). No 
interaction effects occurred (content by group: χ2 = 5.914, p = .116; content by matching: χ2 = 
.943, p = .815; group by matching: z = -.676, p = .499; content by group by matching: χ2
Post hoc analysis of the content main effect showed that moral recognition items 
differed from the neutral1 (z = -2.982, p = .003) and neutral2 ones (z = -2.166, p = .030), as 
did the unmoral items from the neutral1 (z = -2.542, p = .011) and the neutral2 ones (z = -
2.229, p = .026). Neither the moral-related recognition items (z = -1.161, p = .245), nor the 
neutral ones (z = -1.789, p = .074) differed from each other (see Figure 42). 
 = 
4.543, p = .208).  
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Figure 41: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for the literal match and the no literal 
match recognition items. 
 
 
Figure 42: Mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard errors for moral, unmoral, neutral1, and 
neutral2 recognition items. 
 
8.2.5 Correlation 
Finally, a correlation analysis was carried out including decision times and error rates for all 
reasoning problems as well as for the moral-related and neutral ones, together with both 
intelligence scores (CFT/IST), and the c-score of the MJT, looking for differential aspects of 
fluid versus crystallized intelligence components. Significant correlations were obtained from 
IST and CFT (rs = .863), IST and c-Score (rs = .621), CFT and c-score (rs = .827). Error rates 
of moral-related problems correlated with the c-score (rs = -.689), with the CFT (rs = -.794), 
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and with the IST (rs
 
 = -.653). See Appendix L (pp. 198-199) for statistical details and Figures 
43 and 44 for graphical illustration. 
 
Figure 43: Scatter plots of mean CFT-20-R and IST-2000-R IQ-values of 6 participants with mean error rates of 
all problems or moral-related problems. 
 
 
Figure 44: Scatter plots of mean CFT-20-R and IST-2000-R IQ-values of 6 participants with mean c-scores of 
MJT. 
 
Scatter plots with regression lines comparing IST, CFT, and c-score values of 6 participants 
with mean error rates of moral-related as well as error rates of all problems are shown in 
Appendix L (pp. 200-201). Furthermore, scatter plots with regression lines for IST and CFT, 
c-score and IST, c-score and CFT, and c-score with moral-related errors are reported in 
Appendix L (pp. 200-201). 
 
8.3 Discussion 
The fourth experiment revealed group differences between participants with high and average 
IQ values. Participants with superior intelligence had higher c-scores, namely higher moral 
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judgment competence, shorter decision times and made fewer errors (although decision time 
differences did not reach significance). They showed no incongruity effect in the error rates of 
the moral-related problems and interestingly, there was also a general effect of intelligence as 
shown in the correlations of the CFT with all error rates and decision times of all deductive 
reasoning problems (moral-related and neutral problems). The IST in contrast was almost 
exclusively correlated with the error rates of the moral-related problems and MJT c-score. 
The results indicate that intelligence has indeed influences on performance in 
deductive reasoning problems (Johnson-Laird, 2006). Fluid intelligence in particular, seems to 
be responsible for these overall better reasoning abilities. Fluid intelligence in turn is 
associated with working memory capacity (Engle, 2002). Both reflect “[…] the ability to keep 
a representation active, particularly in the face of interference and distraction.” (Engle, 
Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999, p. 309). Thereby, “WM capacity, or executive 
attention, is most important under conditions in which interference leads to retrieval of 
response tendencies that conflict with the current task.” (Engle, 2002, p. 19). Moreover, there 
is also a connection between speed of task processing and intelligence (Fry & Hale, 2000), 
although there was only a trend in decision times that high intelligent participants answered 
faster than participants with average intelligence. The reason why this difference did not reach 
significance might be due to the fact that the high IQ group was significantly older than the 
group with average intelligence (z = -2.567, p = .007), since it is known that decision times 
slow down with age (Der & Deary, 2006; Tun & Lachman, 2008). Another explanation might 
be that high intelligent participants took more time to perform better as was reflected in the 
lower error rates. In relation to these group differences, one might wonder that there were no 
content effects in the error rates but only in the decision times. A potential content effect 
might have vanished since the high intelligent participants made almost no errors at all. This 
appears to have reduced the overall error rates for both groups, although the group with 
average intelligence made almost twice as much errors in the moral-related condition as 
compared to the neutral one. The decision times in turn revealed a significant main effect that 
could be related to the additional time the high intelligent participants needed for the moral-
related problems to avoid errors. Thus, both groups needed more time to process the moral-
related problems, but that resulted only in the group of superior intelligence in lower error 
rates. This additional time the later group applied to the moral-related problems might be due 
to the emotional load of these problems (see also evaluation of Pre-Study III). These 
emotional laden contents might have activated personal attitudes (Lefford, 1946), which had 
to be processed additionally. It can be suggested that these attitudes are related to prior 
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knowledge about morals, thus reflect moral attitudes (cp., Luo et al., 2006). The correlations 
of the crystallized intelligence components particularly to the error rates of the reasoning 
problems and the c-score of the MJT (Lind, 2008) seem to further support these assumptions. 
Thus, all participants seemed to reason practically in the moral-related conditions. 
It might be concluded that intelligence influences both theoretical and practical 
reasoning. This influence seems to be mediated by fluid and crystallized intelligence 
components. Fluid intelligence is more related to working memory capacities (i.e., rational 
processes), whereas crystallized intelligence represents emotionally laden prior knowledge 
(i.e., emotional/intuitive processes) or is related to moral attitudes based on this emotionally 
laden knowledge. Perhaps, the WM capacities helped suppressing prior knowledge / moral 
attitudes to focus on task demands more easily, or ‘just’ enabled appropriate task processing 
in general. 
With regards to the recognition items, there was only a main effect of group for the 
error rates reflecting again the overall better performance of the high intelligent participants. 
With respect to the content, both groups were slower in the moral-related condition and no 
differences concerning error rates could be found. In contrast to the postulated effects and the 
evidences seen in the training experiment reported earlier, the moral-related content did not 
improve recognition performance. However, taking the given explanation of moral attitudes 
and upcoming prior knowledge into account as well as working memory capacities might give 
a hint to understand these results. The overall performance of the average intelligence group 
was worse compared to that of the superior intelligence group, independent from moral-
related or neutral contents, and also independent from the specific task at hand. In contrast, 
the performance of the high intelligent participants was almost error free independent from 
contents and tasks, but they needed in both tasks more time to handle the moral-related 
problems/sentences in order to keep error rates low. 
Besides these interesting results and evidences, a few limiting factors of this 
experiment have to be mentioned. The first factor is the small number of participants. This 
reduced statistical power extremely, thus rendering potential effects not significant. 
Furthermore, the correlation analysis reveals insights in potential relations between 
intelligence and reasoning performance, but does not allow assumptions about causal 
relationships. In addition, the groups differed with regards to age and gender as well as 
concerning potential prior knowledge of intelligence tests and presumably logical reasoning in 
general (although explicit knowledge of deductive reasoning tasks could be excluded). They 
were also intentionally chosen to differ significantly in intelligence level. A further 
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experiment and correlation seems necessary however, in order to compare many more persons 
with varying intelligence and performance levels to obtain evidence whether performance in 
theoretical and practical reasoning as well as moral judgment competence rises with 
increasing IQ or not. These critical points constrain potential generalizations of the current 
findings. Therefore, the results are impressive, but have to be interpreted with caution. 
An even better indicator of the reciprocal involvement of rational and 
emotional/intuitive processes on theoretical and practical reasoning can be obtained by 
measuring participants’ brain activations. Thus, the last experiment dealt with the brain 
processes and associated cognitive processes which participants show while they handle 
theoretical and practical reasoning problems. 
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9. Experiment V – fMRI 
This last experiment investigated ‘normal’ participants dealing with the deductive inference 
problems used in Experiment II while measuring their brain activity with event-related 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This experiment should yield further 
evidence of potential similarities or even dissimilarities in cognitive processes and associated 
brain areas for theoretical and practical reasoning. 
In order to determine similarities and dissimilarities in the functional neuroanatomy of 
reasoning and its associated processes with moral content (i.e., ‘practical reasoning’) and with 
abstract content (i.e., ‘theoretical reasoning’) Regions of Interest (ROIs) were defined for the 
brain imaging data analysis according to the main findings of the above mentioned studies. It 
was only focused on the main structures which revealed to be involved in theoretical and 
practical reasoning. However, regarding the differences between studies in labeling the frontal 
brain areas, only the DLPFC as region rather associated with rational processes (e.g., Greene 
et al., 2004; Schaich Borg et al., 2006), the OFC as region rather associated with 
emotional/intuitive processes (e.g., Dolan, 2002; Prehn et al., 2008), and the mPFC as region 
rather associated with integration of both of these processes (especially the ventral parts of the 
mPFC; e.g., Adolphs, 1999, 2006; Damasio, 2006) were taken into account. Apart from the 
frontal regions, further brain structures and areas were proposed and investigated: the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) as region rather associated with working memory processes like 
conflict detection and monitoring (e.g., Moll et al., 2003; Young & Koenigs, 2007), the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) as region associated with Theory of Mind (ToM) processes 
and sensory integration (e.g., Frith & Frith, 1999; Heekeren et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2006), 
temporal areas associated with emotional, intuitive, and knowledge-based processes (e.g., 
Goel & Dolan, 2003b; Moll et al., 2005), and the parietal cortex associated with rather 
rational and working memory processes or reasoning with and without content (e.g., Canessa 
et al., 2005; Goel & Dolan, 2003b; Greene et al., 2001). 
The assumption was to obtain increased activations in the following brain regions for 
reasoning with (moral) and without (abstract) content: the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the parietal lobe, the precuneus, the STS-region, and the temporal 
pole, since these structures have consistently been identified across various studies. The 
concrete hypotheses related to this assumption are: 
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- Theoretical and practical reasoning are at least partly based on activations of 
similar brain areas involving frontal, temporal, and parietal regions (see concrete 
ROIs above). 
- These regions in turn are associated with rational and emotional/intuitive processes 
as well as with working memory~, knowledge~, and ToM related processes. 
The STS-region ROI (in the following, short: STS) included the superior temporal 
gyrus, the angular gyrus, and the supramarginal gyrus.16
Note that the main focus of this experiment was on overlapping brain regions, not 
single x,y,z-coordinates, and thus on the main involved cognitive processes (rational and 
emotional/intuitive). Further sub-divisions of brain structures/regions and further associated 
sub-processes are necessary, but beyond the scope of the current experiment. Details 
concerning methods are reported in the following section. 
 The parietal lobe ROI (in the 
following, short: parietal) included the superior and inferior parietal lobe as well as the 
angular and supramarginal gyrus. The occipital brain regions were neglected, since increased 
activations due to the visual presentation of the reasoning problems were expected there 
anyway. The positive and negative emotional content problems as well as the neutral content 
ones served as controls identifying regions only dealing with emotional or ‘simple’ content 
effects. 
 
9.1 Method 
9.1.1 Participants 
In this last experiment, 31 healthy participants meeting the inclusion criteria (no previous 
mental illness, no psychotropic medication, and medical suitability for fMRI) volunteered in 
the study and gave informed written consent according to the Declaration of Helsinki 
(1964/2008). The 17 female participants had a mean age of 21.76 years (S.D. ±3.13), and the 
14 male participants had a mean age of 25.36 years (S.D. ±6.52). The experiment was 
approved by the ethics committee of the German Psychological Society (DGPs). Participants 
came from local universities. For the approximately 45 minute’s experimental session, the 
participants were financially compensated or received course credits. Again, all participants 
were native German speakers, naïve to logical reasoning tasks, right-handed according to 
Salmaso and Longoni’s (1985) modified version of the Edinburgh Handedness Questionnaire 
(Oldfield, 1971), and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
                                                 
16 Since the STS is sometimes also labeled as temporal parietal junction (TPJ, e.g., Young, Cushman, Hauser, & 
Saxe, 2007) and its real dimension is unspecific, the inferior parietal lobe was also included in the ROI for the 
STS region to cover all possible activations associated with this area. 
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9.1.2 Material 
The deductive inference problems applied here were the same as in Experiment II. Thus, a 
total of 48 problems were presented in the scanner, representing a 6 (content) × 2 (validity) 
within-subject factorial design. 
 
9.1.3 Procedure 
Prior to the brain imaging experiment, participants read the instruction and practiced with 
three examples not used in the experiment outside the scanner on a standard personal 
computer. Subsequently, the participants were put into the scanner, and ran through the 
technical measurements (field mappings, anatomical scan) before engaging in the main 
experiment. Problems were randomly presented via an LCD projector onto a screen that could 
be viewed through a mirror mounted on the head coil (visual field = 18°). The sentences were 
presented successively, whereby the first premise lasted 5 s, the second 4 s, followed by a 5 s 
pause with a ±1.125 s jitter, and finally, the conclusion lasted for 14 s. The third sentence 
(presented in red) had to be judged as valid or invalid using a response box which was 
positioned on the right side of the participants’. The participants used their index and middle 
fingers to answer via button press on the response box within this 14 s presentation of the 
conclusion. This time window for the conclusion was also jittered with ±1.125 s before the 
next problem appeared (Figure 45). The jitters were implemented to avoid anticipation effects 
of the participants in order to control possible sustained steady states of the BOLD signal as 
well as to avoid measuring always the same slices at the same time. Each trial lasted 
approximately 33 s. The software Presentation 9.0 (©Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, 
USA) was used for stimulus presentation as well as for the recording of participants’ 
responses and decision times. 
 
 
Figure 45: Procedure of one trial of the imaging experiment. 
 
9.1.4 Analysis of behavioral data 
Behavioral data concerning error rates (almost no missing values occurred, thus correct 
answers correspond to the difference of 100% minus error rates) and decision times were 
analyzed by setting up a general linear model for repeated measures and post hoc paired-
sample t-tests for the 6 × 2 factors (content × validity). Analysis were done with SPSS© 17.0 
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(SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois, USA 1989 - 2009) and significance level was set to p = .05 (F-
values of the GLM were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). 
 
9.1.5 Image acquisition and analysis 
Functional and anatomical brain images were obtained using a 1.5 T whole-body tomograph 
(Siemens Magnetom Symphony, Erlangen, Germany) with a standard head coil. Structural 
image acquisition consisted of 160 T1-weighted sagittal images (MPRage, 1 mm slice 
thickness). Field mapping images were measured in the same space and resolution as the 
functional images. For the functional imaging a total of 684 volumes were registered using a 
standard T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (EPI) with 25 slices covering 
the whole brain (slice thickness = 5 mm, 1 mm gap, descending acquisition, TE = 55 ms, TR 
= 2.5 sec., flip angle = 90°, field of view = 192 mm × 192 mm, matrix size = 64 × 64). The 
orientation of the axial slices was parallel to the AC-PC line. 
The first six volumes were discarded to control for saturation effects. Preprocessing 
and data analyses were done with the statistical parametric mapping software package 
(©SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) using Matlab 7.6 
(©Mathworks Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, USA). After converting scanner DICOM images 
with MRIConvert 2.0 (©Lewis Center for Neuroimaging, University of Oregon, USA), 
preprocessing was carried out. The measured fieldmaps were used in the realignment and 
unwarping steps, followed by a slice time correction and the normalization steps, where 
images were matched to the standard ICBM/MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) template. 
Finally, the images were smoothed using an isotropic three-dimensional Gaussian filter with a 
full width at half maximum of 9 mm. 
For each participant, the experimental conditions were modeled by a stick function 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (hrf) using a general linear 
model. This function was applied to the 6 (content) by 2 (validity) factors building the 
factorial design at the single subject level. The two types of premises and the six movement 
parameters of the rigid body transformation, applied by the realignment procedure, were 
introduced as covariates of no interest in the model. The time series were filtered with a high 
pass filter of 128 s and serial correlations were controlled by an AR(1) process. T-contrasts 
were set for all 12 conditions (content by validity), which were then analyzed at the group 
level. 
At the group level, a factorial within-subject ANOVA design was built to model the 
12 conditions. Comparisons of conditions were done by calculating appropriate contrasts. 
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Conjunction analyses were conducted according to the ‘minimum statistics approach’ 
(Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005). The resulting voxel-wise tests were 
corrected for multiple comparisons for the predefined ROIs as well as for the explorative 
whole brain analysis. Results were considered significant at p < .05 (p < .025 when the ROIs 
were split in left and right hemisphere). ROI creation was done with MARINA (Walter, 
Blecker, Kirsch, Sammer, Schienle, Stark, & Vaitl, 2003). 
Labeling for the brain regions activated in the F-test were done with MARINA 
(Walter et al., 2003) and its included anatomical tool (Tzourio-Mazoyer, Landeau, 
Papathanassiou, Crivello, Etard, Delcroix, Mazoyer, & Joliot, 2002). To obtain the Brodmann 
labels, SPM5 MNI/ICBM-based x, y, z data were transformed into Talairach-space with 
GingerALE 2.0 implemented in BRAINMAP (Laird, Fox, Price, Glahn, Uecker, Lancaster, 
Turkeltaub, Kochunov, & Fox, 2005), whereby the newest ALE-algorithm was used 
(Eickhoff, Laird, Grefkes, Wang, Zilles, & Fox, 2009). Coordinates were then defined with 
the TALAIRACH DAEMON (Lancaster, Woldorff, Parsons, Liotti, Freitas, Rainey, 
Kochunov, Nickerson, Mikiten, & Fox, 2000). Reported Brodmann Areas should be handled 
carefully (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) and are only mentioned as supplemental information. 
Finally, MRIcro (Rorden & Brett, 2000) was used to create figures of activated ROI contrasts 
for better illustration. 
 
9.2 Results 
9.2.1 Behavioral data 
9.2.1.1 Error rates 
On the descriptive level participants made 18.15% errors with the moral problems, 16.53% 
with the unmoral ones, 7.26% with the abstract problems, 5.24% with the neutral ones as well 
as 8.06%, and 13.71% with positive and negative emotional problems, respectively (Figure 
46, left). The general linear model revealed a significant main effect of content (ME content: 
F(2.556, 76.695) = 7.612, p < .001) and an interaction effect of content and validity (IE: 
F(1.926, 57.772) = 7.032, p .002) for the error rates. No main effect of validity occurred (ME 
validity: F(1, 30) = .005, p = .946). 
The corresponding post hoc t-tests of the content effect (Appendix M, p. 202) showed 
that moral problems (vs. neutral: t(30) = 3.906, p < .001; vs. abstract: t(30) = 2.979, p = .006; 
vs. positive emotional: t(30) = 2.843, p = .008) and unmoral problems (vs. neutral: t(30) = 
4.119, p < .001; vs. abstract: t(30) = 2.923, p = .007; vs. positive emotional: t(30) = 2.695, p = 
.011) were more prone to errors than all other conditions (except the negative emotional 
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control problems, where analysis did not reach significance; moral vs. negative emotional: 
t(30) = 1.283, p = 209; unmoral vs. negative emotional: t(30) = 1.022, p = .315). In contrast, 
the abstract problems revealed the lowest error rates as compared to all others (except for the 
neutral problems, t(30) = -1.541, p = .134), whereby the comparison with the positive 
emotional problems was insignificant this time (vs. positive emotional: t(30) = -.441, p = 662; 
vs. negative emotional: t(30) = -2.794, p = .009). Post hoc t-tests for the significant interaction 
are only shown in Appendix M (p. 203), since the analysis of the brain imaging data was 
restricted to the content categories. 
Analyzing only the moral-related problems concerning their moral status (moral, 
unmoral) and their validity (valid, invalid) yielded an incongruence effect. The effect showed 
that participants made more errors with the incongruent (moral-invalid/unmoral-valid) 
problems as compared to the congruent ones (moral-valid/unmoral-invalid) (F(1, 30) = 9.990, 
p = .004; t(30) = -3.161, p = .004). 
 
 
Figure 46: (left) mean error rates in percent (%) with standard error for moral, unmoral, neutral, abstract, positive 
emotional, and negative emotional problems; (right) mean decision times in milliseconds (ms) with standard 
error for the same conditions. 
 
9.2.1.2 Decision times 
Descriptively, participants showed increased decision times for moral (2321 ms) and unmoral 
problems (2372 ms) as compared to abstract (1290 ms), neutral (1723 ms), positive emotional 
(1816 ms), and negative emotional (1939 ms) problems (Figure 46, right). Decision times 
yielded a significant main effect for validity (F(1, 30) = 29.808, p < .001) and content 
(F(3.141, 94.226) = 22.496, p < .001), but no interaction (F(2.169, 65.066) = .662, p = .531) 
in the general linear model. Post hoc t-tests confirmed that invalid problems showed higher 
decision times than valid ones (t(30) = -5.460, p < .001). The same accounts for moral 
problems (vs. neutral: t(30) = 4.445, p < .001; vs. abstract: t(30) = 6.900, p < .001, vs. 
positive-emotional: t(30) = 3.765, p = .001;  vs. negative-emotional: t(30) = 3.072, p = .004) 
as well as unmoral ones (vs. neutral: t(30) = 4.882, p < .001; vs. abstract: t(30) = 8.058, p < 
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.001; vs. positive-emotional: t(30) = 4.262, p < .011; vs. negative-emotional: t(30) = 3.103, p 
= .004) in comparison to all the others. The abstract problems in turn differed from all others 
resulting in the shortest decision times (vs. neutral: t(30) = 3.612, p = .001; vs. positive 
emotional: t(30) = -5.417, p < .001; vs. negative emotional: t(30) = -4.780, p < .001). All 
results are reported in Appendix M (p. 202). Decision times showed no incongruence effect of 
the moral-related problems (F(1, 30) = .287, p = .596). 
 
9.2.2 Imaging data 
Since the neural similarities and dissimilarities of theoretical (i.e., deductive reasoning) and 
practical reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning), as well as in the associated processes 
(emotional/intuitive and/or rational) were of special interest, the analysis included four steps. 
First, the effects of single conditions (moral, unmoral, neutral, abstract, positive emotional, 
and negative emotional) were analyzed, regardless of validity. Subsequently, the focus was 
put only on conditions showing any corresponding neural activation. Second, a conjunction 
analysis for these conditions was done. Third, differences between these conditions were 
calculated. Finally, a whole-brain explorative F-test was conducted in order to test for further 
activations in structures outside the pre-defined ROIs. 
 
9.2.2.1 Results of the Region of Interest (ROI) analyses 
Analyzing the activation during the six content conditions revealed significant effects for 
moral, abstract, and neutral problems, but not for unmoral and both of the emotional ones in 
all predefined ROIs (see table in Appendix N, p. 204, and Figure 47 below for details). 
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Figure 47: Significant activations of calculated ROIs (voxel-based, FEW-corrected with p = .025) for single 
conditions (abstract, moral, neutral); LH = left hemisphere, RH = right hemisphere, each figure contains 12 
slices with activation density color bar; slices in each figure correspond to the slice lines shown in the sagittal 
image on the right bottom image shown in Figure 48 below. Activated brain regions are: OFC = orbitofrontal 
cortex, MTG = middle temporal gyrus, STS = superior temporal sulcus region, ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, 
mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex, precuneus, and DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, (for 
better identification of activations, only the first image includes labeling of activated brain areas). 
 
Next, the common activations in abstract, moral, and neutral problems were tested. 
Again, all predefined ROIs revealed significant bilateral activations (see table in Appendix N, 
p. 205, and Figure 47 above for details). Note that pair-wise conjunctions are not necessary 
since the conjunction of the three conditions also encompasses the results of possible pair-
wise conjunctions. 
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Figure 48: Significant activations of calculated ROIs (voxel-based, FEW-corrected with p = .025) for difference 
comparisons between abstract and moral problems as well as moral and abstract problems; LH = left hemisphere, 
RH = right hemisphere, each figure contains 12 slices with activation density color bar; slices in each figure 
correspond to the slice lines shown in the sagittal image on the right bottom image. Activated brain regions are 
labeled in Figure 47 above. 
 
In the third analysis, the differences between the conditions were analyzed. 
Contrasting abstract problems with the moral ones yielded increased bilateral activations in 
the ACC, the DLPFC, the mPFC, the MTG, the parietal lobe, the Precuneus, the STS, the 
Temporal Pole, and the right OFC. The inverse contrast (moral – abstract) showed increased 
left-hemispheric activations in the DLPFC, the mPFC, the MTG, the precuneus, the STS, and 
the temporal pole (see both comparisons in Figure 48 above). Comparing the abstract with 
neutral problems again resulted in increased activations in all ROIs bilaterally, except for the 
OFC and the temporal pole, which only showed right hemispheric activations. Conversely, 
neutral problems minus abstract ones revealed increased activations in the left temporal pole. 
Subsequently, the contrast of the moral problems with the neutral ones identified increased 
bilateral activations in the ACC and the mPFC as well as left hemispheric activations in the 
DLPFC, the MTG, the OFC, parietal, and the STS. The inverse comparison yielded no 
activations at all (see all comparisons in Appendix N, pp. 206-207). 
 
9.2.2.2 Results of the explorative whole-brain analysis 
Finally, an explorative whole-brain analysis (F-test) was conducted to test, whether further 
regions are activated during the different reasoning processes. The activated regions matched 
almost all of the predefined ROIs except for an inferior and medial occipital lobe activation 
(F-value: 13.21; cluster-size: 5; x y z coordinates: -15 -93 -3; BA 17). Therefore, no further 
analyses were conducted. 
Experiment V – fMRI 
127 
 
9.3 Discussion 
9.3.1 Behavioral Results 
The results of the behavioral data showed that participants again produced more errors and 
needed more time in answering the moral-related problems as compared to all others. In 
contrast, the abstract problems were almost comparable to the neutral problems and yielded 
fewer errors and shorter decision times than the emotional controls or the moral-related 
problems. Thus, as shown in Figure 46, the content per se affected the reasoning performance, 
but it was especially heightened for the moral-related problems. This content effect normally 
facilitating deductive reasoning (e.g., Wason & Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird et al., 1972), 
disturbed the reasoning performance in the current experiment, as it was already shown in 
Experiment I and II. Thus, the fMRI experiment also yielded the moral-related, problem 
inherent incongruence effect. In turn, this incongruence effect, which the participants revealed 
also in this experiment, again supports assumptions of knowledge about morals or personal 
moral attitudes due to learning involved in practical reasoning (e.g., Luo et al., 2006; Moll et 
al., 2005). 
However, this moral-related content effect could not explain the increased error rates 
of the negative emotional and, to a limited amount, the positive emotional problems. These 
increments might rather have resulted from the emotional content per se, since Blanchette and 
Richards (2004) as well as Blanchette (2006) had shown that emotional content (positive and 
negative) impeded the reasoning process. Another possible explanation for the incongruity 
effect might also be related to the emotional load of the moral-related problems. If morals are 
learned and stored, at least partly, as ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006), dealing with 
morality seems to activate these markers again. Therefore, the incongruence effect could also 
reflect the emotional load of the moral-related problems, since emotional laden knowledge is 
remembered better (e.g., Ferré, 2003). Perhaps, the emotional load is responsible for the 
performance of the participants in the emotional problems, whereas a mixture of emotional 
and intuitive influences, and thus related processes, caused the performance on the moral-
related problems. Since participants were able to deal with the abstract reasoning problems 
almost error-free, and solved most of the others problems as well (about 80 % correct), there 
is further evidence for rational processes involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. 
Independent of these behavioral results and the drawn assumptions, the main foci of 
the fifth experiment were the neural correlates of theoretical and practical reasoning, and 
whether there are similarities between these processes and associated brain areas. This will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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9.3.2 Imaging data 
9.3.2.1 Abstract problems 
The bilateral activations found for the abstract reasoning problems are in line with the idea of 
a widespread network of cortical structures involved in theoretical reasoning (Goel, 2007, see 
introduction). This network, encompassing frontal, temporal, and parietal structures, 
presumably associated with emotional/intuitive and rational processes as well as ToM and 
working memory, accordingly supports ‘dual-process’ accounts of theoretical reasoning (e.g., 
Evans, 2008; Goel, 2007, Liebermann, 2003). In turn, ‘dual-process’ models account for an 
involvement of emotional/intuitive and rational processes in reasoning. However, Goel (2003) 
could only identify a bilateral fronto-parietal network activated by abstract reasoning, but is 
lacking temporal structures. Other studies in turn, could show activations for reasoning per se 
in a bilateral fronto-temporo-parietal network (Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff, & Sloutsky, 2006), 
or a fronto-temporo-occipital network also including the basal ganglia and cerebellar 
structures (Goel & Dolan, 2003a). With regards to the activated clusters in the left DLPFC 
and the left parietal lobe, the results further support the findings of Knauff et al. (2003) who 
also discovered activations in a bilateral fronto-temporo-parietal network, where the left 
hemispheric activations in the frontal and parietal regions were increased as compared to the 
right hemispheric activations. 
 
9.3.2.2 Moral problems 
Problems with moral content also yielded bilateral activations in a widespread fronto-
temporo-parietal network. This provides support for ‘dual-process’ accounts of practical 
reasoning (e.g., Greene et al., 2004) requiring a large cortical network (e.g., Casebeer, 2003a; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Raine & Yang, 2006). The results corroborate the notion of 
Goodenough and Prehn (2004) who stated that almost all brain imaging studies (e.g., Greene 
et al., 2001; Heekeren et al., 2003; Moll et al., 2001) –concerned with morals– found similar 
areas to be activated, although different tasks with different stimuli and task demands were 
used. Therefore, the results are in line with such findings by also identifying similar brain 
activations. This might be taken as further evidence for the applicability of the behaviorally 
validated reasoning problems. In contrast, it would be possible to argue that the actual 
experiment did not directly investigate moral reasoning since it used deductive inference 
problems. In fact, deductive inferences with a moral content (not moral reasoning in the literal 
sense) were explored. As already mentioned above however, the behavioral results and the 
Experiment V – fMRI 
129 
 
difference contrasts (discussed below) yield further evidence that participants executed some 
kind of moral reasoning/judgment making. 
Another interesting point is that the clusters of activated voxels for the abstract 
problems were (descriptively) often almost twice as large as those for the moral ones. If 
morals are learned, the moral problems might have required less brain activity than the 
abstract ones, whereas most people actively need to do mental executions while solving a 
deductive/logical problem (we seldom reason without contents in such an abstract way). This 
assumption is supported by studies showing that over learned, practiced, or automated tasks 
could lead to decreased brain activity (e.g., Ramsey, Jansma, Jager, Van Raalten, & Kahn, 
2004; Van Raalten, Ramsey, Duyn, & Jansma, 2008). Therefore, also the brain activations 
found for moral reasoning provide evidence for rational and emotional/intuitive processes as 
well as ToM and working memory processes involved in practical reasoning. This further 
supports ‘dual-process’ accounts of practical reasoning. 
 
9.3.2.3 Neutral problems 
The neutral problems led to bilateral fronto-temporo-parietal network activations. This seems 
to reflect the above mentioned results of the reasoning literature (e.g., Goel, 2007; Knauff, 
2007, 2009a). Since the neutral problems served as controls to filter out ‘simple’ content 
effects, it appears astonishing that these controls activated almost comparable cluster-sizes as 
the abstract problems. The neutral material applied here might have been not familiar enough 
to facilitate reasoning not only behaviorally (reduced error rates), but also with respect to 
brain activity. Therefore, participants seemed to handle neutral problems in a similar way as 
the abstract ones. 
 
9.3.2.4 Conjunction analysis 
The major aim of the last experiment was to obtain evidence whether theoretical and practical 
reasoning is based on similar brain structures, and thus, similar processes or not. The results 
seem to support these assumptions since bilateral activations in all of the predefined ROIs for 
the conjunction of the abstract, neutral, and moral problems could be found. The main 
argument against these assumptions may be that the actual task only required deductive 
reasoning and thus led to common activations of the different stimulus sub-categories. 
However, as shown in the behavioral data as well as in the differences of the single effects or 
the difference contrasts discussed in the following, there are similarities and dissimilarities in 
the reasoning processes and their underlying neural substrates. It seems legitimate therefore, 
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to assume that participants reasoned about (and judged sometimes according to) the content. 
Therefore, the moral content rather than the validity was decisive for the participants´ 
responses on the moral problems. Furthermore, according to the above mentioned brain 
imaging results of deductive and moral reasoning research, the results seem to be in line with 
the findings of both of these research domains. Moreover, for the first time this shows 
similarities between theoretical and practical reasoning. 
 
9.2.3.5 Difference analysis 
Comparing the abstract problems with the moral ones yielded bilateral activations in all of the 
predefined ROIs. These activations however, were more accentuated in the left hemisphere 
(larger voxel clusters activated with higher t-values). This especially applies to the DLPFC, 
the temporal and the parietal regions, except for the OFC which only showed right 
hemispheric activations in this comparison. Almost identical results were obtained from the 
contrast of the abstract and neutral problems. These results seem to support assumptions of 
Fangmeier et al. (2006), who proposed a bilateral fronto-temporo-parietal network for 
reasoning. Furthermore, the results partly match the accentuated left hemispheric activations 
in frontal and parietal regions in the study of Canessa et al. (2005) or Noveck, Goel, and 
Smith (2004) as well as of Knauff et al. (2003). However, the right-hemispheric and the 
temporal activations challenge the distinctions made by Goel (2003) who claimed that 
abstract content requires a more universal system involving a bilateral fronto-parietal 
network, whereas reasoning with semantic content activates a left hemispheric fronto-
temporal network. Such lateralization could not be found in the current experiment. The data 
are in better agreement with findings of Monti and colleagues (Monti, Parsons, Martinez, & 
Osherson, 2007; Monti, Parsons, & Osherson, 2009), who also proposed common, but 
especially left hemispheric accentuated, ‘core and support’ brain areas for deductive 
inferences. 
In contrast, Goel and Dolan (2003b) showed that a left fronto-temporal network is 
activated with familiar content, and bilateral parietal lobes and dorsal PFC are required for 
unfamiliar content. Since one can assume that abstract content is different from semantic 
content (i.e., moral problems), and differs even more from ‘simple’, not so familiar content 
(i.e., neutral problems), further studies seem necessary to resolve the open question whether 
the hemispheric specialization really exists or not. If a hemispheric specialization exists, as 
proposed by Goel and Dolan (2003a, 2003b) for example, studies should focus on the precise 
origins of this lateralization. Moreover, comparing the neutral problems with the abstract ones 
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indeed yielded a left temporal activation, but the left frontal activations were absent. 
Providing therefore, only partial support for such lateralized network proposals again. 
The comparison of the moral problems with the abstract ones only revealed left 
hemispheric activations, especially accentuated in temporal regions and the mPFC. These 
activations in the left mPFC seem to correspond to the assumptions of Goel, Shuren, 
Sheesley, and Grafman (2004) who proposed an asymmetry for deductive reasoning 
depending on the content. Thereby, they assumed that the left PFC responds more to social 
content and the right PFC to arbitrary content, which is comparable to the abstract condition. 
Although no increased unilateral activation could be found for the abstract problems in the 
right DLPFC or mPFC, the results are (partially) in accordance with the proposal of Goel and 
colleagues (Goel et al., 2004) that reasoning with different contents results in a hemispheric 
asymmetry. This asymmetry however, needs to be further explored since it might not be 
differentiated only by semantic content versus ‘pure’ abstract reasoning (see also arguments 
above). This assumption gets further support from the bilateral activations of almost all cortex 
regions in the single effects analysis for all conditions. Conversely, the left hemispheric 
activations in the contrast between moral and abstract problems provide thorough evidence 
for an additional left hemispheric activation for familiar (Goel & Dolan, 2003b) or social 
content (Goel et al., 2004). 
Regarding the research on moral reasoning, the left DLPFC activation of the moral 
problems compared to the abstract ones seems to match the results of Heekeren et al. (2003), 
Moll et al. (2001), and Schaich Borg et al. (2006), who also found left DLPFC activation with 
moral stories and scenarios. The mPFC activation of the same comparison partly matches the 
VMPFC activations of diverse studies using personal moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene et al., 2004), moral pictures (Harenski & Hamann, 2006), simple ethical sentences 
(Heekeren et al., 2003), or socio-normative judgments (Prehn et al., 2008). The dorsal 
fractions of the mPFC ROI and their activations seem to correspond to the findings of Fiddick 
et al. (2005) concerning their social contract trials. The increased temporal activations for 
moral problems also replicate, at least partly, several studies (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; 
Heekeren et al., 2003; Prehn et al., 2008). 
Canessa et al. (2005) for example found right hemispheric activations for social 
contents, while Heekeren et al. (2003) detected also bilateral temporal activations for moral 
sentences compared to controls. Thus, it seems necessary to investigate potential hemispheric 
asymmetries associated with varying contents more systematically to gain further insights in 
these possible hemispheric specializations. 
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10. General Discussion 
The work presented here investigated human reasoning using behavioral and brain imaging 
experiments. Thereby, the main goal was to find similarities of theoretical (i.e., how humans 
do or can reason) and practical reasoning (i.e., how humans should use their reasoning 
abilities to act reaching ‘eudaimonia’, or to act morally, respectively). These similarities 
should be based on common cognitive processes (i.e., rational and emotional/intuitive) and 
underlying brain structures. Further influencing factors mediating these processes were also 
suggested and discussed (i.e., working memory and intelligence for example). 
The reported experiments reveal indeed evidence for similar but also distinct cognitive 
processes and brain structures involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. These findings 
seem to support assumptions already made by Damasio (2006), LeDoux (2006), Thagard 
(2006), or Monti et al. (2007, 2009), whereby the later postulated ‘core and support’ brain 
areas and associated processes involved in reasoning focusing exclusively on theoretical 
reasoning. Therefore, the current experiments seem to fulfill a requirement already proposed 
by Evans (2008). He suggested a reunification of the theoretical and practical reasoning 
research to explore potential similarities of these two reasoning domains. Evans (2008) 
derived this idea by referring to the various ‘dual-process’ accounts that exist in both of these 
research domains. However, they were developed rather in isolation than in combination. 
Thus, adapting Evans (2008) proposals, a suggestion for the current findings is to interpret 
them as providing evidence for ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ processes (derived from the terms 
‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’) involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. It seems important 
to further adapt Evans’ notion that these two processes/systems/types involved in human 
reasoning can both be conscious or unconscious, and can work together, or separated, or in 
opposition to each other. Even though there is some dispute what kind of terms and associated 
processes could really be ascribed to the two different systems, a distinction can be made 
along the potential involvement of working memory processes that are only related to ‘Type 
2’ processes (cp., Evans, 2008). Therefore, ‘Type 1/System 1’ processes seem to be rather fast 
and automatic, whereas ‘Type 2/System 2’ processes might be rather slow and effortful (cp., 
Samuels, 2006). For the current work and in accordance with the literature of both research 
domains, it could be further assumed that ‘System 1’ processes are rather associated with 
emotions and (over) learned prior knowledge (i.e., intuitions), whereas ‘System 2’ processes’ 
rather refer to rationality and ‘pure’ reason. The actual experiments provide no evidence 
however, which of these potential processes involved in human reasoning is conscious or 
unconscious. Furthermore, whether or not terms such as ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006), 
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or ‘informed intuition’ (Thagard, 2006), or ‘high and low road’ as well as ‘mental models’ are 
better suitable in describing some of these processes involved cannot be judged with the 
experiments conducted within this thesis. Apart from this, the current results appear to be in 
line with such a cautious phrased ‘dual-process’ account based for example on the finding of 
the incongruence effect and its variable occurrence. “Normal” participants showed this effect 
whereas trained participants or participants with superior intelligence did not. This leads to 
the assumption of two different processes involved which can conflict, or interact, or work in 
isolation, respectively. Yet, the concrete mechanisms remain unclear and have to be explored 
further. The same accounts for other processes and influencing factors, not in the focus of the 
current work (e.g., situational context, learning history, personality traits). Nevertheless, the 
conclusion one might draw from the current findings seems rather to extend the suggestion by 
Monti et al. (2007, 2009) of ‘core and support’ units involved in theoretical reasoning to the 
domain of practical reasoning, instead of adapting the interpretation of Fiddick et al. (2005) to 
theoretical reasoning. They assumed various content-dependent processes for practical 
reasoning and rejected the idea of ‘dual-process’ accounts. 
The following sections shall discuss the reported findings and interpretations of the 
various experiments in detail. It aims to provide a critical integration and starts with the three 
pre-studies. 
 
10.1 Pre-Studies 
The pre-studies indicated the applicability of the deductive inference problems with different 
contents. All problems seemed to represent their intended contents. Concerning the logic 
dimension, the abstract problems received the highest rating in Pre-Study I, and the unmoral 
problems the lowest ratings in all three pre-studies. Moral content problems were almost 
equivalent to neutral, positive emotional, negative emotional, neutral1, and neutral2 problems 
across the three pre-studies. The invalid problems received lower ratings than the valid ones, 
within their corresponding contents. In addition, invalid problems were most often also rated 
lower than valid ones regardless of the content categories. Even though the participants of the 
pre-studies were not supposed to draw inferences, the problems were evaluated also according 
to their inherent logical structure. This yields evidence that the distinction between problems 
where the conclusion follows from the premises, and those where drawing an inference is 
impossible, was rated appropriately. Moreover, rating the abstract problems in the logic 
dimension highest seems to reflect their relation to ‘pure’ deductive reasoning, thus logic. The 
participants of all pre-studies and experiments were presumed to be no logicians or trained in 
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logic (prior to the current study). To recognize the relation between abstract problems and 
logic so directly, might therefore reflect some “inborn” or “learned” affinity to logic, hence 
their rational reasoning abilities/capacities. However, this assumption remains speculative, 
even though Kant for example (1781/1998) proposed something very similar in his ‘critique 
of pure reason’, whereby his metaphysics did not refer to inborn but to ‘a priori’. In addition, 
more empirically based evidence corresponds to the chosen reasoning problems. These were 
the ‘simplest’ ones available which are almost always solved without errors (cp., Knauff, 
2007). Therefore, rating the abstract problems as most ‘logical’ might be also due to their 
obvious and easy inherent structure. This is particular when all three sentences are presented 
at the same time (i.e., on one page together). 
Another interesting point concerning the logic dimension is that unmoral problems 
received the lowest ratings. This could be interpreted as first evidence that parts of the 
knowledge about morals, persons might possess, are according to the content of the human 
rights articles. Without such ‘moral’ prior knowledge participants should have rated the moral 
and unmoral problems as equally logical. However, the occurring reasoning process of a 
participant rating an unmoral problem might have been equivalent to “this is unmoral, thus 
illogical”. Vice versa, moral problems might have been sensed as serving our human purposes 
reaching a fruitful and peaceful flourishing life, thus being logical. It could also be even 
simpler. It is morally “OK” since the participants learned statements like these in institutions 
(i.e., school, church), thus rating moral problems as logical. These hypotheses are on the one 
hand very speculative, but receive further support from the ratings of the moral or unmoral 
problems in the positive and negative emotionality dimensions. 
The unmoral problems were rated as more negative than all other ones (except the 
negative emotional problems), whereas the moral problems were rated as more positive than 
all other inferences (except the positive emotional ones). Basically, one might assume that 
moral-related content is highly emotional. This was confirmed by the current findings, 
especially in Pre-Study I, where only emotionality was interrogated. However, a further 
speculation is that morals are negatively emotional laden. Since education and therefore 
learning of morality are often strongly intertwined with duties and obligations, and failings 
are almost always immediately penalized, children might evaluate and associate morals with 
negative feelings. However, when children begin to realize why morals (e.g., in form of laws, 
social rules, etc.) are useful for a peaceful and flourishing coexistence, their negative 
perception of morals might shift towards a more positive one. Therefore, normative 
statements and morally proper actions seem to be accompanied by positive feelings, whereas 
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only unmoral actions violating “our moral sense” lead to negative appraisals. Interestingly, 
these speculations seem to have several implications for a theory of morality. The fact that 
emotions (positive and negative) play an important role in moral reasoning and decision 
making challenges proposals of ‘pure’ rational process accounts of morality (e.g., Kant, 
1785/2000, 1797/2007; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Schaich Borg et al., 2006)
Nevertheless, the concept of emotions being involved in morals, especially as a kind 
of “moral emotions” for approval and disapproval of actions, has already been proposed by 
different researchers (
. In contrast, 
the assumed shift in children’s learning processes –understanding and internalizing morals– 
seems to require more rational processes for the evaluation and the recognition of real 
emotions, followed by the insight how useful morality is for “a better life”. This notion clearly 
contradicts “emotional theories” of morals (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Hume, 1751/2003; Hutcheson, 
1755/1968; Shaftesbury, 1711/1963). Another assumption that has to be made refers to these 
ratings which revealed evidence that participants in the pre-studies were also influenced by 
the content of the problems, thus reasoned about and perhaps also answered/rated according 
to this content. Therefore, the pre-studies present first evidences for emotional/intuitive and 
rational processes involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. However, whether or not 
morals are learned and represent therefore prior knowledge/intuitions, or reflect some 
automatic moral attitudes (cp., Luo et al., 2006), it cannot be decided within this current work 
(see also discussion in the introduction and below). 
Casebeer, 2003b; Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Moll, De 
Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, Bramati, Mourao-Miranda, Andreiuolo, & Pessoa, 2002; Nichols & 
Mallon, 2006; Smith, 1759/2004). Unfortunately, this idea has not been linked to emotional 
evaluations in “normal” reasoning processes which are not concerned with moral contents. 
This seems astonishing, in particular, since a few proposals state that emotions support 
learning and serve as an appraisal tool for all reasoning and decision making processes, 
perhaps represented as ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006).17
These assumptions made for the pre-studies will be discussed further in the following 
sections starting with the first two behavioral experiments. 
 Emotions seem therefore to be 
an important part of our cognitions (see also LeDoux, 2006; or Thagard, 2006). 
 
                                                 
17 The current pre-studies and experiments provide thorough evidence for the involvement of emotionally laden 
prior knowledge (i.e., emotional/intuitive processes) on reasoning, but could not account for the whole ‘somatic 
marker’ hypothesis by Damasio, which requires the entire body to be activated and involved, when storing and 
retrieving this emotional laden knowledge. To investigate this, was beyond the scope of the current experiments. 
However, the concept of Damasio seems the most plausible one explaining influences of emotional laden prior 
knowledge on cognitive processes, thus the involvement of emotional/intuitive processes in reasoning. 
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10.2 Experiments I + II 
The first two experiments show that moral-related reasoning problems, especially in the 
conflicting incongruent condition, resulted in more errors and higher decision times (cp., 
Evans, 2008; Greene et al., 2004). Incongruity effects have often been investigated in 
deductive reasoning with valid conclusions but unbelievable content (and vice versa), hence 
contradicting prior knowledge (Blanchette et al., 2007; Goel & Dolan, 2003b; Knauff, 2007; 
Lou et al., 2006; Manktelow & Evans, 1979). As reported in the introduction, these effects 
were thus called ‘belief bias’ (Evans, 1989, 2008). This ‘classical belief bias’ however, does 
not match the current findings. As already discussed above, the incongruity effects appearing 
in the current experiments might therefore, if at all, be labelled ‘new belief bias’. Since this 
incongruity was embedded in the current experiments to ensure that participants reason and 
answer according to morals and not to logic; this occurring incongruence effect is a hint that 
participants indeed reasoned and answered according to the moral-related content. Hence, the 
reasoning problems contained aspects of practical as well as theoretical reasoning. 
A possible different explanation of the appearing incongruity effect has been 
mentioned already. It refers to automatic moral attitudes (Luo et al., 2006). These attitudes 
represent activated stimulus-reinforcement associations, thus an automatic evaluation of a 
moral stimulus as good or bad. In incongruent cases, two opposing valence expectancies are 
built, leading to a response conflict which has to be solved. However, Luo et al. (2006) refer 
also to patient studies which revealed evidence that moral attitudes can only be created 
adequately if persons were able to learn and therefore form the necessary stimulus-
reinforcement associations. Therefore, moral attitudes seem also to be based on learned prior 
knowledge or intuitions associated with emotional processes. This knowledge comes into 
mind automatically and emotionally laden. For this reason, the current work adapted the 
‘somatic marker’ hypothesis by Damasio (2006). Moreover, also Luo and colleagues (Luo et 
al., 2006) refer to more ‘rational’ processes and associated brain structures which are 
activated in addition to the areas associated with moral attitudes. These additional brain areas 
are required to solve a potential incongruity-based conflict, in particular, when explicit 
reasoning is required. Thus, it remains an open question, whether (over) learned and 
emotionally laden prior knowledge leads to attitudes or just represents emotionally laden 
intuitions. It is also an unresolved issue, whether knowledge has to be separated from 
emotional evaluations/loads or not. Further research seems therefore necessary. 
In contrast, the assumption that morality represents (over) learned knowledge is 
supported more and more (Churchland, 1998; Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Kohlberg, 1969; 
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Moll et al., 2005; Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001). This has also been shown in various patient 
studies (Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, Chen, Shapira, & Miller, 2005; Raine & Yang, 2006). 
Since prior knowledge means that certain facts have been (over) learned, these (over) learned 
facts seem to create the necessary basis interfering with task demands. In turn, these intuitive 
processes might then have been responsible for the incongruity effects found in the current 
experiments. 
Furthermore, the cited patient studies yield evidences that moral knowledge could be 
preserved after brain injuries, but ‘correct’ moral decisions also require emotions, since 
morality represents highly emotional material. Koenigs et al. (2007) for example, investigated 
moral decision making of six patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) lesions 
as compared to brain-damaged comparison participants (no damage in areas associated with 
emotions) and healthy controls. They used moral-personal, moral-impersonal and non-moral 
dilemmas. The VMPFC-patients had problems only with emotional responses and emotion 
regulation, but normal intelligence, normal deductive reasoning abilities, and preserved 
knowledge of social and moral norms. Koenigs et al. (2007) only found differences between 
the controls and the VMPFC patients for the moral-personal dilemmas (especially for the 
highly conflicting ones) indicating that these patients were impaired in moral judgments 
involving emotionally salient actions. The decisions of the patients represented a kind of 
utilitarian judgment in these dilemmatic scenarios. This means that they approved killing one 
person in order to save the lives of five other persons, for example. The authors (2007) 
suggest that their results show intact knowledge of social and moral norms in VMPFC 
patients. This was proven due to the missing emotional reaction to harm of others in the 
moral-personal dilemmas. In these dilemmas the patients had to rely on their explicit 
knowledge in dealing with the decision and consequently revealed a kind of utilitarian 
judgment. Therefore, Koenigs et al. (2007) conclude that “[…] the present findings are 
consistent with a model in which a combination of intuitive/affective and conscious/rational 
mechanisms operate to produce moral judgments.” (p. 910). As mentioned above, the authors 
also claim that the VMPFC is rather an integration area of rational and emotional processes in 
moral reasoning than an exclusive ‘moral decision area’. It seems still unclear however, 
whether all emotional abilities of these patients were impaired since also the moral-
impersonal dilemmas contained emotional load, where patients did not show any performance 
differences compared to both of the control groups. 
Apart from this, these patient studies support the findings of the current experiments 
that practical reasoning requires emotional/intuitive and rational processes. In turn, learning 
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morality, highly emotional material as well as executing moral tasks after years of learning 
might create and further activate ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006). Thus, a possible 
explanation concerning the emotional/intuitive proportions of moral reasoning processes in 
these patients might be missing or impaired ‘somatic markers’. These markers contribute to 
cognitive processes besides the rational proportions. 
With regards to the ‘pure’ deductive reasoning problems (i.e., abstract inferences), 
participants were fastest and made almost no errors at all. This indicates that participants were 
able to reason theoretically although the applied problems were the easiest available (cp., 
Knauff, 2007). This missing variation in problem complexity however, restricts these 
assumptions. Moreover, the abstract problems were sometimes more prone to errors than the 
neutral ones. Thus, there is evidence that persons normally do not reason according to ‘pure’ 
logic in such an abstract way. In turn, these facilitative effects of the neutral problems as 
compared to the abstract ones support proposals of positive content effects in deductive 
reasoning (e.g., Wason & Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird et al., 1972). Taking the emotional 
controls into account complicates this picture. Indeed, it shows the reverse effects. In 
particular, the positive and negative emotional invalid problems showed increased decision 
times and error rates that contradict facilitative content effects. This rather seems to be in line 
with the findings of Blanchette and colleagues (Blanchette, 2006; Blanchette & Richards, 
2004; Blanchette et al., 2007) that emotionally laden content could lead to positive, but also to 
negative performance in deductive reasoning. Again in turn, the valid emotional problems 
showed the potential facilitative content effects. Apart from an abstract version of deductive 
reasoning problems according to classical logic, this leads to the suggestion that theoretical 
reasoning which is normally not content-free, is influenced by emotions caused by the 
emotional load of the reasoning problems. So, theoretical reasoning seems to be based on 
rational and emotional processes, as has already been shown for practical reasoning as well. 
One might object that all theoretical reasoning problems produced lower error rates than the 
practical ones, and therefore, the real influences on these reasoning problems were solely 
based on prior knowledge. However, as shown in the moral-valid and the unmoral-invalid 
conditions, where prior knowledge also played a role, the ‘intuitive’ proportions of the 
involved reasoning processes could not account for all results of the moral-related problems. 
Indeed, the moral-valid problems showed facilitative content effects, whereas the unmoral-
invalid ones showed slightly negative content effects. The latter finding might account for 
disturbing negative emotions on reasoning. In turn, the fact that the participants could deal 
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with the moral-valid inferences might endorse the human ability to reason deductively and to 
deregulate emotional influences (cp., Pizarro et al., 2003). 
The findings discussed so far yielded first evidences for rational and 
emotional/intuitive processes involved in theoretical and practical reasoning, but remain 
unsatisfactory. Therefore, further support seems necessary. 
 
10.3 Experiment III – Training 
The third experiment not only showed that training in deductive reasoning improves 
performance (cp., Cheng et al., 1986; Klaczynski & Laipple, 1993; Klauer et al., 1997; Klauer 
et al., 2000), but also that transfer effects are possible (cp., Klacynski & Laipple, 1993; 
Ziegler, 1990). The trained participants improved their reasoning performance in the post test 
as compared to the pretest as well as their results in the computer experiment, thus 
transferring their learned knowledge with abstract, absurd, and emotional problems to moral-
related and neutral reasoning problems. Also the trained participants however, were more 
prone to errors and had higher decision times in the moral-related conditions as compared to 
the neutral ones, even though these effects could only be shown descriptively. 
The content effects caused by the practical reasoning problems, in particular by the 
moral-invalid and the unmoral-valid ones, where content and logical form conflict represented 
again an incongruence effect in deductive reasoning. Hence, the moral-invalid problems 
produced most errors while moral-valid inferences were solved almost perfectly. This 
incongruity effect might have been increased for the groups without training or pseudo 
training due to the time pressure in Experiment III (cp., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). The 
time limit for evaluating the conclusions was set in Experiment III to enhance training 
differences. This time pressure discerned not only the groups of the third experiment better, 
but also increased the error rates of both of the controls groups as compared to the error rates 
of the also untrained participants in the first two experiments. These time pressure effects 
seemed to have been especially heightened for the group without training. Thus, if one had 
argued that for example the group with the pseudo training performed worse due to an 
exhaustive but unhelpful training, the time pressure effects of the group without training could 
contradict such an assumption. 
Interestingly, all participants, sometimes also the trained group, were influenced by the 
moral-related content, thus showing practical reasoning. Furthermore, these content 
influences, in particular the incongruence effect, might represent ‘intuitive’ processes 
involved in practical reasoning. Additionally, the effects of the moral-valid and neutral 
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reasoning problems are a hint for facilitative content influences on theoretical reasoning (cp., 
Cox & Griggs, 1982; Griggs & Cox, 1982; Johnson-Laird et al., 1972; Wason & Shapiro, 
1971). However, the slightly enhanced error rates of moral-valid problems compared to the 
neutral ones, for example in the trained group, also seem to contradict facilitative content 
effects. At least, if one assumes that theories could explain reasoning that postulate that social 
content by itself should have been helpful (Canessa et al., 2005; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; 
Cosmides, 1989; Manktelow & Over 1991). In contrast, one might suggest that there was a 
mixture of practical and theoretical reasoning, owed to the problem inherent structure, and 
both were not only influenced by prior knowledge but also by rational processes. Such 
assumption receives further support from the obtained training effects, since training 
improved only the rational proportions of the involved reasoning processes. An objection 
might be that the training applied did not only improve rational reasoning processes. 
However, the training was derived from the one used by Klauer et al. (2000) which explicitly 
focused with their training on improving deductive reasoning abilities (especially in the 
version that worked best, and was thus applied here). Furthermore, the participants of the 
current experiment were not trained in moral reasoning, or taught moral knowledge, or 
instructed how to control and to guide their emotions. It is clear that this cannot definitely 
exclude different factors that might have been trained. There is evidence however, that only 
the rational reasoning abilities of the training group were improved. 
The fact that all groups seemed to apply rational and intuitive reasoning processes 
yields evidence for ‘dual-process’ accounts of theoretical and practical reasoning (e.g., Evans, 
2008; Greene, 2007). This appears to contradict mental rule theories (e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 
1998; Braine et al., 1995; Rips, 1994). In accordance to the mental rule theories, participants 
should have ignored the content and should have dealt only with content-free, abstract rules. 
This was clearly not the case for both of the control groups but also for the trained participants 
in the moral-valid condition. Moreover, the results also object the domain-specific accounts 
like the pragmatic reasoning schema theory (e.g., Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) or the logic of 
social exchange theory (e.g., Cosmides, 1989). These theories contain the assupmtion that 
reasoning should be built on acquired (via typical life experiences) or innate rule structures. 
With regards to deontic questions in particular, these rules/schemas should have produced 
facilitative content effects and even less incongruity effects (see also critics by Manktelow & 
Over, 1991, 1995). Therefore, according to these theories, participants should have had 
performance gains in the reasoning problems especially in the moral-related conditions just 
because of content (cp., Canessa et al., 2005; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989). 
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Vice versa, there is evidence that also the mental model theory (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
1983, 2006; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird et al., 1992), besides ‘dual-process’ 
accounts (e.g., Evans, 2008), might at least partly be in line with some of the results. The 
weakest evidence for the mental model theory is based on the fact that the logic training of the 
current experiment was derived from former trainings showing that training according to the 
mental model theory works best (for an overview see Klauer & Meiser, 2007). However, the 
current experiment did not intend to investigate the success of different training methods. 
Thus, this evidence remains rather weak, since no comparison trainings according to other 
reasoning theories were applied. Further support for the mental model theory could be derived 
from the fact that it deals with mental models containing semantic content. This means that 
the reasoner does not use abstract, content-free formal rules for his reasoning processes, but 
rather relies on the content of the given premises. The participants of the current experiment 
therefore, might have dealt with the moral-related content of the premises building mental 
models for their reasoning processes. Furthermore, the mental model theory also postulates 
influences of prior knowledge on the reasoning process and provides a shortcut to working 
memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1986, 2003) involvement in deductive reasoning. So, the participants 
might have built mental models of the premises and related these to prior knowledge of 
morals. Now, the mental model theory postulates that “[...] reasoners may fail either because 
they miscomprehend the premises and construct inappropriate models or because the required 
manipulations of models overtax their working memory.” (Klauer & Meiser, 2007, p. 213). 
There is evidence that the performance of the participants with pseudo training or no training 
was disrupted by working memory constraints. Meiser and colleagues (Meiser et al., 2001), 
for example, showed that working memory capacity plays an important role in deductive 
reasoning after being trained according to the mental model theory in contrast to being trained 
with regards to other reasoning theories. Thus, Meiser et al. (2001) denote the influence of 
working memory capacity on reasoning as inherent in the mental model theory account of 
deductive reasoning. So, an explanation for the trained participants of the current experiment 
might be that their working memory capacities were improved due to the prior training. 
Hence, they could better focus on the logical structure of the deductive reasoning problems 
and suppress upcoming intuitive/heuristic processes (i.e., moral knowledge) more easily than 
the untrained participants. An advanced “moral” theory, based on the mental model theory, 
referring to deontic propositions and using such an explanatory proposal has been presented 
by Bucciarelli et al. (2008). This theory however, deals with ‘intuitive’/heuristic and 
emotional proportions in the reasoning process, thus it seems connected to a ‘dual-process’ 
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account rather than to the mental model theory which is almost exclusively based on rational 
and conscious reasoning processes (Manktelow, 2004). They try to circumvent such 
difficulties by proposing that moral reasoning is deontic reasoning. Deontic reasoning is on 
the one hand ‘normal’ reasoning and on the other hand it is specialized for morals. This seems 
to be quite confusing. Furthermore, Bucciarelli et al. (2008) postulate that their theory is 
based on mental models, but that decisions are sometimes based on emotional evaluations, 
and sometimes on deontic evaluations. Finally, they differentiate between intuitions and 
emotions, which also appear to be misleading. If morals are learned and concerned with 
highly emotional issues (Bucciarelli et al., 2008 share this view), it does not seem to be useful 
to discern intuitions (i.e., prior knowledge/learned morality) from emotions so extremely. In 
turn, this also represents a potential critique of the ‘classic’ mental model theory, which 
struggles with a possible explanation of the involvement of ‘intuitive’ and emotional 
processes in theoretical and practical reasoning. As Verschueren and colleagues (Verschueren 
et al., 2005a) noted, it might be reasonable to integrate the mental model theory in a ‘dual-
process’ account representing the involved ‘System 2’ processes (e.g., Evans, 2003) to 
circumvent such difficulties. 
Another point supporting the assumption of a working memory involvement in the 
current experiment refers to the decision times of the trained participants. The group receiving 
the logic training was always faster than both of the control groups, but needed more time 
answering the moral-related problems than the neutral ones. This might indicate that activated 
emotionally laden prior knowledge (i.e., heuristic, emotional, and intuitive processes) had to 
be suppressed by analytic processes (i.e., rational processes) first, before the learned rule 
could be applied. Suppression mechanisms might have caused a higher working memory load, 
since analytic processes are associated with working memory capacity (e.g., Evans, 2008; 
Johnson-Laird, 2006). In turn, working memory involvement in theoretical reasoning, 
mediated via prior knowledge provides evidence again for ‘dual-process’ accounts of 
theoretical reasoning. The influence of ‘intuitive’, perhaps emotional laden, processes on 
practical reasoning also seems evident. However, as mentioned above, the rational 
proportions of the reasoning processes involved in practical reasoning could not be tested with 
the current experiment. Therefore further experiments were conducted, which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
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10.4 Experiment IV - Intelligence 
The results of Experiment IV seem to reinforce the previous assumptions. The fact that high 
intelligent participants did not show an incongruence effect as well as less errors and shorter 
decision times in all reasoning problems compared to the group with average intelligence 
indicates a general effect of intelligence on reasoning. This suggestion is supported by the 
correlation analysis, where especially the fluid IQ values were correlated with the decision 
times and error rates of all problems. An explanation for this general effect of intelligence is 
that theoretical reasoning performance is often associated with ‘System 2’ processes, which 
are in turn related to working memory capacity/performance (cp., Evans, 2008). For working 
memory, a connection between higher intelligence and higher performance levels was shown 
earlier (e.g., Colom et al., 2004; Johnson-Laird, 2006). One might conclude therefore, that 
participants with higher fluid intelligence possess higher working memory capacities, thus 
better theoretical reasoning abilities. 
In contrast, the crystallized intelligence component was only correlated with the c-
score and the error rates of the moral-related reasoning problems, whereby crystallized 
intelligence is assumed to reflect accumulated knowledge, thus ‘System 1’ processes (cp., 
Evans, 2008). Former studies showed that there are also connections between IQ and moral 
reasoning/competence levels (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1979). Furthermore, a higher IQ 
allows for better learning performance and earlier achievement of higher moral competence 
levels (Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001; Stojiljković, 1998). Thus, it can be concluded that 
participants with higher crystallized IQ values had better learning and memory capacities for 
morals, perhaps stored as ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 2006). This would indicate better 
practical reasoning abilities. 
So far, there is evidence that persons with high fluid and crystallized intelligence 
levels have higher working memory capacities. This leads to an improvement of rational 
reasoning processes in general as well as higher knowledge-related performance levels, 
therefore an improvement of (emotional) intuitive reasoning processes as compared to persons 
with average intelligence level. For the current experiment however, one might assume that 
the higher moral competence of the high intelligent participants should have conflicted with 
the better general reasoning abilities. With respect to the results, this was not the case, even 
though the incongruity effect seems to be based on activations of ‘intuitive’ processes dealing 
with (over-) learned knowledge. Thus, to avoid a potential incongruence effect, one has to 
suppress these upcoming, automated processes by more ‘rational’ and deliberate processes. 
Regarding the correlations of the fluid intelligence component of the high intelligent 
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participants may provide an explanation. The fluid IQ values correlated with almost all 
decision times and error rates. Therefore, high intelligent participants possess high ‘rational’ 
reasoning abilities. Although they also possess high practical reasoning abilities at the same 
time (compare c-score values), the rational reasoning abilities might have even trumped the 
‘intuitive’ ones, thus suppressed these automatic knowledge-based processes. Another 
speculative explanation refers to potential rational influences on practical reasoning which 
were used to guide moral decisions in the “right” direction (i.e., to reason and subsequently 
act according to the human rights articles). Evidence for this assumption is available in the 
few errors made by the high intelligent participants. These exclusively occurred within the 
unmoral reasoning problems. Nevertheless, these assumptions remain speculative and further 
evidence is necessary regarding the potential influences of ‘rational’ processes on 
‘emotional/intuitive’ ones in reasoning. 
Potential critics concerning this experiment have been mentioned already, but a few 
points have to be discussed more extensively. The main point is the small sample and thus the 
weak power of the statistics applied as well as the limited possibility to generalize the results, 
which were also sometimes based on a trend rather than clear significant effects. Concerning 
the sample, there was not only a huge mean age difference between the two groups, but also a 
gender mismatch. The group with the high intelligent participants consisted almost 
exclusively of men (5 men, 2 women), whereas the group with the average intelligent 
participants was composed mainly of women (6 women, 1 man). The former group 
represented a mean age of 29 years and the later had a mean age of 21 years. Thus, it might be 
that besides intelligence based differences, confoundations due to age and/or sex were 
responsible for the results in the experiment and in the MJT. However, there is evidence that 
the IQ values of men and women are equal on average and that no sex differences exist (e.g., 
Colom, García, Juan-Espinosa¸ & Abad, 2002; Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, & Williams, 
2008). In turn, men normally show a greater variance performance in IQ tests than women, 
representing more extreme values in the tests applied (Amelang & Bartussek, 1990). 
Therefore, more women can be found with average IQ values, whereas more men are 
available with extreme IQ values. This might explain why it was easier to acquire men for the 
superior intelligence group than women and vice versa. Furthermore, it seems possible to 
exclude potential sex-related differences concerning logical reasoning abilities. A study by 
Lynn, Backhoff, and Contreras-Niňo (2004) for example showed that there are no sex 
differences in logical reasoning performance. Berzonsky and Ondrako (1974) also reported no 
sex differences in deductive reasoning abilities. With regards to the age differences, there is 
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also the assumption that they did not have a confounding influence. In accordance to Piaget’s 
proposals, humans reach the formal operational stage (i.e., abstract reasoning abilities) from 
age 12 onwards (Miller, 1993), and a possible decline of logical reasoning abilities is assumed 
not to occur before the age of 50 years or older (Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, & 
Knowlton, 2004). Finally, one might suggest that the moral judgment competence levels 
differed between the groups due to age or sex influences. But again, also for moral judgment 
competence, Lind and colleagues (Lind, Grocholewska, & Langer, 1987) could not find any 
sex differences, and also no effects due to age differences are reported. It seems therefore 
plausible to relate the groups differences found in the actual experiment to intelligence 
differences. Nevertheless, a few doubts remain due to the small sample size. To gain further 
evidences for the main assumptions of the current work, a final experiment was conducted, 
which shall be discussed below. 
 
10.5 Experiment V - fMRI 
The behavioral results of this last experiment were similar to those of the former ones, 
particularly of the second experiment, where the same reasoning problems were applied. Of 
more interest in this investigation were the neural correlates of theoretical and practical 
reasoning. Several Regions of Interest (ROIs) were postulated according to the existing 
findings of theoretical and practical reasoning research: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), temporal pole, medial temporal gyrus (MTG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
parietal lobe, and precuneus. The different brain areas assumed to be involved in both 
reasoning domains were associated with specific cognitive processes according to the existing 
research results. The DLPFC is associated with rather rational processes (e.g., Greene et al., 
2004; Schaich Borg et al., 2006), the OFC is associated with rather emotional processes (e.g., 
Dolan, 2002; Prehn et al., 2008), and the mPFC (especially its ventral parts) counts as 
integration area for both of these processes (; e.g., Adolphs, 1999, 2006; Damasio, 2006). 
Furthermore, the ACC is associated with working memory processes and executive functions 
(e.g., conflict detection and monitoring; e.g., Moll et al., 2003; Young & Koenigs, 2007), 
whereas the STS is associated with ToM processes and sensory integration of ‘information’ 
(e.g., Frith & Frith, 1999; Heekeren et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2006). The temporal areas are 
often related to emotional~, intuitive~, and knowledge-based processes (e.g., Goel & Dolan, 
2003b; Moll et al., 2005), and the parietal cortex seems to be responsible for rather rational 
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and working memory processes or reasoning with and without content (e.g., Canessa et al., 
2005; Goel & Dolan, 2003b; Greene et al., 2001). 
The results of this last experiment seem to confirm the assumption of similar brain 
areas to be involved in theoretical and practical reasoning. Brain activations were found in all 
of the predefined ROIs for the practical (i.e., moral) and theoretical (i.e., abstract) reasoning 
problems, both in the single effects analysis and the conjunction analysis. This gives evidence 
for similar cognitive processes to be involved in theoretical and practical reasoning, namely 
‘rational’ (and working memory related) and emotional/intuitive processes.18
Apart from these common activations, the last experiment provided also some distinct brain 
activations for theoretical and practical reasoning, with bilateral activations for the first one, 
and exclusively left-hemispheric activations for the latter one in almost all of the ROIs. These 
obtained hemispheric asymmetries could lead to an additional separation, not just between 
‘emotional/intuitive’ and ‘rational’ reasoning processes, but rather between different 
reasoning ‘sub-processes’ (reasoning without content and reasoning with content, i.e. moral, 
social, emotional, etc.). This seems to be in line with a suggestion originally made only for 
theoretical reasoning by Monti et al. (2007, 2009) who postulated ‘core and support areas’ to 
be involved in reasoning. The investigation of reasoning about specific contents (events, 
actions, goals) with various reasoning problems (i.e., syllogisms, conditionals, dilemmas) 
could be means to further explore the cognitive and neural ‘sub-categories’ of the human 
reasoning system (theoretical, practical). For example, the frontal cortex seems to include 
much more specific brain areas than have so far been defined and investigated (cp., Moll, De 
Oliveira-Souza, Moll, Ignacio, Bramati, Caparelli-Daquer, & Eslinger, 2005). Such 
segregation of brain structures could be an interesting step for future reasoning research.  
 The brain 
structures found to be activated by theoretical and practical reasoning problems thus 
encompassed a widespread fronto-temporo-parietal network. Therefore, these brain 
activations and their associated cognitive processes reveal further evidence for ‘dual-process’ 
accounts representing and explaining the reasoning processes involved in theoretical 
reasoning (e.g., Goel, 2007) and in practical reasoning (e.g., Greene, 2007) best. This also 
endorses the suggestion already made by Evans (2008), who derived his proposal however 
only theoretically, and awaited empirical confirmation. The current experiments, especially 
this last one, might have provided first evidence for his suggestions, although further 
experiments appear to be necessary (see critics section below). 
                                                 
18 Note that particularly the fMRI experiment yielded evidence for emotional laden prior knowledge, thus 
influences of emotions on theoretical and practical reasoning, since the orbitofrontal and temporal areas found to 
be activated are particularly associated with emotional and intuitive processes. 
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10.6 Critics and limitations 
The preceding experiments dealt with deductive inference problems containing various 
contents. The aim of all experiments was to find similarities and maybe a common basis for 
theoretical and practical reasoning concerning cognitive processes and related brain 
structures. A first possible critique on all experiments is that they only encompassed 
theoretical reasoning problems, thus only investigated theoretical reasoning. Although the 
embedded possibility of an incongruity effect, indeed appearing in all experiments, should 
ensure that participants partly reason and decide according to practical reasoning, one cannot 
finally exclude the possibility that only theoretical reasoning occurred. The fact however, that 
the trained participants produced the most errors with incongruent moral-related problems as 
compared to all others seems to support the assumption of occurring practical reasoning 
processes, even though these effects could only be seen descriptively. Apart from this 
unsolved question, the moral-related problems resulted in huge content effects (except for the 
participants with superior intelligence). Content effects are known from many studies (cp., 
Manktelow, 2004). One content effect often found is the so called ‘belief bias’ (e.g., Evans et 
al., 1983). This effect represents the fact that prior knowledge/beliefs (activated by the content 
of the problem) interact with rational processes (activated by the logical structure of the 
problem). This means that persons tend to rather accept a given conclusion, if it is valid 
and/or believable, and to reject a given conclusion, if it is invalid and/or unbelievable. The 
effect of believability is especially heightened on invalid problems. In the current work, it was 
at least partly assumed that the ‘belief bias’ effect corresponds to the results of the moral-
related problems. Indeed, the results indicate an interaction effect of intuitive and rational 
processes involved in solving the reasoning problems. Furthermore, the invalid problems were 
almost always solved worse than the valid ones. This seemed to be in line with the ‘classical 
belief bias’ effect. Having a more detailed look on the results however, revealed that they did 
not match this effect. The results of the moral-valid, the moral-invalid, and the unmoral-valid 
problems were in accordance with it, but those of the unmoral-invalid problems were not. 
Although these latter problems contradict common moral beliefs and represent invalid 
conclusions, they were treated similar as the moral-valid ones. In turn, this does not contradict 
the assumption of prior knowledge/intuitive processes interacting with rational processes 
while solving the task, and was thus labeled ‘new belief bias’ effect. This interaction is related 
to the problem inherent congruence-incongruence dichotomy. The question remains however, 
as to what caused the results, particularly of the unmoral-invalid problems. This issue could 
be extended, at least partly, to the results regarding the emotional problems, especially the 
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invalid ones. It appears that several factors might have been responsible for the various results 
of the different experiments. Since different factors contributed to the effects found, no single 
explanation related to former findings of other studies could account for the current findings 
in total. 
It seems helpful to have a more detailed look on the problems and their respective 
structure and contents. As shown in Appendix A, a few of the moral-invalid and unmoral-
invalid problems contained a negation (i.e., ‘not’) in the conclusion. From former studies it is 
known that sentences containing a negation require more time to be processed and result in 
poorer reasoning performance (e.g., Gough, 1966; Just & Carpenter, 1971; Kaup & Zwaan, 
2003; Kaup, Zwaan, & Ludtke, 2007). The reading comprehension in particular seems to be 
affected by negations inherent in the wording of a sentence (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Just and 
Carpenter (1992) assumed that sentence comprehension depends on the amount of 
information that could be processed in working memory at the same time. Thus, working 
memory capacity constrains comprehension. However, comprehension also varies according 
to individual WM capacity differences (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Since negation might be 
particularly taxing working memory, more capacity seems necessary to process negated 
sentences compared to non-negated ones. Therefore, problems containing a negation in the 
conclusion appeared to show a worse performance than those without a negation. This might 
also explain why participants with superior intelligence and assumed higher working memory 
capacity did not reveal such performance decrements. The structure of all three sentences of 
the reasoning problems shows that a few of them, e.g., the positive emotional and negative 
emotional invalid ones, also contained a negation in the “then” part of the first premise. Thus, 
there might have already been a comprehension problem for the participants when reading the 
premises. Further explanations however, even complicate this picture. As discussed in the 
introductory part on logic, reasoning problems could be varied according to their logical form 
by affirming or denying the antecedent or consequent of the conditional in the minor premise, 
leading to valid or invalid conclusions. A negation in the conditional sentence, i.e., the major 
premise, can also affect the logical form of the whole problem, and thus the form of the 
possible conclusions. Evans (1977) investigated persons presenting reasoning problems with 
affirmed or negated antecedent or consequent of the conditional sentence. He found that 
participants approved conclusions with a negation rather than those without. This effect 
depending on the manipulation of negating the antecedent or the consequent of the major 
premise was originally called ‘conclusion bias’ and thought to reflect a pure response bias 
(Evans et al., 1993). It affected AC, DA, and MT inferences but not the MP ones (under 
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implication). Later, Evans, Clibbens, and Rood (1995) could show that this bias occurs mainly 
with DA and MT inferences, but not AC, and labeled it then ‘double negation effect’. The 
‘double negation effect’ refers to the fact that participants are unable to deal with negated 
propositions that lead to affirmative conclusions. This effect might account for a few of the 
results of the current experiments besides the already mentioned influences of working 
memory capacity due to negated sentences per se. These factors referred so far, represent a 
weakness of the reasoning problems applied in the current experiments, which were not 
controlled and matched for linguistic complexity. Problem complexity influences 
performance on deductive reasoning (e.g., Monti et al., 2007, 2009) and thus also participants’ 
performance in the current experiments might have been affected due to the different complex 
reasoning problems applied. As mentioned above, the problems, especially the invalid moral-
related ones as well as the invalid emotional ones contained further weaknesses. To match the 
content of the human rights articles and to create problems with similar wording and contents 
in all possible forms (e.g., moral and unmoral, valid and invalid), the problems sometimes 
changed their affiliation to a specific content-condition from the first to the third sentence. For 
example, a moral major premise resulted in an unmoral conclusion and a positive emotional 
major premise ended up in a negative emotional conclusion. This might have caused some 
irritations for the participants while solving the reasoning problems. Another confounding 
factor, specific to these problems could have resulted in even more dramatically deteriorating 
effects on reasoning performance. There appear to be content effects within the major 
premises which could have conflicted with the content effects of the overall problem. A 
statement like “If a person is happily in love, then she perceives her life as not reasonable.” 
already contains conflicting contents in the major premise. Those statements could 
immediately cause complicated and conflicting interactional processes between prior 
knowledge (i.e., intuitive processes) about such propositions and emotional evaluations of 
these statements as well as rational processes trying to mediate and monitor conflicting 
thoughts. In turn, this could have also influenced working memory capacity and performance 
on the reasoning problems. Further points that have been already discussed above shall only 
be remembered. Decision times for Experiments I, II, and III have to be interpreted with 
caution, since sentence length was not matched and therefore could not be controlled 
adequately due to the abstract problems. Furthermore, no incongruent neutral, abstract or 
emotional control problems were embedded in the experiment. Although the incongruity for 
the moral-related ones was only chosen to ensure that participants reason practically, this 
would have ensured better comparability of the results and reduced potential complexity 
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differences between the distinct reasoning conditions. Moreover, no “real” moral reasoning 
control condition was applied. It is assumed that at least the wrong answers of the moral-
related problems relate to the fact that participants reasoned and answered practically instead 
of theoretically. However, testing moral reasoning directly would have revealed better 
evidence of the potential processes involved in practical reasoning. Further studies should 
match the problems so far, so that participants could and should have to answer according to 
practical and not according to theoretical reasoning (i.e., questioning whether the last sentence 
is morally correct or not). All of these critics limit and constrain potential interpretations and 
generalizations of the results. Moreover, four problems per category seem to be very few, 
resulting in low statistical power and perhaps restricted explanatory variance in the occurring 
performances. This refers in particular to the moral-related problems where 26 other articles 
of the Declaration of Human Rights would have been available to be implemented in the 
current experiments. It remains unclear as to what kind of effects further and/or other articles 
would have produced. This also caused constraints on the interpretation and potential 
generalization of the results. Finally, there is one additional critical factor that might have 
influenced the performance of the reasoning problems, even though it was not inherently 
based on them. This factor concerns potential influences of the performance of the 
recognitions items on the performance of the reasoning problems (and vice versa). Although 
the recognition items applied in experiments III and IV did not influence the groups 
differently, contributions and influences on the distinct reasoning performances could not be 
excluded. 
Other critics refer to the small sample size of the intelligence experiment or to the 
assumed training effects which should have only affected rational reasoning processes, but 
were already discussed in the preceding sections. 
In total, these critics, especially on the reasoning problems applied in the preceding 
experiments, restrict the interpretations and conclusions that could be drawn from the results. 
The critics indicate some confoundations and weaknesses of the paradigm used. However, 
since the current experiments represent a first attempt to combine theoretical and practical 
reasoning research and to create deductive reasoning problems according to relative strictly 
formulated statements (i.e., human rights articles), these first experiments and related 
preliminary results might outweigh the critics. In particular, since new, explorative research 
projects seem to be accompanied often by starting problems and limited potential 
generalizations of the findings, thus requiring replication and further evidences. So, a first 
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step is made and awaits further contributions to this interesting and interdisciplinary research 
field. 
 
Conclusions and Outlook 
152 
 
11. Conclusions and outlook 
Apart from the just mentioned critics, it seems possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions 
with respect to the current findings. First, the experiments yielded evidences that theoretical 
and practical reasoning are based on common and distinct brain areas and associated 
reasoning processes. Both reasoning domains appear to require ‘rational’ and 
‘emotional/intuitive’ cognitive processes and underlying brain areas, namely a fronto-
temporo-parietal network. Therefore, ‘dual-process’ accounts (e.g., Evans, 2008; Goel, 2007; 
Greene, 2007) seem to explain and to account for theoretical and practical reasoning 
processes best. Indeed, if both of these reasoning domains are based on similar cognitive 
processes and related brain structures, a single ‘dual-process’ model seems sufficient. 
Furthermore, theoretical and practical reasoning processes depend on and are influenced by 
cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence), ToM related processes, and working memory capacity. 
In addition, morals seem to be learned, at least partly according to the contents of the articles 
of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, perhaps stored as ‘somatic markers’ 
(Damasio, 2006). Thus, the preceding experiments also reveal evidence for the applicability 
of these articles to investigate moral reasoning with validated items according to an (almost) 
worldwide accepted standard.19
The experiments reported here revealed first evidence for most of the hypotheses and 
assumptions derived from the literature on theoretical and practical reasoning research 
findings. Although these evidences were obtained using different experimental approaches 
and investigating numerous and various participants, an important refinement has to be 
mentioned. There was no big variation in the items applied (i.e., only ‘simple’ deductive 
reasoning problems filled with the content of four different human rights articles were used). 
Thus, it seems apparently clear that further experiments should implement different reasoning 
tasks as well as further human rights articles to obtain additional evidences for the up to now 
preliminary conclusions drawn above. Furthermore, as noted above, moral control tasks might 
be used as well as matched incongruent problems for all conditions to exclude potential critics 
or alternative explanations. Moreover, problem complexity and problem inherent content 
 Finally, the current experiments provide first support that 
theoretical and practical reasoning could and should be investigated together, as has been 
suggested by Evans (2008) for example. 
                                                 
19 The Declaration of Human Rights is not a philosophical proof or logical derivation embedded in a 
comprehensive theory according to philosophical demands. However, the lack of such a theory forces scientists 
to use the best material available and a worldwide agreement seems to be more appropriate than any speculative 
and not evaluated approaches (e.g., dilemmas). In turn, the influences of experimental research findings on 
morals and ethics has to be discussed, but is far beyond the scope of this thesis (for further discussion of these 
issues, see for example Greene, 2003). 
Conclusions and outlook 
153 
 
effects have to be controlled or, if necessary and possible, be eliminated. However, to 
postulate common reasoning processes and underlying brain areas for theoretical and practical 
reasoning (besides distinct ones), which vary and are varied by and from different factors 
(e.g., intelligence, working memory capacity, ToM, task complexity, task contents), instead of 
proposing different reasoning processes and brain areas for each potential sub-domain of 
reasoning, seems to match proposals of other researchers in the field (e.g., Damasio, 2006, 
LeDoux, 2006, Thagard, 2006) as well as new suggestions made for example in the memory 
research domain. New ideas suggest that material stored in long-term memory (LTM) and 
activated by a current task requires or even produces no new storage areas/systems between 
LTM and working memory but just the known associative storage areas/systems interact with 
the process-guiding, manipulative ones (e.g., Postle, 2006). Therefore, it seems prominent to 
take the current finding as a primary step for further investigations of the human reasoning 
system. Not only to explore its distinct, but also its common reasoning processes and 
underlying brain areas involved (i.e., the ‘core units’ of human reasoning involved in all 
reasoning domains). 
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Appendix A 
Deductive inference problems in original German language 
Deductive inference problems of all Pre-Studies and Experiments 
validity 
valid invalid 
conditions 
moral 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann hat er 
trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Ein Mensch kommt behindert zur Welt. 
Der Mensch hat ein Recht auf Leben. 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann muss 
er getötet werden. 
Ein Mensch kommt behindert zur Welt. 
Der Mensch darf nicht getötet werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
nicht versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Kriegsgefangener. 
Der Mensch darf nicht versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Kriegsgefangener. 
Der Mensch darf nicht versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann muss er 
menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Ein Verbrecher wird verhört. 
Der Verbrecher muss menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann darf er gefoltert 
werden. 
Ein Verbrecher wird verhört. 
Der Verbrecher darf nicht gefoltert werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann muss 
er durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Ein Mensch gehört einer Minderheit an. 
Der Mensch muss durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann ist er 
ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
Ein Mensch gehört einer Minderheit an. 
Der Mensch muss trotzdem durch das Gesetz geschützt 
werden. 
unmoral 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann muss 
er getötet werden. 
Ein Mensch kommt behindert zur Welt. 
Der Mensch muss getötet werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann hat er 
trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Ein Mensch kommt behindert zur Welt. 
Der Mensch hat kein Recht auf Leben. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Kriegsgefangener. 
Der Mensch darf versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
nicht versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Kriegsgefangener. 
Der Mensch darf  versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann darf er gefoltert 
werden. 
Ein Verbrecher wird verhört. 
Der Verbrecher darf gefoltert werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann muss er 
menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Ein Verbrecher wird verhört. 
Der Verbrecher wird nicht menschenwürdig behandelt. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann ist er 
ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
Ein Mensch gehört einer Minderheit an. 
Der Mensch ist ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann muss 
er durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Ein Mensch gehört einer Minderheit an. 
Der Mensch ist ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
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Continuation of Appendix A 
Deductive inference problems of Pre-Study I and Experiments I + II + V 
validity 
valid invalid 
conditions 
abstract 
Wenn A, dann B. 
A.  
B.                                                                  
Wenn A, dann B. 
A. 
Nicht B.                                                                     
Wenn C, dann D. 
C. 
D. 
Wenn C, dann D. 
C. 
Nicht D. 
Wenn X, dann Y. 
X. 
Y. 
Wenn X, dann Y. 
X. 
Nicht Y. 
Wenn W, dann Z. 
W. 
Z. 
Wenn W, dann Z. 
W. 
Nicht Z. 
neutral 
Wenn ein Mensch fremde Länder mag, dann verreißt er 
gerne. 
Ein Mensch mag fremde Länder. 
Der Mensch verreißt gerne. 
Wenn ein Mensch fremde Länder mag, dann verreißt er 
gerne. 
Ein Mensch mag fremde Länder. 
Der Mensch verreißt nicht gerne. 
Wenn ein Mensch die Natur mag, dann mag er auch 
Blumen. 
Ein Mensch mag die Natur. 
Der Mensch mag auch Blumen. 
Wenn ein Mensch die Natur mag, dann mag er auch 
Blumen. 
Ein Mensch mag die Natur. 
Der Mensch mag keine Blumen. 
Wenn ein Mensch starken Haarwuchs hat, dann muss er 
häufiger zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat starken Haarwuchs. 
Der Mensch muss häufiger zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch starken Haarwuchs hat, dann muss er 
häufiger zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat starken Haarwuchs. 
Der Mensch muss nicht häufiger zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch älter wird, dann bekommt er Falten. 
Ein Mensch wird älter. 
Der Mensch bekommt Falten. 
Wenn ein Mensch älter wird, dann bekommt er Falten. 
Ein Mensch wird älter. 
Der Mensch bekommt keine Falten. 
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Continuation of Appendix A 
 
Deductive inference problems of Pre-Study II and Experiment II + V 
validity 
valid invalid 
conditions 
positive-
emotional 
Wenn ein Mensch glücklich verliebt ist, dann findet er sein 
Leben sinnvoll. 
Ein Mensch ist glücklich verliebt. 
Der Mensch findet sein Leben sinnvoll. 
Wenn ein Mensch glücklich verliebt ist, dann findet er sein 
Leben nicht sinnvoll. 
Ein Mensch ist glücklich verliebt. 
Der Mensch findet sein Leben sinnvoll.  
Wenn ein Mensch Freunde hat, dann ist er in Gesellschaft. 
Ein Mensch hat Freunde. 
Der Mensch ist in Gesellschaft.  
Wenn ein Mensch Freunde hat, dann ist er nicht in 
Gesellschaft. 
Ein Mensch hat Freunde. 
Der Mensch ist in Gesellschaft.  
Wenn ein Mensch an der Börse einen großen Gewinn 
macht, dann ist er glücklich. 
Ein Mensch macht an der Börse einen großen Gewinn. 
Der Mensch ist glücklich.  
Wenn ein Mensch an der Börse einen großen Gewinn 
macht, dann ist er nicht glücklich. 
Ein Mensch macht an der Börse einen großen Gewinn. 
Der Mensch ist glücklich.  
Wenn ein Mensch ein Gewinner ist, dann ist er auf der 
Sonnenseite des Lebens. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Gewinner.  
Der Mensch ist auf der Sonnenseite des Lebens.  
Wenn ein Mensch ein Gewinner ist, dann ist er nicht auf 
der Sonnenseite des Lebens. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Gewinner. 
Der Mensch ist auf der Sonnenseite des Lebens.  
negative-
emotional 
Wenn ein Mensch unglücklich verliebt ist, dann findet er 
sein Leben sinnlos. 
Ein Mensch ist unglücklich verliebt. 
Der Mensch findet sein Leben sinnlos.  
Wenn ein Mensch unglücklich verliebt ist, dann findet er 
sein Leben nicht sinnlos. 
Ein Mensch ist unglücklich verliebt. 
Der Mensch findet sein Leben sinnlos.  
Wenn ein Mensch ohne Freunde ist, dann ist er einsam. 
Ein Mensch ist ohne Freunde. 
Der Mensch ist einsam.  
Wenn ein Mensch ohne Freunde ist, dann ist er nicht 
einsam. 
Ein Mensch ist ohne Freunde. 
Der Mensch ist einsam.  
Wenn ein Mensch an der Börse einen großen Verlust 
macht, dann ist er unglücklich. 
Ein Mensch macht an der Börse einen großen Verlust. 
Der Mensch ist unglücklich. 
Wenn ein Mensch an der Börse einen großen Verlust 
macht, dann ist er nicht unglücklich. 
Ein Mensch macht an der Börse einen großen Verlust. 
Der Mensch ist unglücklich. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Verlierer ist, dann ist er auf der 
Schattenseite des Lebens. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Verlierer. 
Der Mensch ist auf der Schattenseite des Lebens.  
Wenn ein Mensch ein Verlierer ist, dann ist er nicht auf der 
Schattenseite des Lebens. 
Ein Mensch ist ein Verlierer. 
Der Mensch ist auf der Schattenseite des Lebens. 
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Deductive inference problems of Pre-Study III and Experiments III + IV 
validity 
valid invalid 
conditions 
neutral1 
Wenn ein Mensch abends ins Kino geht, dann sieht er sich 
einen Film an. 
Ein Mensch geht abends ins Kino. 
Der Mensch sieht sich einen Film an. 
Wenn ein Mensch abends ins Kino geht, dann sieht er sich 
einen Film an. 
Ein Mensch geht abends ins Kino. 
Der Mensch sieht sich keinen Film an. 
Wenn ein Mensch im Wald spazieren geht, dann zieht er 
eine Jacke an. 
Ein Mensch geht im Wald spazieren. 
Der Mensch zieht eine Jacke an. 
Wenn ein Mensch im Wald spazieren geht, dann zieht er 
eine Jacke an. 
Ein Mensch geht im Wald spazieren. 
Der Mensch zieht keine Jacke an. 
Wenn ein Mensch den Tierpark besucht, dann beobachtet 
er exotische Tiere. 
Ein Mensch besucht den Tierpark. 
Der Mensch beobachtet exotische Tiere. 
Wenn ein Mensch den Tierpark besucht, dann beobachtet 
er exotische Tiere. 
Ein Mensch besucht den Tierpark. 
Der Mensch beobachtet keine exotischen Tiere. 
Wenn ein Mensch sportlich ist, dann trainiert er im 
Fitnessstudio. 
Ein Mensch ist sportlich. 
Der Mensch trainiert im Fitnessstudio. 
Wenn ein Mensch sportlich ist, dann trainiert er im 
Fitnessstudio. 
Ein Mensch ist sportlich. 
Der Mensch trainiert nicht im Fitnessstudio. 
neutral2 
Wenn ein Mensch besonders starken Haarwuchs hat, dann 
muss er häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat besonders starken Haarwuchs. 
Der Mensch muss häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch besonders starken Haarwuchs hat, dann 
muss er häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat besonders starken Haarwuchs. 
Der Mensch muss nicht häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch über die Straße geht, dann achtet er auf 
den Verkehr. 
Ein Mensch geht über die Straße. 
Der Mensch achtet auf den Verkehr. 
Wenn ein Mensch über die Straße geht, dann achtet er auf 
den Verkehr. 
Ein Mensch geht über die Straße. 
Der Mensch achtet nicht auf den Verkehr. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Bernhardiner hat, dann kauft er 
Hundefutter. 
Ein Mensch hat einen Bernhardiner. 
Der Mensch kauft Hundefutter. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Bernhardiner hat, dann kauft er 
Hundefutter. 
Ein Mensch hat einen Bernhardiner. 
Der Mensch kauft kein Hundefutter. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Computer besitzt, dann benutzt 
er ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Ein Mensch besitzt einen Computer. 
Der Mensch benutzt ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Computer besitzt, dann benutzt er 
ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Ein Mensch besitzt einen Computer. 
Der Mensch benutzt ihn nicht zum Surfen im Internet. 
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Appendix B 
Recognition items in original German language 
Recognition items of Pre-Study III and Experiments III + IV 
matching 
literal match no literal match 
conditions 
moral 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann hat er 
trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Ein Mensch wird im Krankenhaus geboren. 
Dann hat er  trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann muss 
er getötet werden. 
Ein Mensch wird im Krankenhaus geboren. 
Dann darf er nicht getötet werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
nicht versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch befindet sich im Krieg. 
Dann darf er nicht versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch befindet sich im Krieg. 
Dann darf er nicht versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann muss er 
menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Ein Verbrecher ist im Gefängnis. 
Dann muss er menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann darf er gefoltert 
werden. 
Ein Verbrecher ist im Gefängnis. 
Dann darf er nicht gefoltert werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann muss 
er durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist Leistungssportler. 
Dann muss er durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann ist er 
schutzlos vor dem Gesetz. 
Ein Mensch ist Leistungssportler. 
Dann ist er nicht schutzlos vor dem Gesetz. 
unmoral 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann muss 
er getötet werden. 
Ein Mensch wird im Krankenhaus geboren. 
Dann muss er getötet werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann hat er 
trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Ein Mensch wird im Krankenhaus geboren. 
Dann hat er kein Recht auf Leben. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch befindet sich im Krieg. 
Dann darf er versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch ein Kriegsgefangener ist, dann darf er 
nicht versklavt werden. 
Ein Mensch befindet sich im Krieg. 
Dann darf er versklavt werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann darf er gefoltert 
werden. 
Ein Verbrecher ist im Gefängnis. 
Dann darf er gefoltert werden. 
Wenn ein Verbrecher verhört wird, dann muss er 
menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Ein Verbrecher ist im Gefängnis. 
Dann muss er nicht menschenwürdig behandelt werden. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann ist er 
ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
Ein Mensch ist Leistungssportler. 
Dann ist er ohne Schutz durch das Gesetz. 
Wenn ein Mensch einer Minderheit angehört, dann muss 
er durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
Ein Mensch ist Leistungssportler. 
Dann muss er nicht durch das Gesetz geschützt werden. 
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Continuation of Appendix B 
Recognition items of Pre-Study III and Experiments III + IV 
matching 
literal match no literal match 
conditions 
neutral1 
Wenn ein Mensch abends ins Kino geht, dann sieht er sich 
einen Film an. 
Ein Mensch geht abends ins Theater. 
Dann sieht er sich einen Film an. 
Wenn ein Mensch abends ins Kino geht, dann sieht er sich 
einen Film an. 
Ein Mensch geht abends ins Theater. 
Dann sieht er sich keinen Film an. 
Wenn ein Mensch im Wald spazieren geht, dann zieht er 
eine Jacke an. 
Der Mensch geht nach draußen. 
Dann zieht er eine Jacke an. 
Wenn ein Mensch im Wald spazieren geht, dann zieht er 
eine Jacke an. 
Der Mensch geht nach draußen. 
Dann zieht er keine Jacke an. 
Wenn ein Mensch den Tierpark besucht, dann beobachtet 
er exotische Tiere. 
Der Mensch besucht ein Museum. 
Dann beobachtet er exotische Tiere. 
Wenn ein Mensch den Tierpark besucht, dann beobachtet 
er exotische Tiere. 
Der Mensch besucht ein Museum. 
Dann beobachtet er keine exotischen Tiere. 
Wenn ein Mensch sportlich ist, dann trainiert er im 
Fitnessstudio. 
Ein Mensch ist musikalisch. 
Dann trainiert er im Fitnessstudio. 
Wenn ein Mensch sportlich ist, dann trainiert er im 
Fitnessstudio. 
Ein Mensch ist musikalisch. 
Dann trainiert er nicht im Fitnessstudio. 
neutral2 
Wenn ein Mensch besonders starken Haarwuchs hat, dann 
muss er häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat einen Bart. 
Dann muss er häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch besonders starken Haarwuchs hat, dann 
muss er häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Ein Mensch hat einen Bart. 
Dann muss er nicht häufig zum Friseur gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch über die Straße geht, dann achtet er auf 
den Verkehr. 
Ein Mensch geht durch die Stadt. 
Dann achtet er auf den Verkehr. 
Wenn ein Mensch über die Straße geht, dann achtet er auf 
den Verkehr. 
Ein Mensch geht durch die Stadt. 
Dann achtet er nicht auf den Verkehr. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Bernhardiner hat, dann kauft er 
Hundefutter. 
Der Mensch hat einen Hamster. 
Dann kauft er Hundefutter. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Berhardiner hat, dann kauft er 
Hundefutter. 
Der Mensch hat einen Hamster. 
Dann kauft er kein Hundefutter. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Computer besitzt, dann benutzt 
er ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Ein Mensch besitzt einen Locher. 
Dann benutzt er ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen Computer besitzt, dann benutzt er 
ihn zum Surfen im Internet. 
Ein Mensch besitzt einen Locher. 
Dann benutzt er ihn nicht zum Surfen im Internet. 
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Appendix C 
Example questions of the Questionnaires for Pre-Studies I + II + III 
Example questions of Pre-Study I 
 
Wenn X, dann Y. 
X. 
 
Nicht Y. 
 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit logischem Denken zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit Moral zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit Emotionen zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
 
 
Example questions of Pre-Studies II + III 
 
Wenn ein Mensch behindert zur Welt kommt, dann hat er trotzdem ein Recht auf Leben. 
Ein Mensch kommt behindert zur Welt. 
 
Der Mensch hat ein Recht auf Leben. 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit logischem Denken zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit Moral zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit positiven Emotionen zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
 
Wie viel hat diese Aufgabenstellung mit negativen Emotionen zu tun? 
⁪ nichts – ⁪ etwas – ⁪ viel – ⁪ sehr viel 
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Appendix D 
Results of Pre-Study I  
problem-evaluation I 
Wilcoxon signed rank test 
logic dimension morality dimension emotionality dimension 
z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv z = -3.418 p = .001 z = -1.904 p = .057 z = -1.667 p = .095 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v z = -3.052 p = .002 z = -.558 p = .577 z = -1.728 p = .084 
moral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -3.149 p = .002 z = -.816 p = .415 z = -.347 p = .728 
moral-v vs. neutral-v z = -.039 p = .986 z = -3.735 p < .001 z = -3.466 p = .001 
moral-v vs. neutral-iv z = -3.366 p = .001 z = -3.735 p < .001 z = -3.521 p < .001 
moral-v vs. abstract-v z = -.797 p = .425 z = -3.736 p < .001 z = -3.527 p < .001 
moral-v vs. abstract-iv z = -1.802 p = .072 z = -3.736 p < .001 z = -3.531 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-v z = -2.260 p = .024 z = -2.324 p = .020 z = .000 p = 1.000 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv z = -.093 p = .926 z = -2.737 p = .006 z = -1.574 p = .116 
moral-iv vs. neutral-v z = -3.129 p = .002 z = -3.839 p < .001 z = -3.535 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral-iv z = -.295 p = .768 z = -3.839 p < .001 z = -3.523 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. abstract-v z = -3.105 p = .002 z = -3.843 p < .001 z = -3.530 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. abstract-iv z = -2.677 p = .007 z = -3.843 p < .001 z = -3.529 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -2.138 p = .033 z = -.312 p = .755 z = -1.813 p = .070 
unmoral-v vs. neutral-v z = -3.185 p = .001 z = -3.638 p < .001 z = -3.670 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. neutral-iv z = -2.399 p = .016 z = -3.638 p < .001 z = -3.729 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. abstract-v z = -3.051 p = .002 z = -3.642 p < .001 z = -3.732 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. abstract-iv z = -.378 p = .705 z = -3.642 p < .001 z = -3.736 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral-v z = -2.938 p = .003 z = -3.734 p < .001 z = -3.445 p = .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral-iv z = -.090 p = .928 z = -3.734 p < .001 z = -3.559 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. abstract-v z = -3.107 p = .002 z = -3.736 p < .001 z = -3.578 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. abstract-iv z = -2.626 p = .009 z = -3.736 p < .001 z = -3.580 p < .001 
neutral-v vs. neutral-iv z = -3.302 p = .001 z = .000 p = 1.000 z = -.589 p = .556 
neutral-v vs. abstract-v z = -1.886 p = .059 z = -1.000 p = .317 z = -2.947 p = .003 
neutral-v vs. abstract-iv z = -2.049 p = .040 z = -1.000 p = .317 z = -2.956 p = .003 
neutral-iv vs. abstract-v z = -3.224 p = .001 z = -1.000 p = .317 z = -2.952 p = .003 
neutral-iv vs. abstract-iv z = -2.513 p = .012 z = -1.000 p = .317 z = -2.947 p = .003 
abstract-v vs. abstract-iv z = -2.484 p = .013 z = .000 p = 1.000 z = -1.000 p = .317 
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Appendix E 
Results of Experiment I 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests due to significant IE of content × validity 
error rates 
calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv t(20) = -3.710 p = .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v t(20) = -2.646 p = .016 
moral-v vs. neutral-v --- (n.s.) --- (n.s.) 
moral-v vs. abstract-v t(20) = -1.369 p = .186 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv t(20) = 3.202 p = .004 
moral-iv vs. neutral-iv t(20) = 3.532 p = .002 
moral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(20) = 3.325 p = .003 
unmoral-v vs.unmoral-iv t(20) = 1.921 p = .069 
unmoral-v vs. neutral-v t(20) = 2.646 p = .016 
unmoral-v vs. abstract-v t(20) = 2.329 p = .030 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral-iv t(20) = .000 p = 1.000 
unmoral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(20) = -.271 p = .789 
neutral-v vs. neutral-iv t(20) = -1.369 p = .186 
neutral-v vs. abstract-v t(20) = -1.369 p = .186 
neutral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(20) = -.295 p = .771 
abstract-v vs. abstract-iv t(20) = -1.000 p = .329 
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Appendix F 
Results of Pre-Study II 
problem-evaluation II 
Wilcoxon signed rank test 
logic dimension morality dimension 
positive-emotionality 
dimension 
negative-emotionality 
dimension 
z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv z = -2.779 p = .005 z = -.141 p = .888 z = -3.785 p < .001 z = -2.220 p = .026 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v z = -2.772 p = .006 z = -2.573 p = .010 z = -3.935 p < .001 z = -3.927 p < .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -3.165 p = .002 z = -1.548 p = .122 z = -3.851 p < .001 z = -3.795 p < .001 
moral-v vs. positive-emotional-v z = -.172 p = .863 z = -3.925 p < .001 z = -3.391 p = .001 z = -3.480 p = .001 
moral-v vs. positive-emotional-iv z = -2.760 p = .006 z = -3.930 p < .001 z = -2.255 p = .024 z = -3.400 p = .001 
moral-v vs. negative-emotional-v z = -1.129 p = .259 z = -3.930 p < .001 z = -3.796 p < .001 z = -3.939 p < .001 
moral-v vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -2.894 p = .004 z = -3.923 p < .001 z = -2.808 p = .005 z = -3.403 p = .001 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-v z = -.685 p = .493 z = -2.639 p = .008 z = -3.069 p = .002 z = -3.735 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv z = -1.603 p = .109 z = -.985 p = .325 z = -1.967 p = .049 z = -2.464 p = .014 
moral-iv vs. positive-emotional-v z = -2.511 p = .012 z = -3.257 p = .001 z = -3.889 p < .001 z = -3.439 p = .001 
moral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv z = -.190 p = .849 z = -3.219 p = .001 z = -.524 p = .600 z = -.939 p = .348 
moral-iv vs. negative-emotional-v z = -2.014 p = .044 z = -3.299 p = .001 z = -2.926 p = .003 z = -3.539 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -.679 p = .497 z = -3.017 p = .003 z = -.026 p = .979 z = -1.516 p = .129 
unmoral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -1.761 p = .078 z = -1.177 p = .239 z = -2.993 p = .003 z = -1.859 p = .063 
unmoral-v vs. positive-emotional-v z = -2.794 p = .005 z = -2.260 p = .024 z = -3.936 p < .001 z = -3.935 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. positive-emotional-iv z = -.901 p = .368 z = -2.511 p = .012 z = -3.738 p < .001 z = -2.799 p = .005 
unmoral-v vs. negative-emotional-v z = -2.435 p = .015 z = -2.579 p = .010 z = -1.511 p = .131 z = -.022 p = .982 
unmoral-v vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -1.139 p = .255 z = -2.190 p = .029 z = -3.511 p < .001 z = -3.230 p = .001 
unmoral-iv vs. positive-emotional-v z = -3.031 p = .002 z = -3.121 p = .002 z = -3.931 p < .001 z = -3.830 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv z = -2.379 p = .017 z = -3.566 p < .001 z = -3.560 p < .001 z = -1.946 p = .052 
unmoral-iv vs. negative-emotional-v z = -2.793 p = .005 z = -3.408 p = .001 z = -2.214 p = .027 z = -2.073 p = .038 
unmoral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -2.101 p = .036 z = -3.195 p = .001 z = -1.975 p = .048 z = -1.830 p = .067 
positive-emotional-v vs. positive-emotional-iv z = -2.537 p = .011 z = -.095 p = .924 z = -3.830 p < .001 z = -3.835 p < .001 
positive-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-v z = -2.169 p = .030 z = -.090 p = .929 z = -3.934 p < .001 z = -3.929 p < .001 
positive-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -2.943 p = .003 z = -.703 p = .482 z = -3.855 p < .001 z = -3.688 p < .001 
positive-emotional-iv vs. negative-emotional-v z = -2.348 p = .019 z = -.606 p = .545 z = -3.735 p < .001 z = -3.487 p < .001 
positive-emotional-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -.956 p = .339 z = -2.030 p = .042 z = -.357 p = .721 z = -.087 p = .930 
negative-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-iv z = -2.659 p = .008 z = -.699 p = .485 z = -3.424 p = .001 z = -3.436 p = .001 
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Appendix G 
Results of Experiment II 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests 
 
due to significant IE of content × validity 
decision times error rates 
calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values t-values (df) p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv t(32) = -5.486 p < .001 t(32) = -4.572 p < .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v t(32) = -2.374 p =.024 t(32) = -2.478 p = .019 
moral-v vs. neutral-v t(32) = 3.024 p = .005 t(32) =.627 p = .535 
moral-v vs. abstract-v t(32) = 5.778 p < .001 t(32) = -.828 p = .414 
moral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(32) = 2.264 p = .030 t(32) =.442 p = .662 
moral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(32) = .423 p = .675 t(32) =.000 p = 1.000 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv t(32) = 2.749 p = .010 t(32) = 4.195 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral-iv t(32) = 4.722 p < .001 t(32) = 4.804 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(32) = 6.174 p < .001 t(32) = 4.707 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(32) = 4.434 p < .001 t(32) = 5.078 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(32) = 4.096 p < .001 t(32) = 5.108 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. unmoral-iv t(32) = -2.901 p = .007 t(32) = 2.232 p = .033 
unmoral-v vs.neutral-v t(32) = 4.308 p < .001 t(32) = 2.901 p = .007 
unmoral-v vs. abstract-v t(32) = 5.846 p < .001 t(32) = 2.213 p = .034 
unmoral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(32) = 3.849 p = .001 t(32) = 2.640 p = .013 
unmoral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(32) = 2.248 p = .032 t(32) = 2.378 p = .024 
unmoral-iv vs.neutral-iv t(32) = 3.539 p = .001 t(32) = 1.000 p = .325 
unmoral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(32) = 7.359 p < .001 t(32) =.620 p = .540 
unmoral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(32) = 2.021 p = .052 t(32) =.770 p = .447 
unmoral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(32) = 2.155 p = .039 t(32) =.226 p = .823 
neutral-v vs.neutral-iv t(32) = -2.784 p = .009 t(32) = -.702 p = .488 
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Continuation of Appendix G 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests 
 
due to significant IE of content × validity 
decision times error rates 
calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values t-values (df) p-values 
neutral-v vs. abstract-v t(32) = 3.505 p = .001 t(32) = -1.305 p = .201 
neutral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(32) = -.222 p = .826 t(32) = -.373 p = .712 
neutral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(32) = -2.045 p = .049 t(32) = -.571 p = .572 
neutral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(32) = 3.682 p = .001 t(32) = -.273 p = .786 
neutral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(32) = -.519 p = .608 t(32) = -.373 p = .712 
neutral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(32) = -1.996 p = .055 t(32) = -1.000 p = .325 
abstract-v vs. abstract-iv t(32) = -1.343 p = .189 t(32) =.466 p = .645 
abstract-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(32) = -2.737 p = .010 t(32) =.941 p = .354 
abstract-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(32) = -3.765 p = .001 t(32) = 1.139 p = .263 
abstract-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(32) = -2.378 p = .024 t(32) =.000 p = 1.000 
abstract-iv vs.negative-emotional-iv t(32) = -4.535 p < .001 t(32) = -.627 p = .535 
positive-emotional-v vs. positive-emotional-iv t(32) = -1.806 p = .080 t(32) = -.571 p = .572 
positive-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(32) = -1.349 p = .187 t(32) = -.239 p = .813 
positive-emotional-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(32) = -.636 p = .529 t(32) = -1.000 p = .325 
negative-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-iv t(32) = -2.733 p = .010 t(32) = -.649 p = .521 
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Appendix H 
Results of Pre-Study III – Deductive reasoning problems 
problem-evaluation III 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
logic dimension morality dimension 
positive-emotionality 
dimension 
negative-emotionality 
dimension 
z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv z = -4.354 p < .001 z = -.524 p = .600 z = -3.767 p < .001 z = -3.686 p < .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v z = -3.220 p = .001 z = -.529 p = .597 z = -4.034 p < .001 z = -4.441 p < .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -4.535 p < .001 z = -1.680 p = .093 z = -3.977 p < .001 z = -4.116 p < .001 
moral-v vs. neutral1-v z = -1.809 p = .070 z = -4.724 p < .001 z = -3.971 p < .001 z = -4.043 p < .001 
moral-v vs. neutral1-iv z = -4.390 p < .001 z = -4.735 p < .001 z = -4.116 p < .001 z = -3.251 p = .001 
moral-v vs. neutral2-v z = -1.402 p = .161 z = -4.732 p < .001 z = -3.440 p = .001 z = -4.031 p < .001 
moral-v vs. neutral2-iv z = -4.449 p < .001 z = -4.730 p < .001 z = -4.118 p < .001 z = -3.775 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-v z = -3.201 p = .001 z = -.238 p = .812 z = -3.003 p = .003 z = -4.136 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv z = -1.881 p = .060 z = -1.238 p = .216 z = -1.425 p = .154 z = -1.763 p = .078 
moral-iv vs. neutral1-v z = -4.354 p < .001 z = -4.728 p < .001 z = -.219 p = .826 z = -4.336 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral1-iv z = -.681 p = .496 z = -4.737 p < .001 z = -2.438 p = .015 z = -4.313 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral2-v z = -4.427 p < .001 z = -4.661 p < .001 z = -.595 p = .552 z = -4.342 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -1.451 p = .147 z = -4.729 p < .001 z = -1.263 p = .207 z = -4.273 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. unmoral-iv z = -4.115 p < .001 z = -1.407 p = .160 z = -1.523 p = .128 z = -3.059 p = .002 
unmoral-v vs. neutral1-v z = -2.497 p = .013 z = -4.723 p < .001 z = -2.952 p = .003 z = -4.548 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. neutral1-iv z = -3.912 p < .001 z = -4.724 p < .001 z = -1.210 p = .226 z = -4.549 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. neutral2-v z = -2.655 p = .008 z = -4.653 p < .001 z = -2.756 p = .006 z = -4.549 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs. neutral2-iv z = -3.799 p < .001 z = -4.722 p < .001 z = -1.898 p = .058 z = -4.551 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral1-v z = -4.525 p < .001 z = -4.717 p < .001 z = -1.992 p = .046 z = -4.551 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral1-iv z = -1.118 p = .264 z = -4.722 p < .001 z = -.862 p = .389 z = -4.465 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral2-v z = -4.531 p < .001 z = -4.722 p < .001 z = -2.136 p = .033 z = -4.548 p < .001 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -.318 p = .751 z = -4.718 p < .001 z = -.839 p = .402 z = -4.553 p < .001 
neutral1-v vs. neutral1-iv z = -4.382 p < .001 z = -.284 p = .776 z = -3.623 p < .001 z = -2.503 p = .012 
neutral1-v vs. neutral2-v z = -.486 p = .627 z = -.254 p = .799 z = -1.535 p = .125 z = -1.508 p = .132 
neutral1-v vs. neutral2-iv z = -4.440 p < .001 z = -1.511 p = .131 z = -1.845 p = .065 z = -2.292 p = .022 
neutral1-iv vs. neutral2-v z = -4.513 p < .001 z = -.618 p = .537 z = -3.446 p = .001 z = -3.093 p = .002 
neutral1-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -.629 p = .529 z = -1.942 p = .052 z = -2.167 p = .030 z = -1.642 p = .101 
neutral2-v vs. neutral2-iv z = -4.431 p < .001 z = -1.705 p = .088 z = -2.387 p = .017 z = -3.020 p = .003 
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Continuation of Appendix H 
Results of Pre-Study III – Recognition items 
recognition items  
evaluation III 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
(m = match, nm = no match) 
logic dimension morality dimension 
positive-emotionality 
dimension 
negative-emotionality 
dimension 
z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values z-values p-values 
moral-m vs. moral-nm z = -2.318 p = .020 z = -.175 p = .861 z = -2.671 p = .008 z = -3.676 p < .001   
moral-m vs. unmoral-m z = -2.094 p = .036 z = -.632 p = .527 z = -3.423 p = .001 z = -4.445 p < .001   
moral-m vs. unmoral-nm z = -2.886 p = .004 z = -.713 p = .476 z = -3.333 p = .001 z = -3.800 p < .001 
moral-m vs. neutral1-m z = -.462 p = .644 z = -4.690 p < .001  z = -2.656 p = .008 z = -4.141 p < .001   
moral-m vs. neutral1-nm z = -.369 p = .712 z = -4.711 p < .001 z = -3.536 p < .001 z = -3.601 p < .001   
moral-m vs. neutral2-m z = -2.393 p = .017 z = -4.712 p < .001  z = -2.514 p = .012 z = -4.134 p < .001   
moral-m vs. neutral2-nm z = -2.622 p = .009 z = -4.711 p < .001  z = -3.284 p = .001 z = -4.153 p < .001 
moral-nm vs. unmoral-m z = -.214 p = .831 z = -.936 p = .350 z = -1.459 p = .144 z = -2.955 p = .003 
moral-nm vs. unmoral-nm z = -.976 p = .329 z = -.185 p = .853 z = -.120 p = .904 z = -.014 p = .989 
moral-nm vs. neutral1-m z = -1.468 p = .142 z = -4.581 p < .001 z = -.595 p = .552 z = -4.295 p < .001 
moral-nm vs. neutral1-nm z = -2.068 p = .039 z = -4.553 p < .001  z = -.176 p = .860 z = -4.220 p < .001   
moral-nm vs. neutral2-m z = -.594 p = .553 z = -4.600 p < .001  z = -1.193 p = .233 z = -4.206 p < .001   
moral-nm vs. neutral2-nm z = -3.295 p = .001 z = -4.598 p < .001  z = -1.165 p = .244 z = -4.325 p < .001   
unmoral-m vs. unmoral-nm z = -.893 p = .372 z = -1.477 p = .140 z = -1.582 p = .114 z = -3.660 p < .001   
unmoral-m vs. neutral1-m z = -1.394 p = .163 z = -4.634 p < .001 z = -2.024 p = .043 z = -4.468 p < .001 
unmoral-m vs. neutral1-nm z = -1.950 p = .051 z = -4.634 p < .001 z = -1.705 p = .088 z = -4.468 p < .001 
unmoral-m vs. neutral2-m z = -.934 p = .350 z = -4.632 p < .001 z = -2.435 p = .015 z = -4.470 p < .001   
unmoral-m vs. neutral2-nm z = -3.330 p = .001 z = -4.637 p < .001 z = -2.414 p = .016 z = -4.519 p < .001   
unmoral-nm vs. neutral1-m z = -2.044 p = .041 z = -4.712 p < .001 z = -.791 p = .429 z = -4.468 p < .001   
unmoral-nm vs. neutral1-nm z = -2.821 p = .005 z = -4.711 p < .001 z = -.284 p = .776 z = -4.469 p < .001 
unmoral-nm vs. neutral2-m z = -.231 p = .818 z = -4.712 p < .001 z = -1.429 p = .153 z = -4.465 p < .001   
unmoral-nm vs. neutral2-nm z = -3.431 p = .001 z = -4.715 p < .001   z = -1.331 p = .183 z = -4.382 p < .001 
neutral1-m vs. neutral1-nm z = -.836 p = .403 z = -1.725 p = .084 z = -.975 p = .330 z = -1.186 p = .236 
neutral1-m vs. neutral2-m z = -2.150 p = .032 z = -.273 p = .785 z = -.743 p = .458 z = -.587 p = .557 
neutral1-m vs. neutral2-nm z = -1.975 p = .048 z = .000 p = 1.000 z = -.539 p = .590 z = -1.000 p = .317 
neutral1-nm vs. neutral2-m z = -2.717 p = .007 z = -1.994 p = .046 z = -1.360 p = .174 z = -1.100 p = .271 
neutral1-nm vs. neutral2-nm z = -2.172 p = .030 z = -1.725 p = .084 z = -1.691 p = .091 z = -1.611 p = .107 
neutral2-m vs. neutral2-nm z = -3.340 p = .001 z = -.447 p = .655 z = -.354 p = .723 z = -.333 p = .739 
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Material of the logic training in original German language 
Pretest 
Pretest - instruction 
 
Lieber Teilnehmer, 
 
im folgenden Test geht es um logisches Denken. Sie sollen einige Aufgaben dieser Art bearbeiten: 
 
Wenn Hänschen in die Schule geht, dann lernt er schreiben. 
Hänschen geht in die Schule.  
 
Hänschen lernt schreiben. 
 
Ist dieser Schluss logisch gültig?                                  Ja                                   Nein 
 
So sehen die Aufgaben aus. Sie sollen hier beurteilen, ob der dritte Satz unter dem Strich logisch aus den 
Sätzen über dem Strich folgt. Dies bedeutet, dass der logische Schluss, der hier gezogen wird, gültig ist. Wenn 
Sie also finden, dass der Satz unter dem Strich aus den ersten Sätzen folgt, dann kreuzen sie bitte „Ja“ an, 
wenn nicht, dann „Nein“. 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mitarbeit. 
 
 
Pretest – problems 
valid invalid 
Wenn M, dann N. 
M. 
N. 
Wenn W hinten ist, dann ist A seitlich. 
W ist hinten. 
A ist nicht seitlich. 
Wenn ein Mensch viel Alkohol trinkt, dann schadet er damit seiner 
Gesundheit. 
Ein Mensch trinkt viel Alkohol. 
Der Mensch schadet damit seiner Gesundheit. 
Wenn Tina sich einen Hund kauft, dann muss sie mit ihm 
spazieren gehen. 
Tina kauft sich einen Hund. 
Sie muss nicht mit ihm spazieren gehen. 
Wenn ein Mensch Hunger hat, dann holt er sich etwas zu essen aus 
dem Kühlschrank. 
Ein Mensch hat Hunger. 
Er holt sich etwas zu essen aus dem Kühlschrank. 
Wenn es Außerirdische gibt, dann liegt New York im Westen 
von Texas. 
Es gibt Außerirdische. 
New York liegt nicht im Westen von Texas. 
Wenn Johanna abnehmen will, dann isst sie abends ganz viele Chips. 
Johanna will abnehmen. 
Sie isst abends ganz viele Chips. 
Wenn man einen Freund nicht jeden Tag sieht, dann verliert 
man ihn. 
Man sieht den Freund nicht jeden Tag. 
Man verliert ihn nicht. 
Wenn D links ist, dann ist Q rechts. 
D ist links. 
Q ist rechts. 
Wenn es nicht schneit, dann regnet es. 
Es schneit nicht. 
Es regnet nicht. 
Wenn man sich nicht auf die Prüfung vorbereitet, dann fällt man durch. 
Man bereitet sich nicht auf seine Prüfung vor. 
Man fällt durch. 
Wenn die Möhre krumm ist, dann ist sie eine Banane. 
Die Möhre ist krumm. 
Sie ist keine Banane. 
Wenn ein Mensch rote Ohren hat, dann kommt er vom Mars. 
Ein Mensch hat rote Ohren. 
Er kommt vom Mars. 
Wenn ein Mensch vor die Hunde geht, dann wird er von ihnen 
gefressen. 
Ein Mensch geht vor die Hunde. 
Der Mensch wird nicht von ihnen gefressen. 
Wenn es rot ist, dann ist es grün. 
Es ist rot. 
Es ist grün. 
Wenn ein Mensch unglücklich ist, dann denkt er an Selbstmord. 
Ein Mensch ist unglücklich. 
Der Mensch denkt nicht an Selbstmord. 
Wenn der Frühling kommt, dann wird es wärmer draußen. 
Der Frühling kommt. 
Es wird wärmer draußen. 
Wenn C1, dann P3. 
C1. 
Nicht P3. 
Wenn ein Tier im Meer lebt, dann muss es ein Meeresfisch sein. 
Ein Tier lebt im Meer. 
Das Tier muss ein Meeresfisch sein. 
Wenn Stephan sein Zimmer putzt, dann ist die Vier ein 
Primzahl. 
Stephan putzt sein Zimmer. 
Die Vier ist keine Primzahl. 
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Introduction to propositional logic 
 
Aussagenlogik 
 
 
Können Sie logisch Denken? Sicherlich werden Sie diese Frage ohne zu zögern bejahen. Aber was ist logisches 
Denken bzw. Logik überhaupt? 
Im Alltag hört man oft den Satz: „Das ist doch logisch!“ Meistens meinen wir damit, dass ein Gedankengang 
folgerichtig ist bzw. den Gesetzen der Logik entspricht und ihn somit jeder leicht nachvollziehen kann. Doch ist 
das, was wir denken, wirklich immer so logisch und für alle verständlich? Bestimmt haben Sie schon Situationen 
erlebt, in denen jemand ihren gedanklichen Schlüssen nicht so ohne Weiteres folgen konnte, oder Sie konnten 
die Gedankengänge eines anderen mal nicht verstehen. Um dies zu vermeiden, begannen Philosophen im 4. 
Jahrhundert v. Chr., eine allgemein gültige Logik zu entwickeln, um eindeutige Urteile über logisches bzw. 
unlogisches Denken und Argumentieren fällen zu können. 
Von einem fachlichen Standpunkt aus ist Logik die Wissenschaft von den Gesetzen und Formen des Denkens. 
Begründet wurde die formale Logik von Aristoteles. Den Mittelpunkt der aristotelischen Logik bildet die Lehre 
vom Schließen und der Beweisführung. Zuerst betrachtete er die Logik als Teil der Rhetorik, mit dem der 
Redner auf das Auditorium einwirken kann. Später sah er die Logik als Wissen, das den Weg zur Erlangung von 
Wahrheit weist. 
Nach Aristoteles beschäftigten sich noch unzählige andere berühmte Philosophen und Mathematiker mit der 
Logik, die so auch stets weiterentwickelt wurde. Heute wird Logik vor allem in der Philosophie und Mathematik 
gelehrt. 
 
Hier beschäftigen wir uns nun mit der Aussagenlogik. Dabei zieht man aus zwei oder mehr gegebenen Aussagen 
logische Schlüsse, indem man die Beziehungen der Aussagen zueinander bewertet. Um das nachvollziehen zu 
können, zunächst ein Beispiel: 
 
 
Wenn es regnet, dann ist die Straße nass. 
Es regnet. 
Also ist die Straße nass. 
 
 
Die Sätze über dem Strich nennt man Prämissen, den Satz unter dem Strich Konklusion. Die erste Prämisse 
besteht aus zwei Aussagen, nämlich „Es regnet“ und „Die Straße ist nass“. 
 
Man stellt sich nun die Frage, ob die Konklusion aus den Prämissen folgen kann. Wenn dies der Fall ist, wie 
beim oben genannten Beispiel, dann bezeichnet man das Ganze als logisch gültigen Schluss. Statt gültig kann 
man auch valide sagen. Wenn man von einem logisch validen Schluss spricht, so meint man damit nicht nur die 
Konklusion (den Satz unter dem Strich), sondern das ganze System der drei Sätze, also die Beziehung zwischen 
den Prämissen und der Konklusion. Die Konklusion selbst stellt also keinen Schluss dar. Doch was macht denn 
nun einen logisch validen Schluss aus?  
 
 
Drei Merkmale von logisch validen Schlüssen sind besonders wichtig, um diese Frage zu beantworten. Diese 
werden Ihnen nun vorgestellt: 
 
1. 
 Wenn die Prämissen wahr sind, dann ist auch die Konklusion wahr.                     
 
Man geht also davon aus, dass die Konklusion auch wahr ist, falls die Prämissen wahr sind. Es ist hier sehr 
wichtig zu beachten, dass man nicht behauptet, dass die Prämissen immer der  
Continuation of introduction to propositional logic 
 
Wahrheit entsprechen. Aber wenn die Prämissen in einem logisch validen Schluss wahr sind, dann überträgt sich 
diese Wahrheit auf die Konklusion. Allerdings unterscheidet sich die Frage ob die Konklusion wahr ist 
wesentlich von der Frage, ob der Schluss valide ist: 
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2. 
Ob die Prämissen wahr sind, spielt für die Beurteilung der Korrektheit des Schlusses keine Rolle. 
 
Das hört sich zunächst sehr seltsam an, erklärt sich aber durch ein Beispiel: 
 
Wenn ein Mensch studiert, dann hat er die Eigenschaft A. 
Ein Mensch studiert. 
Der Mensch hat die Eigenschaft A. 
 
Auch  das ist ein logisch valider Schluss. Aber was ist die Eigenschaft A? Dieser Ausdruck ist so vage und 
unbestimmt, dass man nicht beurteilen kann, ob die Prämissen wahr oder falsch sind. Der Schluss ist aber 
trotzdem gültig. 
Dieses Merkmal führt uns direkt weiter zum dritten Merkmal: 
 
3. 
Für die Korrektheit eines Schlusses sind die Bedeutungen der in ihm vorkommenden Begriffe 
unwesentlich.  
 
Das kann man durch das obige Beispiel leicht nachvollziehen. Man weiß nicht, was „Eigenschaft A“  inhaltlich 
heißen soll, es könnte praktisch alles sein. Wenn die „Eigenschaft A“ dafür steht, dass man sich an der Uni 
eingeschrieben hat, dann wäre die Prämisse durchaus wahr. Es  könnte aber auch sein, dass die „Eigenschaft A“ 
dafür steht, dass man eine besonders große Nase hat, dann ist die Prämisse falsch. Es studieren schließlich auch 
Menschen mit kleinen Nasen. Trotzdem kann man einen logischen Schluss ziehen. Die inhaltlichen Bedeutungen 
der Prämissen sind für das logische Schließen also vollkommen unwichtig.  
 
Man beurteilt die logische Gültigkeit nicht nach dem Inhalt der Prämissen bzw. deren Wahrheitsgehalt. Es 
kommt auf die logische Form der Aussagen an. Doch was ist die logische Form einer Aussage? Wie erhält man 
sie? 
 
Die logische Form einer Aussage enthält nur noch die Bestandteile einer Aussage, die für die Beurteilung der 
Gültigkeit des Schlusses von Bedeutung sind. Dazu wird die Aussage abstrahiert. Man überträgt die einzelnen 
Teile der Aussagen in eine künstliche Sprache, die aus Symbolen besteht. So sind die Aussagen dann nur noch 
symbolisch dargestellt.  
Elemente der künstlichen Sprache sind: 
• Symbole die für Aussagen stehen: P, Q, R, S, T,.... 
• Symbole, die die Bildung komplizierterer Sätze erlauben, z.B.:  
 
Symbol Bedeutung 
∧ und 
∨ oder 
→ wenn, ... dann 
  
 
Die oben stehenden Beispiele können nun in die Sprache der Logik übersetzt werden, wobei man die zwei 
Aussagen zunächst durch Symbole ersetzt:         
 
Wenn P, dann Q                                                            
P                                                                                   
Q                                                                                  
 
sowie „wenn, ... dann“ durch : 
 
P  Q 
P                                                                                    
Q                                                                                    
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Durch das Abstrahieren wird die Form der Aussage also vom Inhalt der Aussage getrennt. Doch wann genau ist 
ein Schluss nun logisch valide? 
 
Es gibt Regeln, die verwendet werden, um die logische Gültigkeit einer Aussage zu bestimmen. Diese Regeln 
richten sich nur nach der Form einer Aussage. 
Eine wichtige Regel der Aussagenlogik ist der Modus Ponens: 
 
Aus der Bejahung der ersten Aussage folgt die Bejahung der zweiten Aussage. 
 
Die Form des Modus Ponens sieht so aus:  
 
Wenn P, dann Q 
P 
Q 
 
Die erste Aussage in der ersten Prämisse (P) wird in der zweiten Prämisse genannt. Die zweite Aussage taucht 
dann in der Konklusion auf. Die zweite Aussage folgt also aus der Ersten. Alle Schlüsse, die diese Form haben, 
sind gültig! 
 
Ein ungültiger Schluss taucht auf, wenn nach der Bejahung der ersten Aussage die zweite Aussage in der 
Konklusion verneint wird: 
 
Wenn es regnet, dann ist die Straße nass.                       
Es regnet.                                                                         
Die Straße ist nicht nass. 
 
 
Ist dies denn nun ein logisch valider Schluss: 
 
Wenn jemand religiös ist, dann ist er verheiratet. 
Der Papst ist religiös. 
Der Papst ist verheiratet. 
 
Auch dieser Schluss folgt der Form des Modus Ponens und ist somit logisch valide. Wie oben erklärt, hat der 
Inhalt keinen Einfluss auf die Gültigkeit der Schlüsse. So kommt es auch dazu, dass inhaltlich falsche Schlüsse, 
wie dieser, als logisch valide gelten. 
 
Falls Sie jetzt noch Fragen haben, oder Ihnen noch etwas unklar ist, haben Sie keine Scheu und wenden Sie sich 
bitte an Ihre Versuchsleitung. Sie wird Ihre Fragen gerne beantworten. 
 
Ansonsten können Sie nun auf der nächsten Seite mit den Übungsaufgaben beginnen. 
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Trainings phase – problems (conclusion had to be produced by participants) 
Wenn A, dann B. 
A. 
Wenn es Rot ist, dann ist es auch Gelb. 
Es ist Rot. 
Wenn die Sonne scheint, dann ist es hell draußen. 
Die Sonne scheint. 
Wenn er ein Mechaniker ist, dann kann er einen Hubschrauber 
fliegen. 
Er ist ein Mechaniker. 
Wenn ein Mensch eine tiefe Wunde hat, dann verliert er viel Blut. 
Ein Mensch hat eine tiefe Wunde. 
Wenn es eine Überschwemmung gibt, dann treiben Leichen im 
Wasser. 
Es gibt eine Überschwemmung. 
Wenn Peter abends in die Kneipe geht, dann trinkt er Bier. 
Peter geht abends in die Kneipe 
Wenn Anna eine Eins in Mathe schreibt, dann ist der Mond aus 
grünem Käse. 
Anna schreibt eine Eins in Mathe. 
Wenn ein Mensch ins Schwimmbad geht, dann genießt er die 
Sonne. 
Ein Mensch geht ins Schwimmbad.  
Wenn Gerda die Pflanze nicht gießt, dann wächst sie trotzdem 
weiter. 
Gerda gießt die Pflanze nicht. 
Wenn ein Kind sich verletzt, dann weint es. 
Ein Kind verletzt sich.  
Wenn Tomaten reif sind, dann sind sie blau. 
Die Tomaten sind reif. 
Wenn der Hund eine schlimme Verletzung hat, dann wird er 
eingeschläfert. 
Der Hund hat eine schlimme Verletzung. 
Wenn Ein Mensch einen schwerwiegenden Fehler macht, dann 
muss er mit den Konsequenzen leben.  
Ein Mensch macht einen schwerwiegenden Fehler. 
Wenn CX, dann CY. 
CX. 
Wenn ein Tier Beine hat, dann ist es ein Säugetier. 
Ein Tier hat Beine. 
Wenn ein Kind schwer erziehbar ist, dann kommt die Super Nanny. 
Ein Kind ist schwer erziehbar. 
Wenn ein Mensch faul ist, dann schreibt er schlechte Noten. 
Ein Mensch ist faul. 
Wenn ein Mensch alt ist, dann wird er bald sterben. 
Ein Mensch ist alt. 
Wenn Max einen Ball wirft, dann fliegt er bis in den Himmel. 
Max wirft einen Ball. 
Wenn C rechts ist, dann ist B links. 
C ist rechts. 
Wenn RX, dann Z9. 
RX. 
Wenn der Apfel grün ist, dann ist die Banane auch grün. 
Der Apfel ist grün. 
Wenn Oliver die Aufgabe nicht löst, dann ist er ein Versager. 
Oliver löst die Aufgabe nicht. 
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Trainings phase – problems (given conclusions) 
valid invalid 
Wenn GD, dann WQ. 
GD. 
WQ. 
Wenn H, dann K. 
H. 
Nicht K. 
Wenn die Ampel rot ist, dann darf man fahren. 
Die Ampel ist rot. 
Man darf fahren. 
Wenn ein Mensch einen schweren Unfall hatte, dann ist er 
querschnittsgelähmt. 
Ein Mensch hatte einen schweren Unfall. 
Der Mensch ist nicht querschnittsgelähmt. 
Wenn man lange in der Sonne sitzt, dann bekommt man einen 
roten Kopf. 
Man sitzt lange in der Sonne. 
Man bekommt einen roten Kopf. 
Wenn ein Mensch Krebs hat, dann muss er viel leiden. 
Der Mensch hat Krebs. 
Der Mensch muss nicht viel leiden. 
Wenn ein Tier im Wasser taucht, dann hat es Kiemen. 
Ein Tier taucht im Wasser. 
Das Tier hat Kiemen. 
Wenn P links ist, dann ist G rechts. 
P ist links. 
G ist nicht rechts. 
Wenn die Erde der „blaue Planet“ ist, dann sind ihre Bewohner 
auch alle blau. 
Die Erde ist der „blaue Planet“. 
Die Bewohner der Erde sind alle blau. 
Wenn der Rollladen geschlossen ist, dann scheint die Sonne ins 
Zimmer. 
Der Rollladen ist geschlossen. 
Die Sonne scheint nicht ins Zimmer. 
Wenn Albert ins Kino geht, dann kommt Klara auch mit. 
 Albert geht ins Kino. 
Klara kommt auch mit. 
Wenn es Grün ist, dann ist es Weiß. 
Es ist Grün. 
Es ist nicht Weiß. 
Wenn ein Mensch lügt, dann wird seine Nase länger. 
Ein Mensch lügt. 
Seine Nase wird länger. 
Wenn die Zeit reif ist, dann kann man sie ernten. 
Die Zeit ist reif. 
Man kann die Zeit nicht ernten. 
Wenn C vorne ist, dann ist X rechts. 
C ist vorne. 
X ist rechts. 
Wenn ein Tier Flügel hat, dann ist es ein Insekt. 
Das Tier hat Flügel. 
Das Tier ist kein Insekt. 
Wenn es zu einer Naturkatastrophe kommt, dann sterben viele 
Menschen. 
Es kommt zu einer Naturkatastrophe. 
Viele Menschen sterben. 
Wenn Ina den Job nicht kriegt, dann ist sie selbst dran schuld. 
Ina kriegt den Job nicht. 
Ina ist nicht selbst dran schuld. 
Wenn es eine Hungersnot gibt, dann sterben viele Kinder. 
Es gibt eine Hungersnot. 
Es sterben viele Kinder. 
Wenn ein Haus brennt, dann ersticken die Menschen darin 
qualvoll. 
Ein Haus brennt. 
Die Menschen ersticken nicht qualvoll. 
Wenn jemand Theologie studiert, dann glaubt er an Gott. 
Jemand studiert Theologie. 
Er glaubt an Gott. 
Wenn ein Mensch Blut spuckt, dann kommt der Krankenwagen. 
Ein Mensch spuckt Blut. 
Es kommt kein Krankenwagen. 
Wenn Hans sich freut, dann springt er hoch in die Luft. 
Hans freut sich.  
Hans springt hoch in die Luft. 
Wenn ein Mensch die Aufgabe nicht lösen kann, dann ist er dumm. 
Ein Mensch kann die Aufgabe nicht lösen. 
Der Mensch ist nicht dumm. 
 
Appendix 
187 
Continuation of Appendix I 
Posttest 
Posttest - instruction 
Lieber Teilnehmer, 
 
im folgenden Test geht es noch mal um logisches Denken. Bitte bearbeiten Sie erneut einige Aufgaben dieser 
Art: 
 
 
Wenn Hänschen in die Schule geht, dann lernt er schreiben. 
Hänschen geht in die Schule.  
 
Hänschen lernt schreiben. 
 
Ist dieser Schluss logisch valide?                                            Ja                                          Nein 
 
 
Beurteilen Sie, wie bei den Übungsaufgaben, ob die Konklusion valide ist. Wenn Sie dazu keine weiteren 
Fragen haben, dann können Sie jetzt anfangen. 
 
 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Mitarbeit. 
 
 
 
Posttest – problems 
valid invalid 
Wenn B, dann V. 
B. 
V. 
Wenn T1 hinten ist, dann ist T3 seitlich. 
T1 ist hinten. 
T3 ist nicht seitlich. 
Wenn ein Mensch allein im Dunkeln ist, dann hat er große Angst. 
Ein Mensch ist allein im Dunkeln. 
Der Mensch hat große Angst. 
Wenn Elke ein Mitglied von Greenpeace ist, dann ist sie sehr 
umweltbewusst.  
Elke ist ein Mitglied von Greenpeace.  
Sie ist nicht umweltbewusst. 
Wenn ein Mensch Durst hat, dann kauft er sich im Getränkemarkt 
etwas zu trinken. 
Ein Mensch hat Durst. 
Der Mensch kauft sich im Getränkemarkt etwas zu trinken. 
Wenn die Sonne untergegangen ist, dann schlafen alle 
nachtaktiven Tiere. 
Die Sonne ist untergegangen. 
Die nachtaktiven Tiere schlafen nicht. 
Wenn die Uhr rückwärts läuft, dann vergeht die Zeit schneller.  
Die Uhr läuft rückwärts. 
Die Zeit vergeht schneller. 
Wenn man unglücklich verliebt ist, dann muss man seinen 
Liebeskummer im Alkohol ertränken. 
Man ist unglücklich verliebt. 
Man muss seinen Liebeskummer nicht im Alkohol ertränken. 
Wenn A links ist, dann ist B rechts. 
A ist links. 
B ist rechts. 
Wenn Ilse die Fenster putzt, dann sind sie wieder sauber. 
Ilse putzt die Fenster. 
Sie sind nicht wieder sauber. 
Wenn ein Mensch Zigaretten raucht, dann bringt er sich damit selbst 
um. 
Ein Mensch raucht Zigaretten. 
Der Mensch bringt sich damit selbst um. 
Wenn eine Pflanze Blätter hat, dann ist es ein Baum. 
Eine Pflanze hat Blätter. 
Es ist kein Baum. 
Wenn das Universum groß ist, dann ist die Erde eine Scheibe. 
Das Universum ist groß. 
Die Erde ist eine Scheibe. 
Wenn ein Mensch übergewichtig ist, dann wird er von anderen 
gehänselt. 
Ein Mensch ist übergewichtig. 
Der Mensch wird nicht von anderen gehänselt. 
Wenn es flüssig ist, dann ist es Eis. 
Es ist flüssig. 
Es ist Eis. 
Wenn ein Mensch Bohnen isst, dann wird er grün. 
Ein Mensch isst Bohnen. 
Der Mensch wird nicht grün. 
Wenn jemand ein Party gibt, dann lädt er seine Freunde ein. 
Jemand gibt eine Party. 
Er lädt seine Freunde ein. 
Wenn OR, dann WU. 
OR. 
Nicht WU. 
Wenn es Salz im Meer gibt, dann gibt es Zucker im See. 
Es gibt Salz im Meer. 
Es gibt Zucker im See. 
Wenn das Telefon klingelt, dann geht der Telefonmann ran. 
Das Telefon klingelt. 
Der Telefonmann geht nicht ran. 
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Material of the pseudo training in original German language 
 
Introduction to matrice tasks 
 
Matrizenaufgaben 
 
Matrizenaufgaben finden besonders bei Intelligenz-Tests ihre Verwendung. Es sind Aufgaben, bei denen man 
mit Figuren und Formen arbeiten muss wie z.B. Kreisen, Rechtecken oder Punkten. Die Formen sind in 
mehreren Feldern angeordnet. Sie verändern sich nach einem logischen Prinzip von Feld zu Feld. Ein Feld ist 
freigelassen. Die Aufgabe besteht darin, das leere Feld logisch zu ergänzen. Dafür stehen einem mehrere 
Antwortalternativen zur Verfügung. Die richtige Antwort ergibt sich dadurch, dass man die Regel erkennt, nach 
der sich die Anordnung der Formen ändert. Hier ist ein Beispiel: 
 
 
Das leere Feld im oberen Kasten muss ergänzt werden. Die richtige Lösung muss aus den unteren sechs Feldern 
ausgewählt werden. In diesem Fall ist „B“ die richtige Antwort. 
 
Doch wozu braucht man solche Aufgaben überhaupt? Sie wurden entwickelt, um sprach- und rechenfreie 
Aufgaben bei Intelligenztests einsetzten zu können. Auf diese Weise lässt sich die Intelligenz einer Person 
erfassen, ohne den Einfluss ihres Vorwissens oder ihrer kulturellen Herkunft (z.B. Einwanderer die die Sprache 
nicht so gut beherrschen). Es kommt also nicht zu einer Benachteiligung von Menschen mit z. B. niedrigerem 
Bildungsniveau, die bei Tests, die Wissen im sprachlichen oder mathematischen Bereich voraussetzen, einen 
niedrigeren Intelligenzquotienten erzielen würden. 
 
Die Aufgaben, die Sie hier bearbeiten sollen, sind dem Bochumer Matrizentest (BOMAT advanced) entnommen. 
Um alle Aufgaben dieses Tests lösen zu können muss man mehrere logische Regeln erkennen und anwenden, die 
zur korrekten Lösung führen.  
 
Korrespondenz: Jede Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonale beinhaltet identische Figuren. Man muss also nur das 
passende Symbol ergänzen. 
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Variierende Korrespondenz: Jede Spalte, Zeile oder Diagonale beinhaltet ähnliche Grundformen, die in einer 
Teilkomponente (z.B. Form, Farbe, Größe) variieren. Die Grundformen verändern wie unten zu sehen, ihre 
Größe, manchmal aber z.B. auch ihre Farbe. 
 
 
 
 
Addition: Die Figuren einer Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen werden übereinander gelegt. Die Symbole aus einer 
Spalte, Zeile oder Diagonalen werden zusammengefügt. Das letzte Feld ist die Summe aus den vorangegangenen 
Feldern. Alle Symbole sind in diesem Feld an der gleichen Stelle wie vorher. Hier enthält das unterste Feld 
sowohl den Kreis als auch den schwarzen Punkt, die einzeln in den oberen Feldern vorkommen: 
 
 
 
 
Subtraktion: Von den Elementen eines vollständigen Feldes einer Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen werden in den 
übrigen Feldern derselben Richtung Teile ausgeblendet Es werden also von Feld zu Feld Formen oder Symbole 
weggelassen. Hier werden von Innen nach außen Formen weggelassen:  
 
 
 
 
Schnittmengen: Nur die Elemente der Felder einer Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen werden übernommen, die 
auch in den anderen Feldern der Richtung enthalten sind. Hier ist es der Strich: 
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Einzelkomponentenaddition: aus den Feldern in derselben Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen werden nur 
diejenigen Teile übernommen, die nur in einem anderen Feld auftreten. Elemente, die in mehreren Feldern 
vorkommen, werden weggelassen oder verändert.  
 
 
 
 
Nachbarschaftsprinzip/Puzzleprinzip: Hier steht jedes Feld in logischer Beziehung zu allen anderen Feldern. 
Man muss also alle Felder auf einmal in Augenschein nehmen, um den richtigen Lösungsweg zu finden. Hier 
grenzen immer die gleichen Symbole aneinander:  
 
 
 
 
Reihung: Die Veränderungsregel (Addition, Subtraktion, Rotation etc.) setzt sich von Feld zu Feld fort. Diese 
Operation kann in jeder Zeile oder Spalte von vorne beginnen oder sich vertikal bzw. horizontal durch alle 
Felder hindurch fortsetzen. Hier dreht sich der Pfeil von Feld zu Feld um 45° weiter. Natürlich können sich auch 
andere Symbole drehen. 
 
 
 
 
Vollständigkeit: In jeder Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen treten verschiedene Symbole auf, die auch innerhalb der 
anderen Zeilen, Spalten oder Diagonalen in unterschiedlichen Reihenfolgen vorkommen.  
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Dabei tritt jedes Symbol in der entsprechenden Richtung genau einmal auf. Wichtig ist also, dass jedes Symbol 
einmal vorkommt, so wie hier jeweils eine Raute, eine Ellipse und ein Dreieck. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mehrdimensionale Vollständigkeit: In jeder Zeile, Spalte oder Diagonalen treten mehrdimensionale Symbole 
(variierend z.B. in Form, Farbe, Größe) auf. Jede Teilkomponente der Symbole tritt im entsprechenden Verlauf 
genau einmal auf, in unterschiedlicher Kombination. Hier muss man darauf achten, dass sowohl jede Eigenschaft 
eines Symbols jeweils einmal vorkommt, als auch jedes Symbol.  
 
 
 
 
Sukkzessive Folgen: Die verschiedenen Operationen (z.B. Rotation) werden im Verlauf einer Zeile oder Spalte 
in kontinuierlich aufsteigender oder absteigender Anzahl durchgeführt. Die Veränderungsregel wird vom ersten 
zum zweiten Feld einmal angewandt, von Zweiten zum Dritten zweimal, dann dreimal usw. Der Punkt im 
Beispiel wird vom ersten zum zweiten Feld um 45° verschoben, dann vom Zweiten zum Dritten um 2x 45° usw. 
Die Veränderungsregel wird hier also in aufsteigender Reihenfolge gebraucht. 
 
 
 
 
Eindimensionale Anzahlvariation: Verschiedene Symbole treten im horizontalen oder vertikalen Verlauf in 
einer bestimmten logisch vorgegebenen Anzahl auf, hier z.B. immer zweimal: 
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Mehrdimensionale Anzahlvariation: Die verschiedenen Teilkomponenten mehrdimensionaler Symbole 
(variierend in Form, Farbe, Muster oder Größe) treten im horizontalen oder vertikalen Verlauf in einer 
bestimmten, logisch vorgegeben, Anzahl und/oder Reihenfolge auf. Es kommen also nicht nur die einzelnen 
Symbole mehrfach hintereinender vor. Auch die Eigenschaften, die ein Symbol haben kann (z.B. Form, Farbe, 
Größe) treten in bestimmter Anzahl mehrmals hintereinander auf. Hier gibt es drei Symbole und drei Farben, 
wobei die Symbole immer 2x hintereinander auftreten, die Farben 3x.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mit diesen Regeln im Hinterkopf, nach denen sich die Felder verändern können, hat man eine gute Grundlage, 
um die richtige Antwort zu erschließen. Die Regeln sind eigentlich alle mathematische Prinzipien, wie Addition, 
Subtraktion, Schnittmengen etc., die graphisch umgesetzt werden. 
Am wichtigsten ist es aber, dass man sich zunächst einen globalen Überblick über alle Felder verschafft. So kann 
man die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der Felder oft schon auf den ersten Blick sehen. Sollte dies nicht 
der Fall sein, dann betrachtet man einzeln die Spalten, Zeilen und Diagonalen, da die regelhaften Veränderungen 
in jeder Richtung stattfinden können. Und manchmal kommt es ja auch nur darauf an, welche Symbole an das 
entsprechende Feld angrenzen.  
 
Wenn Ihnen die Regeln alle klar sind, nach denen die Veränderungen auftreten können, und Sie keine weiteren 
Fragen mehr haben, beginnen Sie bitte auf der nächsten Seite mit den Aufgaben. Um die richtige Lösung zu 
kennzeichnen, kreuzen Sie immer den Buchstaben an, der für die entsprechende Lösung steht. 
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Examples of the pseudo training tasks with matrices 
1)  
 
2)  
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Results of Experiment III 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests due to significant IE of content × validity 
due to significant IE of 
content × validity of the 
group without training 
 
calculated comparisons 
decision times error rates error rates 
t-values (df) p-values t-values (df) p-values t-values (df) p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv t(35) =  -1.674 p = .103 t(35) = -4.353 p < .001 t(11) = -4.690 p = .001 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v t(35) =  3.199 p = .003 t(35) = -2.907 p = .006 t(11) = -2.345 p = .039 
moral-v vs. neutral1-v t(35) =  4.546 p < .001 t(35) = .620 p = .539 t(11) = -.616 p = .551 
moral-v vs. neutral2-v t(35) =  3.266 p = .002 t(35) = 2.707 p = .010 t(11) = 1.000 p = .339 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv t(35) =  -.507 p = .616 t(35) = 3.820 p = .001 t(11) = 4.690 p = .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral1-iv t(35) =  3.132 p = .003 t(35) = 4.587 p < .001 t(11) = 5.000 p < .001 
moral-iv vs. neutral2-iv t(35) =  2.362 p = .024 t(35) = 5.686 p < .001 t(11) = 5.933 p < .001 
unmoral-v vs.unmoral-iv t(35) =  -5.039 p < .001 t(35) = 2.201 p = .034 t(11) = 2.171 p = .053 
unmoral-v vs. neutral1-v t(35) =  1.460 p = .153 t(35) = 3.839 p < .001 t(11) = 2.419 p = .034 
unmoral-v vs. neutral2-v t(35) =  -.088 p = .930 t(35) = 4.620 p < .001 t(11) = 3.189 p = .009 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral1-iv t(35) =  4.519 p < .001 t(35) = .723 p = .475 t(11) = -.432 p = .674 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral2-iv t(35) =  3.134 p = .003 t(35) = 2.092 p = .044 t(11) = .000 p = 1.000 
neutral1-v vs. neutral1-iv t(35) =  -2.318 p = .026 t(35) = -.683 p = .499 t(11) = .432 p = .674 
neutral1-v vs. neutral2-v t(35) =  -1.957 p = .058 t(35) = 1.784 p = .083 t(11) = 1.483 p = .166 
neutral2-v vs. neutral2-iv t(35) =  -1.380 p = .176 t(35) = -1.673 p = .103 t(11) = -1.000 p = .339 
neutral1-iv vs. neutral2-iv t(35) =  -.873 p = .389 t(35) = 1.405 p = .169 t(11) = .561 p = .586 
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post hoc independent-sample t-tests due to significant three-way IE of content × validity × group 
calculated comparisons 
error rates 
t-values (df) p-values 
moral-v groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = -.405 p = .689 
moral-v groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = .364 p = .719 
moral-v groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = .715 p = .482 
moral-iv groups no training vs. pseudo training t(18.319) = 1.164 p = .259 
moral-iv groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 4.220 p < .001 
moral-iv groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 2.187 p = .040 
unmoral-v groups no training vs. pseudo training t = .482 (22) p = .635 
unmoral-v groups no training vs. logic training t(13.792) = 2.378 p = .032 
unmoral-v groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 2.055 p = .052 
unmoral-iv groups no training vs. pseudo training t(15.572) = -1.239 p = .234 
unmoral-iv groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = .920 p = .368 
unmoral-iv groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(13.939) = 1.797 p = .094 
neutral1-v groups no training vs. pseudo training t(15.957) = 1.301 p = .212 
neutral1-v groups no training vs. logic training t(13.832) = 1.701 p = .111 
neutral1-v groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = .596 p = .557 
neutral1-iv groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = .000 p = 1.000 
neutral1-iv groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.119 p = .275 
neutral1-iv groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = .810 p = .427 
neutral2-v groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = .596 p = .557 
neutral2-v groups no training vs. logic training t(11) = 1.483 p = .166 
neutral2-v groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(11) = 1.000 p = .339 
neutral2-iv groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = .432 p = .670 
neutral2-iv groups no training vs. logic training t(11) = 2.345 p = .039 
neutral2-iv groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(11) = 1.915 p = .082 
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post hoc independent-sample t-tests due to significant IE of content × group 
calculated comparisons 
decision times 
t-values (df) p-values 
moral groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = -.403 p = .691 
moral groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.096 p = .285 
moral groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.272 p = .221 
unmoral groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = -.282 p = .781 
unmoral groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 2.083  p = .049 
unmoral groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.857  p = .077 
neutral1 groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = 1.154  p = .261 
neutral1 groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 3.672  p = .001 
neutral1 groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.768 p = .091 
neutral2 groups no training vs. pseudo training t(22) = 1.242  p = .227 
neutral2 groups no training vs. logic training t(22) = 3.089  p = .005 
neutral2 groups pseudo training vs. logic training t(22) = 1.549  p = .136 
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Results of Experiment IV 
 
post hoc Wilcoxon signed 
rank tests 
due to significant IE content × validity 
due to significant IE content × validity of average 
intelligence group 
calculated comparisons 
error rates error rates 
z-values p-values z-values p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv z = -1.983 p = .047 z = -1.983 p = .047 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v z = -2.041 p = .041 z = -1.633 p = .102 
moral-v vs. neutral1-v z = -1.342 p = .180 z = -1.342 p = .180 
moral-v vs. neutral2-v z = -1.342 p  = .180 z = -1.342 p = .180 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv z = -1.222 p = .222 z = -1.466 p = .143 
moral-iv vs. neutral1-iv z = -1.403 p = .161 z = -1.403 p = .161 
moral-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -2.060 p = .039 z = -2.060 p = .039 
unmoral-v vs.unmoral-iv z = -1.406 p = .160 z = -1.300 p = .194 
unmoral-v vs. neutral1-v z = -1.511 p = .131 z = -1.069 p = .285 
unmoral-v vs. neutral2-v z = -1.511 p = .131 z = -1.069 p = .285 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral1-iv z = .000 p = 1.000 z = -.378 p = .705 
unmoral-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -.828 p = .408 z = -.557 p = .577 
neutral1-v vs. neutral1-iv z = -.378 p = .705 z = -.378 p = .705 
neutral1-v vs. neutral2-v z = .000 p = 1.000 z = .000 p = 1.000 
neutral2-v vs. neutral2-iv z = -1.414 p = .157 z = -1.414 p = .157 
neutral1-iv vs. neutral2-iv z = -1.134 p = .257 z = -1.134 p = .257 
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Correlations with 6 participants 
 
group 
 
  
Ø DT 
(un)moral Ø DT neutral Ø DT all c-Score CFT IST 
r .386 s .579* .435 -.772** -.878** -.877** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .215 .048 .158 .003 .000 .000 
Ø DT 
(un)moral 
 
r 1 s .811** .958** -.552 -.636* -.420 
Sig. (2-tailed) .  .001 .000 .063 .026 .174 
Ø  DT neutral 
 
r   s 1 .902** -.755** -.728** -.480 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .  .000 .005 .007 .114 
Ø  DT all 
 
r   s   1 -.650* -.686* -.434 
Sig. (2-tailed)       . .014 .159 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
group 
 
  Ø Er (un)moral Ø Er neutral Er all c-Score CFT IST 
r .803* s .689* .842** -.772** -.878** -.877** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .013 .001 .003 .000 .000 
Ø Er (un)moral 
 
r 1 s .577* .946** -.716** -.797** -.755** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .  .049 .000 .009 .002 .005 
Ø Er neutral 
 
r   s 1 .789** -.840** -.635* -0.453 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .  .002 .001 .027 .139 
Ø Er all 
r   s   1 -.839** -.792** -.709** 
Sig. (2-tailed)      . .001 .002 .010 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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group 
  
  c-Score CFT IST 
r -.772** s -.878** -.877** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000 
C-Score 
  
r 1 s .827** .621* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .  .001 .031 
CFT 
  
r   s 1 .863** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .  .000 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlation scatterplots with regression line based on 6 participants (1 = high intelligence group, 2 = average intelligence group) 
 
Appendix 
201 
Continuation of Appendix L 
 
Appendix 
202 
Appendix M 
Results of Experiment V (behavioral data)  
post-hoc paired sample t-test due to significant ME of content  error rates decision times 
calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values t-values (df) p-values 
moral vs. unmoral t = .779 (30) p = .442 t = -.199 (30) p = .844 
moral vs. neutral t = 3.906 (30) p < .001 t = 4.445 (30) p < .001 
moral vs. abstract t = 2.979 (30) p = .006 t = 6.900 (30) p < .001 
moral vs. positive emotional t = 2.843 (30) p = .008 t = 3.765 (30) p = .001 
moral vs. negative emotional t = 1.283 (30) p = .209 t = 3.072 (30) p = .004 
unmoral vs. neutral t = 4.119 (30) p < .001 t = 4.882 (30) p < .001 
unmoral vs. abstract t = 2.923 (30) p = .007 t = 8.058 (30) p < .001 
unmoral vs. positive emotional t = 2.695 (30) p = .011 t = 4.262 (30) p < .001 
unmoral vs. negative emotional t = 1.022 (30) p = .315 t = 3.103 (30) p = .004 
neutral vs. abstract t = -1.541 (30) p = .134 t = 3.612 (30) p = .001 
neutral vs. positive emotional t = -1.366 (30) p = .182 t = -1.458 (30) p = .155 
neutral vs. negative emotional t = -4.150 (30) p < .001 t = -2.753 (30) p = .010 
abstract vs. positive emotional t = -.441 (30) p = .662 t = -5.417 (30) p < .001 
abstract vs. negative emotional t = -2.794 (30) p = .009 t = -4.780 (30) p < .001 
positive emotional vs. negative emotional t = -2.306 (30) p = .028 t = -1.244 (30) p = .223 
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post hoc paired-sample t-tests due to significant IE of content × validity error rates 
calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values calculated comparisons t-values (df) p-values 
moral-v vs. moral-iv t(30) = -2.650 p = .013 unmoral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(30) = .828 p = .414 
moral-v vs. unmoral-v t(30) = -3.069 p = .005 unmoral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(30) = -.465 p = .645 
moral-v vs.neutral-v t(30) = 1.976 p = .057 unmoral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(30) = -2.006 p = .054 
moral-v vs. abstract-v t(30) = .000 p = 1.000 neutral-v vs. abstract-v t(30) = -1.976 p = .057 
moral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(30) = 1.000 p = .325 neutral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(30) = -.626 p = .536 
moral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(30) = -.528 p = .601 neutral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(30) = -2.528 p = .017 
moral-iv vs. unmoral-iv t(30) = 2.919 p = .007 neutral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(30) = .000 p = 1.000 
moral-iv vs.neutral-iv t(30) = 3.702 p = .001 neutral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(30) = -1.409 p = .169 
moral-iv vs. abstract-iv t(30) = 3.503 p = .001 neutral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(30) = -3.276 p = .003 
moral-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(30) = 2.832 p = .008 abstract-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(30) = .902 p = .374 
moral-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(30) = 1.938 p = .062 abstract-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(30) = -.528 p = .601 
unmoral-v vs.unmoral-iv t(30) = 3.025 p = .005 abstract-iv vs. positive-emotional-iv t(30) = -1.541 p = .134 
unmoral-v vs.neutral-v t(30) = 3.758 p = .001 abstract-iv vs.negative-emotional-iv t(30) = -3.478 p = .002 
unmoral-v vs. abstract-v t(30) = 2.752 p = .010 positive-emotional-v vs. positive-emotional-iv t(30) = -.571 p = .572 
unmoral-v vs. positive-emotional-v t(30) = 3.202 p = .003 positive-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(30) = -1.153 p = .258 
unmoral-v vs. negative-emotional-v t(30) = 2.376 p = .024 positive-emotional-iv vs. negative-emotional-iv t(30) = -2.065 p = .048 
unmoral-iv vs.neutral-iv t(30) = .828 p = .414 negative-emotional-v vs. negative-emotional-iv t(30) = -1.030 p = .311 
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Results of Experiment V (brain imaging data) 
Analysis of single effects 
 abstract      neutral      moral      
ROIs cluster-size 
t-
value x y z BAs 
cluster-
size 
t-
value x y z BAs 
cluster-
size 
t-
value x y z BAs 
ACC 47 5.54 -3 18 27 BA 24 117 12.16 -6 24 27 BA 32 27 4.95 -6 24 27 BA 32 
 115 6.34 6 27 30 BA 32 203 15.57 9 21 30 BA 32 80 5.74 9 24 30 BA 32 
DLPFC 248 7.88 -33 -6 60 BA 6 400 20.85 -36 -6 57 BA 4 102 7.27 -36 -6 57 BA 4 
 75 6.47 9 21 45 BA 6 280 16.52 9 21 45 BA 6 20 6.77 9 21 45 BA 6 
mPFC 43 7.93 -3 21 45 BA 6 81 18.85 -3 21 45 BA 6 59 7.65 -3 21 45 BA 6 
 193 8.69 3 24 45 BA 32 236 21.13 0 18 42 BA 6 168 8.02 0 18 42 BA 6 
MTG 303 6.17 -54 -54 9 BA 39 530 14.42 -54 -33 0 / 285 6.83 -54 -30 -3 BA 21 
 419 6.00 60 -51 -6 BA 37 344 9.66 48 -27 -3 BA 22 36 4.83 48 -27 -3 BA 22 
OFC 27 6.45 -51 18 -6 BA 47 341 16.53 -33 24 -6 BA 13 118 7.74 -30 24 -6 / 
 267 8.43 48 18 -6 BA 13 521 15.60 33 24 -6 / 120 6.62 48 21 -6 BA 47 
Parietal 1244 11.26 -42 -48 54 BA 40 1426 19.27 -36 -51 48 BA 40 695 8.59 -36 -51 48 BA 40 
 1122 10.06 36 -57 48 BA 7 1254 16.56 36 -57 51 BA 7 525 6.81 33 -57 48 BA 7 
Precuneus 145 6.21 -9 -69 48 BA 7 332 11.96 -21 -66 42 BA 7 114 5.47 -21 -69 45 BA 7 
 176 5.99 9 -66 48 BA 7 361 11.84 12 -72 45 BA 7 132 5.09 12 -72 48 BA 7 
STS 1030 11.26 -42 -48 54 BA 40 1287 19.27 -36 -51 48 BA 40 543 8.59 -36 -51 48 BA 40 
 961 10.06 36 -57 48 BA 7 842 16.56 36 -57 51 BA 7 359 6.81 33 -57 48 BA 7 
Temporal Pole 40 6.57 -57 9 0 BA 22 142 15.49 -54 15 -6 BA 22 70 7.24 -51 21 -12 BA 47 
 70 7.85 51 15 -3 BA 13 146 14.12 51 18 -9 / 63 5.99 48 21 -12 BA 47 
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Conjunction analysis 
ROIs cluster-size t-value x y z BAs 
ACC 25 4.79 -3 24 27 BA 32 
 76 5.73 9 24 30 BA 32 
DLPFC 102 7.27 -36 -6 57 BA 4 
 2 4.40 -15 3 63 BA 6 
 1 4.12 -33 54 12 BA 10 
 1 4.07 -27 0 45 BA 6 
 18 6.47 9 21 45 BA 6 
 1 4.08 9 18 57 BA 6 
mPFC 42 7.65 -3 21 45 BA 6 
 159 8.02 0 18 42 BA 6 
MTG 145 5.89 -51 -51 9 BA 39 
 36 4.83 48 -27 -3 BA 22 
OFC 17 6.96 -33 24 -6 BA 13 
 27 6.45 -51 18 -6 BA 47 
 112 6.62 48 21 -6 BA 47 
Parietal 691 8.59 -36 -51 48 BA 40 
 514 6.81 33 -57 48 BA 7 
Precuneus 92 5.47 -21 -69 45 BA 7 
 95 5.09 12 -72 48 BA 7 
 1 3.98 15 -69 36 BA 7 
STS 536 8.59 -36 -51 48 BA 40 
 1 4.25 -51 -30 -3 BA 21 
 358 6.81 33 -57 48 BA 7 
Temporal Pole 34 6.52 -51 15 -9 BA 22 
 47 5.99 48 21 -12 BA 47 
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Continuation of Appendix N 
Difference comparisons between conditions 
abstract - moral       abstract - neutral       moral - neutral       
 cluster-size t-value x y z BAs  cluster-size t-value x y z BAs  cluster-size t-value x y z BAs 
ACC 10 4.36 -6 15 27 BA 24 ACC 1 3.63 -3 39 27 BA 9 ACC 9 4.13 -3 51 18 BA 9 
 5 4.10 0 12 30 BA 24  1 3.85 0 36 30 BA 6  3 4.01 0 51 15 BA 9 
 5 3.75 6 27 27 BA 32 DLPFC 1 3.97 -27 12 54 BA 6 DLPFC 2 4.07 9 57 33 BA 8 
DLPFC 99 5.28 -30 -12 63 BA 6  15 4.33 9 24 57 BA 6 mPFC 60 4.69 -6 54 33 BA 8 
 1 3.92 -27 6 57 BA 6 mPFC 7 4.13 9 27 60 BA 6  84 4.82 6 57 33 BA 8 
 22 4.83 12 15 57 BA 6  3 4.01 -3 36 33 BA 6 MTG 8 4.36 -63 -12 -21 BA 21 
 7 4.28 27 54 0 BA 10  7 3.99 3 30 48 BA 8 OFC 3 4.17 -42 24 -18 BA 47 
mPFC 4 4.07 -3 21 45 BA 6 MTG 73 4.97 -54 -48 -9 BA 37 Parietal 32 4.79 -48 -63 36 BA 39 
 43 4.85 3 24 45 BA 32  382 7.18 60 -51 -9 BA 37 STS 32 4.79 -48 -63 36 BA 39 
 3 4.07 12 24 57 BA 6  2 4.05 51 -27 -6 BA 22        
MTG 14 5.14 -54 -48 -9 BA 37 OFC 53 5.42 48 18 -6 BA 13        
 34 4.74 -48 -69 3 BA 37  26 4.35 33 54 -12 BA 10        
 1 4.13 -63 -54 18 BA 22  1 4.07 24 24 -9 /        
 351 6.46 60 -51 -6 BA 37 Parietal 845 7.88 -45 -45 51 BA 40        
OFC 37 5.81 48 18 -6 BA 13  9 4.63 -60 -21 24 BA 40        
 19 4.50 42 51 -6 /  904 7.18 36 -57 42 BA 39        
Parietal 970 9.15 -51 -45 51 BA 40 Precuneus 24 4.23 -9 -66 48 BA 7        
 915 7.81 36 -57 48 BA 7  2 4.08 -18 -72 48 BA 7        
Precuneus 17 4.22 -12 -66 48 BA 7  20 4.45 6 -66 48 BA 7        
 1 3.91 -18 -72 48 BA 7 STS 723 7.88 -45 -45 51 BA 40        
 22 4.66 6 -66 48 BA 7  8 4.63 -60 -21 24 BA 40        
STS 814 9.15 -51 -45 51 BA 40  4 4.40 -63 -57 18 BA 22        
 2 4.13 -63 -54 18 BA 22  910 7.18 36 -57 42 BA 39        
 934 7.81 36 -57 48 BA 7 Temporal Pole 19 4.91 51 15 -3 BA 13        
Temporal Pole 2 3.87 -57 9 0 BA 22               
 34 5.72 51 15 -3 BA 13               
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Continuation of Appendix N 
Difference comparisons between conditions 
moral - abstract       neutral - abstract       neutral - moral   
 cluster-size t-value x y z BAs  cluster-size t-value x y z BA's    
DLPFC 3 4.05 -15 54 33 BA 8 Temporal Pole 1 3.91 -54 15 -24 BA 38  no significances  
mPFC 64 5.09 -9 54 36 BA 8  2 3.86 -60 6 -18 BA 21    
MTG 64 5.26 -57 -9 -15 BA 21           
Precuneus 6 4.09 -6 -51 24 BA 31           
STS 8 5.26 -57 -9 -15 BA 21           
Temporal Pole 40 5.09 -57 3 -18 BA 21           
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(Statutatory declaration) 
Eidesstattliche Erklärung 
 
 
 
„Ich erkläre: Ich habe die vorgelegte Dissertation selbständig und ohne unerlaubte fremde 
Hilfe und nur mit den Hilfen angefertigt, die ich in der Dissertation angegeben habe. Alle 
Textstellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen sind, und 
alle Angaben, die auf mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. 
Bei den von mir durchgeführten und in der Dissertation erwähnten Untersuchungen habe ich 
die Grundsätze wissenschaftlicher Praxis, wie sie in der „Satzung der Justus-Liebig-
Universität Gießen zur Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis“ niedergelegt sind, 
eingehalten.“ 
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        Patrick S. Wiedenmann 
